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Abstract 
 
This thesis forwards the concept of the ‘Old Western Men’, a phrase borrowed from C. S. 
Lewis, who used this term to assert the presence of a ‘Great Divide’ in history. Modernity, 
he believed, was essentially secular, unlike what had preceded it. In this sense, he was in 
opposition to it as a Christian. This thesis’s unique contribution to the current literature 
is that it applies Lewis’s identification of the Old Western Men to a broader spectrum of 
intellectuals and artists, previously referred to, more narrowly, as the ‘Catholic literary 
revival’. This Ph.D. locates such a revival within a broader ‘religious mode of response’ to 
modernity, which such men of letters as Lewis believed to be fundamentally materialistic; 
meaning that modernity denied the existence of an objective spiritual reality. Chapter 
one describes the general concept of the Old Western Men, including how it confronted 
secular modernity by attempting to reconcile mind with matter as part of an intellectual 
via media (middle way); it will also examine the importance that some intellectuals 
invested in the concept of imaginative understanding. Chapter two focuses on an Old 
Western emphasis on the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world, one that was essentially 
sacramental, having come to reconcile reason with the imagination. Chapter three 
forwards the Old Western notion of thinking ‘christianly’ by cultivating a divine 
indifference to worldly catastrophe. This also entails examining the concept of self-
sanctification, as well as how the Old Western Men responded to the violence of their 
century by inviting the supernatural into their lives. Chapter four concludes the thesis by 
examining the spiritual/cultural device of Christendom as a redemptive discourse 
combatting European nationalism and racialism.   
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Introduction 
 
 
Writing in Exile’s Return (1934), the American literary critic Malcolm Cowley observed 
how T. S. Eliot’s poem The Waste Land (1922) ‘agreed with all our recipes and 
prescriptions of what a great modern poem should be’.1 Here he lauded Eliot’s noted 
literary modernism. However, Cowley also explained how he and his counterparts also 
‘made private reservations’.2 What concerned them, he remembered, was ‘the idea that 
the poem set forth’.3 For it was his notion that Eliot’s The Waste Land heralded a ‘moving 
toward two extremes […] [and] the first extreme was that of authority and divinely 
inspired tradition as represented by the Catholic Church; the second was Communism’.4 
In this sense, then, the poem ‘made visible a […] division among writers that was not a 
division between capitalist and proletarian’.5 In essence, then, there was something 
evident here that went beyond the typical, identifiably Marxist, division of the oppressor 
and the oppressed. Perhaps what Cowley perceived in The Waste Land was what Eliot 
stated clearly in 1932, then: that ‘the real conflict is not between one set of moral 
prejudices and another, but between the theistic and the aesthetic faith; and it is all for 
the best that the division should be sharply drawn’.6  
 
Cowley recalled that he was ‘forced by Eliot to make a preliminary choice’.7 And he 
‘instinctively rejected’ Eliot’s side of the division, which was the side of theistic faith.8 My 
thesis is, in essence, concerned with ascertaining, as well as confirming, the presence of 
one of those ‘extremes’ suggested by Cowley in 1934: the side of ‘divinely inspired’ 
tradition that Eliot represented. It may be that Cowley’s use of ‘Catholic’ to define Eliot’s 
side of the division was particularly apt too. 
 
My thesis rests on the foundation of four recent works identifying the presence of a 
Catholic ‘revival’ in literature in twentieth century British culture. In 2003, Ian Ker, in The 
Catholic Revival in English Literature, 1845-1961, detailed how ‘Catholicism informed and 
                                                          
1 Malcom Cowley, Exile’s Return (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1934), 124. 
2 Ibid., 125. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 128. 
5 Ibid., 127. 
6 Quoted in Barry Spurr, ‘Anglo-Catholic in Religion’: T. S. Eliot and Christianity (Cambridge: The 
Lutterworth Press, 2010), 2. 
7 Cowley, Exile’s Return, 128. 
8 Ibid. 
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shaped a considerable and impressive corpus of literature in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries’.9 Joseph Pearce’s Literary Converts: Spiritual Inspiration in an Age of 
Unbelief (2006) also revealed ‘a Christian literary revival which, throughout the twentieth 
century, represented an evocative artistic and intellectual response to the prevailing 
agnosticism of the age’.10 In The Making and Unmaking of the English Catholic Intellectual 
Community, 1910-1950 (2009), James R. Lothian, too, identified the presence of a group 
of ‘Catholic intellectuals in interwar England [who] were not a disparate collection of 
individuals but a genuine community united not only by close personal ties but especially 
by ideology’.11 Most recently, in The Third Spring: G. K. Chesterton, Graham Greene, 
Christopher Dawson & David Jones (2012), Adam Schwartz wrote similarly, of a ‘Roman 
Catholic rebellion against modern unbelief […] in twentieth-century British culture’.12 It is 
a central tenet of my thesis that this core of Roman Catholic intellectuals, revealed to us 
by Ker, Pearce, Lothian, and Schwartz, is illustrative of a broader spirit at large in British 
culture at the time, which Eliot also stood for, but one that was not specifically Roman 
Catholic, nor even necessarily Christian – but, rather, one formulated around the 
fundamental discourse on the existence, as well as the continuing relevance, of the 
concept of the supernatural; in other words, a religious worldview. This inevitably 
involved a vital rumination on the supposed secularisation of Britain, in particular, in the 
modern world, which was understood to be synonymous with modernity itself, as 
entailing a fundamental abolition of the, so far historically universal, conception of a 
sacred universe. 
 
My thesis raises a point recently delineated by Glenn W. Olsen in his work The Turn to 
Transcendence: The Role of Religion in the Twenty-First Century (2010): that, though there 
are ‘various competing modernities’13, modernity, at its core, involves ‘a muffling of 
transcendence’.14 And when we speak of an apparent ‘loss of a sense of transcendence’, 
                                                          
9 Ian Ker, The Catholic Revival in English Literature, 1845-1961 (2003; Leominster: Gracewing, 
2004), 7. 
10 Joseph Pearce, Literary Converts: Spiritual Inspiration in an Age of Unbelief (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2006), xi. 
11 James R. Lothian, The Making and Unmaking of the English Catholic Intellectual Community, 
1910-1950 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), xii. 
12 Adam Schwartz, The Third Spring: G. K. Chesterton, Graham Greene, Christopher Dawson & 
David Jones (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 11. 
13 Glenn W. Olsen, The Turn to Transcendence: The Role of Religion in the Twenty-First Century 
(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 114. 
14 Ibid., 176. 
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we mean ‘the loss of a sense that there is a reality beyond the visible’.15 Olsen ‘relates 
this loss to such things typical of modernity’.16 In this sense, I will identify intellectuals 
and artists – whom Olsen, in his work, elects to term ‘transcendentals’ – whose work 
appears to ‘express the more-than-world discovered within the world’.17  
 
Like Olsen, Alan D. Gilbert, in The Making of Post-Christian Britain: A History of the 
Secularization of Modern Society (1980), expressed his view that ‘the very notion of a 
religionless culture is so distinctively modern a phenomenon’.18 This ‘notion’ quite 
notably occupied the thought of Peter L. Berger, who, in The Sacred Canopy: Elements of 
a Sociological Theory of Religion (1967), wrote of a ‘crisis of plausibility’ at the heart of 
modernity19, in which ‘the religious legitimations of the world’ had ‘lost their plausibility 
not only for a few intellectuals and other marginal individuals but for broad masses of 
entire societies’.20 This entailed, or perhaps brought about, secularisation itself, which, as 
Berger wrote, meant in part ‘the process by which sectors of society and culture are 
removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols’.21 However, this 
thesis is primarily concerned with what Berger termed ‘a secularization of consciousness’, 
meaning ‘that the modern West has produced an increasing number of individuals who 
look upon the world and their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations’.22 
It is important that we note this, since the side of the ‘division’ that this thesis will 
establish was very much a response to this apparent shift in ‘consciousness’. Although it 
was not taken in by it, it was, however, obliged to come to terms with it – and, indeed, 
confront its reality, a reality that they, much like Berger, believed was rooted in a turning 
away from the ‘sacred canopy’. In other words, truths formulated around, and justified 
by, ‘a “right” relationship with the sacred cosmos’23 were no longer taken as ‘self-
evident’.24 Moreover, it appeared to be a specifically Protestant development. 
 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 209. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 158. 
18 Alan D. Gilbert, The Making of Post-Christian Britain: A History of the Secularization of Modern 
Society (London: Longman, 1980), xii. 
19 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (1967; New 
York: Anchor Books, 1990), 156. 
20 Ibid., 124. 
21 Ibid., 107. 
22 Ibid, 108. 
23 Ibid., 26. 
24 Ibid., 46. 
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In 1967, Berger described Protestantism ‘in terms of an immense shrinkage in the scope 
of the sacred in reality, as compared with its Catholic adversary’.25 ‘Protestantism’, he 
wrote, divests ‘itself as much as possible from the three most ancient and most powerful 
concomitants of the sacred – mystery, miracle, and magic’.26 Olsen, too, has noted that 
‘the Catholic category of mystery, a reality not discernible by the senses, tended to 
disappear from many forms of Protestantism’.27 As well as this, but in connection to it, 
there is the assumption here that, as Berger contends, ‘the “fullness” of the Catholic 
universe’ provides a bulwark against modernity itself.28 For Berger is of the tradition 
rooted in Max Weber’s observations on the proposed link between Protestantism and 
modernity; Berger maintaining ‘that Protestantism served as a historically decisive 
prelude to secularization’.29 Here, then, secularisation is seen to be synonymous with the 
modern world. Therefore, ‘if one keeps in mind the Protestant development’30 – where 
now it might be said that the Protestant ‘no longer lives in a world ongoingly penetrated 
by sacred things and forces’31 – ‘the profound conservatism’ of Roman Catholicism may 
be relatable, then, to its consistent elevation of the supernatural as a reality in the world 
of time and place.32 In this sense, too, Berger goes as far as to credit conservatives within 
the Roman Catholic Church ‘with a good deal of sociological instinct’ in placing a very 
great emphasis on the supernatural as a reality.33 This may be significant, since many of 
the persons featured in this thesis were, indeed, Roman Catholic. This returns us to the 
supposed Catholic ‘revival’ in the arts in Britain in the twentieth century.  
 
This connection between conservatism and Catholicism has been noted well. Alan D. 
Gilbert observed in 1980 that Catholicism in Britain had generally ‘stood firm against the 
temptation to compromise with the emerging post-Christian culture’.34 While in The Third 
Spring (2012), Schwartz wrote of the ‘consistent, stalwart rebuttals of modernity’s first 
principles and their perceived religious and cultural consequences from a distinctly 
Roman Catholic perspective’ in the twentieth century; a manner of ‘religious protest 
                                                          
25 Ibid., 111. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Olsen, The Turn to Transcendence, 237. 
28 Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 111. 
29 Ibid., 113. 
30 Ibid., 170. 
31 Ibid., 111. 
32 Ibid., 170. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Gilbert, The Making of Post-Christian Britain, 138. 
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against liberal agnosticism and its allegedly secular, progressive, presentist, and 
utilitarian ramifications’.35 Pearce, too, claims that ‘to many […] twentieth-century 
literary converts [to Catholicism] an acceptance of God went hand in hand with a 
rejection of “the world” and its materialism’.36 Returning to Berger, it seems that 
conservatism in the early years of the twentieth century was very much allied to a vision 
of a sacred reality that, it has been argued, was far more suited to a Roman Catholic 
outlook than a Protestant one. Moreover, the adoption of Catholicism as a ‘rejection’ of 
the material world raises the possibility of a significant counterculture at work, one that 
was formed around an affirmation of the supernatural itself. This, in fact, has been noted 
to some extent previously. 
 
Lothian has written of ‘an articulate counterculture of self-consciously Catholic writers 
and artists’.37 Schwartz, too, couched his work on Catholic literary converts in terms of 
‘the culmination of countercultural convictions’.38 Humphrey Carpenter concludes, 
similarly, that ‘the ideas and interests of the Inklings’ – the notable literary grouping at 
Oxford formed around C. S. Lewis – ‘contrasted sharply with the general intellectual and 
literary spirit of the nineteen-twenties and thirties’.39 Pearce and Ker write in much the 
same manner, of a group of primarily Catholic writers confronting an ‘an age of unbelief’. 
The key word here that repeats itself is ‘countercultural’. It has certainly become a 
byword for many of the writers addressed in this thesis. David Harden has recently 
expounded his view that G. K. Chesterton, the Catholic writer, and Lewis, in essence, 
‘write against the modern age’, forwarding their ‘countercultural values’ in the effort to 
‘confront the increasingly commercial, materialist, utilitarian, ends-justify-the-means 
culture of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries’.40 James V. Schall, a self-described 
‘long-time reader of Chesterton’, proclaimed him ‘the most countercultural figure in the 
modern world’.41 As for J. R. R. Tolkien and the Inklings, The Oxford Encyclopaedia of 
British Literature refers to this grouping in terms of their ‘unabashed countercultural 
                                                          
35 Schwartz, The Third Spring, 375. 
36 Pearce, Literary Converts, 324. 
37 Lothian, The Making and Unmaking, xi. 
38 Schwartz, The Third Spring, 8. 
39 Humphrey Carpenter, The Inklings: C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, Charles Williams and their 
Friends (1978; London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006), ix-x. 
40 David Harden, Placed People: Rootedness in G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and Wendell Berry 
(Eugene: Pickwick, 2015), 10. 
41 James V. Schall, Political Philosophy and Revelation: A Catholic Reading (Washington D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 235. 
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convictions about the world at large and the world to come’42 ‘The spiritual depth’ of 
Tolkien’s work is a ‘countercultural response to modernity’, writes Michael Tomko.43 
Jerome P. Baggett includes the Catholic convert Christopher Dawson’s output as a 
historian as ‘a kind of countercultural epistemology [...] amid the chaotic fray of modern 
life’.44 What emerges here is a vital linkage between avowals of spiritual value, opposed 
to material circumstance, and, in the twentieth century, this being taken to mean an 
espousal that is fundamentally contrary to a prevailing, identifiably ‘modern’, ethic. We 
should note this as we continue.  
 
While I think that this common identification of a Roman Catholic ‘counterculture’ 
amongst intellectuals is correct, I also believe that this classification is in danger of 
reducing the significance of this grouping to a footnote or niche in the historiography of 
British intellectual history. It is my purpose to affirm, in one sense, the presence, already 
established, of a spirit that set out consciously to ‘offer some little opposition’, as Evelyn 
Waugh put it, and ‘stand out against the tenor of the age and not go flopping along’.45 
However, I also seek to show how such a counterculture was much more than ‘some little 
opposition’.  
 
Lewis declared in 1954 that his friend Tolkien’s work The Fellowship of the Ring – what 
might be considered to be a countercultural work, I shall argue – published that same 
year, struck ‘like lightning from a clear sky’.46 Actually, that sky was a considerably stormy 
one, this thesis will point out. It was not just a bolt of lightning from a primarily Catholic 
heaven either. For when we broaden our view to encompass the diverse range of writers, 
artists and composers who, to varying degrees, appeared to reject materialism in favour 
of a vision that was essentially supernatural or ‘spiritual’ (the other word that I shall 
employ), we see that in terms of a pronounced divide in thought, particularly evident 
between the two world wars, this much vaunted ‘counterculture’ may well have 
constituted a majority – fulfilling Waugh’s own decree, in 1962, that ‘an artist must be a 
                                                          
42 David Scott Kastan, ed., The Oxford Encyclopaedia of British Literature, Volume 1 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 105. 
43 Paul E. Kerry, ed., The Ring and the Cross: Christianity and The Lord of the Rings (2011; 
Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2013), 207. 
44 Jerome P. Baggett, Sense of the Faithful: How American Catholics Live Their Faith (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 7. 
45 Quoted in Jeffrey Heath, Picturesque Prison: Evelyn Waugh and His Writing (1982; Kingston 
and Montreal: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 1983), 38. 
46 Lewis, C. S., ‘The Gods Return to Earth’, Time and Tide, August 14, 1954. 
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reactionary’, meaning offering ‘some little opposition’.47 In recognising this possibility, we 
might well consider what actually defines a ‘counterculture’. Even if it confronts the 
prevailing ‘spirit’ of an age, is it still a counterculture if its adherents form one side of an 
evenly matched divide? It is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer this question. It 
will, however, forward the prospect of a diverse range of thinkers forwarding a religious 
mode of response to the modern world, therefore representing a ‘competing’ narrative, 
perhaps, combatting the ‘secularization of consciousness’ mentioned before by Berger. 
 
Identifying and describing a particular philosophical ethic requires that we consider a 
number of works produced by a select number of writers, musicians and artists. Such 
primary sources will serve to underline this thesis’s central point of a ‘religious mode of 
response’. The interdisciplinary nature of this work will, I think, justify dubbing this 
twentieth century rejoinder a ‘mode’ or ‘ethic’. As mentioned before, I will make use of 
a solid base of secondary literature on the Catholic revival. However, my thesis will also 
take a similar approach to that of John Holloway’s work The Victorian Sage: Studies in 
Argument (1953), in that there is, indeed, a particular ethic and way of looking at the 
world that is the basis of the ‘sage’. However, where Holloway sought to identify the sage 
through ‘seven separate studies of writers […] pursuing among other things the sage’s 
own distinctive task […] by the essentially individualist methods of the artist’, I will wield 
a different method by forwarding each chapter as a concatenation of individuals pursuing 
a particular point.48 Each chapter, then, will be a study of individuals and their work, 
rather than a single individual. Taken as a whole, this fundamental diversity will affirm 
the general drive of this thesis: which is to forward an ethic that was, indeed, as pointed 
as it was diverse.  
 
Elucidating this reality necessitates an admittedly premeditated methodology 
emphasising broader commonalities rather than localised discords. There are inherent 
problems with this approach. Schwartz, for example, cautions us against taking a too 
‘impressionistic approach’ toward this subject, meaning that we forward a panoply of 
biographical examples, which, as a result of prioritising ‘breadth over depth’, might 
produce ‘insufficiently substantiated’ conclusions.49 The problem of ‘failing to treat many 
                                                          
47 Quoted in Heath, Picturesque Prison, 38. 
48 John Holloway, The Victorian Sage: Studies in Argument (London: Macmillan & Co, Ltd, 1953), 
290. 
49 Schwartz, The Third Spring, 12. 
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of these thinkers in sufficient depth’ is an issue that Lothian raises too.50 Also, Bradley J. 
Birzer has criticised, rightly I think, the glossing over of the inner divisions of some of the 
intellectuals I am concerned with here; ‘most Catholic scholars’ ignoring, for instance, the 
possibility of a divide, ‘real or contrived […] between the neo-Thomists and 
Augustinians’.51 Nevertheless, it is my purpose in this thesis to reveal a fundamental unity 
that necessitates a focus on unifying factors, coalescing around the advocating of the 
supernatural as a reality in the realm of time and place. Putting the dangers marked by 
Schwartz, Lothian and Birzer aside, though not forgetting them, there is perhaps an 
opposite problem here, that of concentrating too specifically and missing the broader 
picture. In standing too close to a cathedral we fail to ascertain its true outline, as well as 
its situation in the surrounding landscape. In a way, such work on a Catholic literary 
revival, for example, has stood too close to the building. This is not really a flaw, however. 
The negatives of either approach can be offset, in part, at least by acknowledging them 
as such. Each may, of course, supplement the other.  In this case, the focus of my thesis 
is founded on establishing outlines rather than details – though this will not always be 
the case. There is a balance to be sought here. This will operate on two levels: within the 
family; and without. This means that I will clarify commonalities, on one level, within the 
stated Catholic ‘revival’ itself, as well as, on a second level, forwarding an evident 
harmony, in terms of a rejection of wholesale materialism, amongst a broader set of 
intellectuals and artists. So it is worth briefly examining the first level here, since this 
brings me into contact with Lothian’s recent work, in particular. 
 
Lothian, in The Making and Unmaking of the English Catholic Intellectual Community, 
1910-1950 (2009), has sought to emphasise a divergence between ‘the political and 
economic focus of the Bellocians’, formed around the Roman Catholic writer Hilaire 
Belloc, between the two world wars, and the Dawsonsite ‘challenge […] from within’, 
which, ‘in contrast’, stressed ‘theology and philosophy’, and was centred around the 
emerging influence of the Catholic convert and historian Christopher Dawson, just 
before, and during, the time of the Second World War.52 Lothian has presented a 
compelling case, arguing that Belloc and his compatriots were essentially political in their 
outlook, much like Cardinal Henry Edward Manning, who Lothian argues anticipated the 
                                                          
50 Lothian, The Making and Unmaking, xvii. 
51 Bradley J. Birzer, Sanctifying the World: The Augustinian Life and Mind of Christopher Dawson 
(Front Royal: Christendom Press, 2007), xii. 
52 Lothian, The Making and Unmaking, xiii. 
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Bellocians, while the Dawsonites  tended to consider ‘the theological issues and spiritual 
concerns that preoccupied [Cardinal John Henry] Newman’.53 While I think Lothian is 
correct to state this difference, which is clearly demonstrated, particularly in the output 
of Belloc and Chesterton, as well as, contrastingly, ‘the Chelsea group’ and the advent, in 
1926, of the publishing house Sheed and Ward54, I seek to show that there was a great 
deal  of theological and philosophical conformity between the so-called Bellocians and 
Dawsonites. As Lothian himself has stated, ‘it would be remiss, indeed, not to 
acknowledge the similarities and personal links even between Dawson himself and the 
Bellocians’, for ‘much of his diagnosis of the maladies of contemporary Europe were so 
similar to those of Belloc, Chesterton’.55 ‘There was no absolute dichotomy.’56  
 
As well as this, Lothian, determined to examine the ‘social thought rather than the quality 
of […] [the] fiction or poetry that united the Catholic writers of the era’, has concluded 
that, initially, ‘Belloc, the mediocre novelist, was much more important to the English 
Catholic intellectual community than Chesterton’.57 His argument here is convincing. As 
my own work will show, confirming Lothian’s point, Chesterton’s influence was most 
keenly felt, and indeed expressed, later, in the output of the Dawsonites. But there is a 
further point to be made here. Much like Lothian’s work, this thesis will resist addressing 
such intellectuals ‘in the context of a “literary revival” […] selected via aesthetic criteria’.58 
However, following this rule, as well as attempting to advance a persona purely 
‘Bellocian’, it may be that Lothian has been unfair to Belloc, in that he has jettisoned any 
such ‘literary’ work of Belloc’s, such as The Four Men: A Farrago (1911), which is actually 
far from being mediocre, in favour of advancing his Bellocian/Dawsonite partition. I 
believe that Lothian’s division here can survive the intrusion of The Four Men: A Farrago. 
In this sense, it is my purpose not to contradict Lothian but ‘acknowledge the similarities’, 
not only within the boundaries of the now acknowledged ‘English Catholic intellectual 
community’59, which of course was in need of acknowledgment, but further afield. It is 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 11. 
54 Ibid., 229. As Lothian writes, ‘in contrast to the Bellocian[s]’, Sheed and Ward, under the 
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my point that this grouping, which has recently been given its due, might now be 
considered more broadly and located within an even more considerable context, that of, 
for want of a better term, the ‘Old Western Men’ – a phrase employed by Lewis in 1954, 
which I shall adopt in my thesis. In essence, then, Lothian’s division of Bellocian and 
Dawsonsite finds its place within an even greater dissection, which itself deserves to be 
explored, but then attached to an even broader concord in spirit. 
 
It is also important, I think, that we continue to make vital distinctions. This unity that we 
speak of only went so far. To illustrate the limits of my claim, my final chapter, in 
particular, will turn to what I will argue was a ‘Catholic’ monopolisation of the spectre of 
Christendom as a response to the rise of nationalism, and Nazism in particular, on the 
continent, as well as its asserted corollary, political internationalism, which was viewed 
as being equally inimical. Christendom, or rather the memory of it, was a vital possession 
of Roman Catholics such as Chesterton and Belloc, and later Dawson too, who were far 
less willing to accept the claims of the so-called ‘Whig interpretation of history’, which 
was a principally Protestant reading of the national, as well as the European, past. In this 
sense, I shall argue, Catholic intellectuals were especially sensitive to themes of 
nationalism and internationalism, which, it might be said, predominated much 
intellectual discourse in Britain, particularly between the two world wars. But it will also 
be my point to illustrate how figures such as M. R. James, the writer of ghost stories, the 
artist Paul Nash and John Ireland, the composer – who will also form part of my thesis – 
though concerning themselves with the theme of the supernatural, were wholly exempt 
from such discourses on Christendom and politics. In terms of a consideration of the 
relevance of the supernatural in the world of politics, both national and international, we 
shall see that Roman Catholic and Anglo-Catholic writers really did represent a 
‘counterculture’, never more so when they found themselves questioning the prevailing 
political doctrines and narratives of the day, in which they were an actual minority. 
However, in doing so, we will also see that Lothian’s division between Bellocians and 
Dawsonites is not always workable. Therefore, in revealing one divide within a 
commonality we unearth a so far unacknowledged unity, but on a smaller, far more 
localised scale. Here, then, we guard against a wholesale impressionism that might, 
otherwise, weaken this thesis. 
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Now we must turn to the context of this combat of ideas, which, I think, represents a vital 
shift in thought from 1900 onwards. Taking an impressionistic approach will allow us to 
perceive an especially Christian – though not implicitly Roman Catholic (or indeed Anglo-
Catholic) – engagement with modernity. Above all, this will bring the thought and output 
of the Inklings into relation with Lothian’s more strictly Catholic Bellocians and 
Dawsonites. Indeed, the four recent accounts on the Catholic intellectual revival have 
concentrated on what Ker, for example, has deemed an ‘explicitly Catholic literature’ in 
twentieth century Britain.60 Because of this, this group – congregating, in particular, 
around the work and consequent influence of G. K. Chesterton – has found itself 
separated from another group, which, though not wholly Catholic, was in close alignment 
with it: the ‘Inklings’, the name given to what Carpenter, in 1978, narrowed down to the 
literary grouping of C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, and Charles Williams. In Romantic Religion: 
A Study of Owen Barfield, C. S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and J. R. R. Tolkien (2006), R. J. 
Reilly included Barfield in this consortium of what he termed ‘Romantic’ Christian (not 
always Catholic) writers. For though Tolkien was a Catholic, Lewis, Williams and Barfield 
were Anglican. Consequently, for the sake of neatness, perhaps, Lewis, a significant 
figure, has been jettisoned by historians from the narrative of a ‘Catholic’ revival; while 
Tolkien, when considered as part of a larger grouping of likeminded writers, has been 
largely considered within the rather more ‘Anglican’ alignment of the Inklings. While the 
elevation of the Inklings makes sense in terms of this group’s geographic location, being 
based predominately in Oxford, there was, in fact, a very great concurrence in thought 
between what has been generally been referred to as the Inklings and the so far 
separately considered Catholic revival.  
 
The same might also be said of the Anglo-Catholic poet Eliot, who has generally been 
considered as part of a broader, but even more separate, movement of ‘literary 
modernism’. This view, of Eliot’s place within the various intellectual and literary 
groupings in twentieth century culture, has recently begun to change. Barry Spurr’s 2010 
work ‘Anglo-Catholic in Religion’: T. S. Eliot and Christianity signalled a shift in focus away 
from Eliot’s literary modernism toward the Christianity and conservatism expressed in his 
writings. This has brought Eliot into relation with a host of Christian writers, as has been 
revealed, for instance, in T. S. Eliot and Christian Tradition (2014), a collection of essays, 
edited by Benjamin G. Lockerd, representing an essential addition to Spurr’s effort to 
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assess the neglected aspect of Eliot’s considerable religiosity. Lockerd, especially, has 
established a vital linkage between Eliot’s developed Christian leanings and the work of 
the historian Christopher Dawson – a figure of some note, who will become familiar to us 
as this thesis develops. In this sense, it is my purpose here to gather together a not 
inconsiderable number of separate threads, some more separate than others, into a 
comprehensive spiritual ethic; or what Callum G. Brown terms ‘discursive Christianity’. 
 
The drive of my thesis is founded, in part, on Brown’s 2001 conception, in The Death of 
Christian Britain: Understanding Secularism, 1800-2000, of ‘discursive Christianity’. 
Brown defines the Christian ‘religiosity of the industrial era’ as, in essence, ‘the people’s 
subscription to protocols of personal identity which they derive from Christian 
expectations, or discourses, evident in their own time and place’.61 By ‘protocols’ Brown 
takes into account a broad spread of ‘rituals or customs of behaviour, economic activity, 
dress, speech and so on which are collectively promulgated as necessary for Christian 
identity’.62 These are then ‘prescribed or implied in discourses’, which might be official, 
public or, indeed, private.63 Such ‘discourses’ may be ‘discerned in the “voices” of the 
people’, he suggests, but also in ‘the dominant media of the time (such as popular books, 
magazines and religious tracts)’.64 Here, then, Brown writes, we may observe ‘a personal 
process of subscription to often very public discourses’, as well as an adoption of ‘very 
private (indeed sometimes intensely secret) protocols related to those discourses’; 
relating, that is, to the presiding ‘Christian’ culture.65 The key phrase here, in terms of 
‘discursive Christianity’, is ‘subscription’, which is the result of, and indeed a particular 
contribution to, an ongoing and identifiably Christian correspondence: 
 
This subscription is thus not necessarily an action which unifies 
individuals’ behaviour or religious beliefs, but it creates a compelling 
religious culture (in the jargon a “discursivity”) to the construction of 
religiosity in the society at large.66 
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Brown takes his ‘discursive’ conception of Christian religiosity ‘as the prerequisite of all 
other roles of religion in society: of institutional, intellectual, functional and diffusive 
Christianity’.67 For it is his point, essentially, that for Christianity ‘to achieve popular 
participation, support or even acquiescence’ – which it must if it is to gain any 
‘democratic’ significance in a ‘society free from state regulation of religious habits’ – ‘it 
must have a base of discursivity’.68 In this sense, Brown concludes, ‘secularisation […] is 
inconceivable without decay in discursive religiosity’, the result of a fundamental ‘loss of 
popular acceptance and recirculation of those discourses’.69 In assessing a supposed 
religious mode of response, this thesis is also, in a sense, identifying such a form of 
‘discursive Christianity’. 
  
As Berger wrote in 1967, ‘men forget. They must, therefore, be reminded over and over 
again. Indeed, it may be argued that one of the oldest and most important prerequisites 
for the establishment of culture is the institution of such “reminders”.’70 ‘Religious ritual’, 
Berger asserts, was ‘a crucial instrument of this process of “reminding”’.71 David Torevell 
elucidated this point to a greater degree in Losing the Sacred: Ritual, Modernity and 
Liturgical Reform (2000). ‘The unique power and potential of ritualized liturgy’ is in its 
ability to ‘transform individual and collective identities and […] reaffirm the values and 
beliefs on which a religious community is based’.72 This ‘potential’, he writes, was given 
up, however, in the wake of the Reformation, when ‘the Protestant emphasis on the word 
coupled with the emergence of a highly suspicious [Cartesian] attitude to the body, 
ensured […] a far more cerebral approach to the sacred’, one that ultimately undermined 
the potency of Christian ritual.73 It is, in part, the purpose of this thesis to forward the 
idea that, in response to this loss, identified by Torevell, and indeed Berger, the Old 
Western Men, a sort of ‘discursive Christianity’, were in the business of ‘reminding’ – 
attempting, in the absence of ritual, to foster a community united around the recognition 
of the supernatural. Ironically – since many of them were Catholic – this was to be 
attempted through the media of their day, which was the written word.  
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Another point must be made here, relating to the place of the Old Western Men within 
the broader view of intellectual history itself. J. W. Burrow, in A Liberal Descent: Victorian 
Historians and the English Past (1981), deemed Chesterton and Belloc ‘a twentieth-
century epilogue’ to ‘the radically disaffected, overtly reactionary strand in the English 
approach to the past’, which ‘in the middle years of the nineteenth century’, in such 
figures as Augustus Pugin, John Ruskin and William Morris, ‘constantly called for […] the 
conception of a medieval utopia’.74 Although Burrow was, I think, right in supposing that 
Chesterton and Belloc were part of what was, indeed, a ‘radical critique of capitalism’, as 
well as ‘a repudiation of Whiggish complacency about national history’, the supposition 
that they were no more than an ‘epilogue’ deserves some attention.75 It is one of the aims 
of this thesis to show that this ‘overtly reactionary’ coda, in Chesterton and Belloc, was 
no meagre ‘nineteenth century’ regurgitation, but a genuine ‘reactionary strand’, or 
rather, a competing narrative that went much further in actually confronting the 
perceived societal ailments of the so-called ‘modern age’. Nor was this protest a 
postscript; being instead a vital expression of religious dissent that survived well into the 
twentieth century in yet another generation of ‘radically disaffected’ intransigents: 
including Waugh, Dawson and Eliot. What the following chapters will attempt to do, then, 
is disassociate Chesterton and Belloc from Burrow’s sweeping, and I think somewhat 
flippant, classification of a homogeneous ‘Tory-Radical critique of English society […] from 
the 1820s onwards’.76 My thesis will conform more to Michael Alexander’s notion of a 
fundamental move toward ‘dissent’77 rooted in ‘an Edwardian relaunch’ of 
medievalism.78  
 
In Medievalism: The Middle Ages in Modern England (2007) Alexander touched upon the 
idea of ‘a second Medieval Revival’79, which, unlike the first, ‘was consciously Christian’.80 
Alexander observes that medievalists belonging to the first revival of interest in the 
Middle Ages, in the nineteenth century – those such as Thomas Carlyle and John Ruskin 
                                                          
74 J. W. Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 240, 241. 
75 Ibid., 241. 
76 Ibid., 240. 
77 Michael Alexander, Medievalism: The Middle Ages in Modern England (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007), xxv. 
78 Ibid., 212. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 265. 
26 
 
– had ‘little to say about the Christianity of Britain in the past’.81 Although ‘Carlyle 
ventured boldly into medieval social history’, for instance, in Past and Present (1843), it 
was the ‘“social vitality”’ of the monastery, rather than ‘the monastic life of prayer and 
worship’, which impressed itself upon him.82 Unlike Burrow, then, Alexander has made 
what I think is a vital and necessary distinction between nineteenth century ‘thinkers such 
as Cobbett, Carlyle and Ruskin’ – a first wave, it might be said, of medievalists, who were 
‘the first to see and to seek to understand the uglier effects of industrialism and 
capitalism’ – and early twentieth century thinkers such as Chesterton and Waugh, whose 
minds turned more toward the Christian spirit underlying the medieval period itself.83 As 
Paul E. Kerry and Laura Judd write, in Thomas Carlyle Resartus (2010), Carlyle in his 
writings opposed ‘the model of positivist history, in which history leads teleologically or 
progressively toward a superior present state’.84 This at least led to a reappraisal of the 
Middle Ages, even if it was ultimately a superficial one. It might be said, then, that 
Chesterton represented a further development, as Alexander suggests; a development 
that was really religious in impetus. And in a sense more sophisticated, as well as 
authentic. I want to develop this idea; and also build upon a formulation made, in 2014, 
by Roger Scruton, which is also related to medievalism, but also secularism.  
 
Scruton has made the point that Matthew Arnold and Friedrich Nietzsche embody a 
‘distinction between two kinds of loss’.85 While Arnold’s anxious cogitations on a loss of 
faith, in such works as Dover Beach (1867), were really a ‘subdued lamentation’, marking 
‘a personal tragedy, to be regretted but concealed’, Nietzsche’s sense of ‘loss’ was, 
conversely, ‘an absolute loss, not only a loss of inward conviction but also of the outward 
symbols of faith […] an existential transfiguration, to be accepted and affirmed’, there 
being no other ‘alternative’.86 Interestingly, Scruton argues that Arnold’s ‘very English 
melancholy’ marked ‘a not-quite-resigned attempt to fit the world of unbelief and 
scientific scepticism into the Gothic frame of Anglican architecture’.87 In this sense, too, 
‘the Gothic revival’ was the ‘idealized expression’ of a sort of ‘shoring up [of] the religious 
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worldview by replicating its outward signs’, attempting, as Ruskin did as well, ‘to 
recapture the sacred for a secular age [...] in the midst of the utilitarian madness’.88 
Nevertheless, Scruton asserts, Arnold’s legacy, as well as the Gothic revival as a whole, 
was essentially pessimistic.89 What we may take from this is that the Gothic revival in the 
nineteenth century was a form of prevarication that lacked a vital authenticity. It 
replicated only the ‘outward signs’ of faith. It was, in the end, insincere. This brings us to 
a point that Chesterton made, which I think might be taken to signify a paradigm shift in 
the early years of the twentieth century, from the ultimately defensive ‘shoring up’ of 
faith, by the Gothic revival, to an aggressive reassertion of the reality and relevance of 
the supernatural; an authentic medievalism, in a sense, by way of its very insistence, 
which Burrow failed to take into account.  
 
One statement by Chesterton especially illustrates what was really a move away from the 
pessimism that Scruton has perceived as being central to the Gothic revival, which was 
itself a medievalism. Chesterton essentially agrees, writing that ‘the Pre-Raphaelites, the 
Gothicists, the admirers of the Middle Ages, had in their subtlety and sadness the spirit 
of the present day’.90 While in actual fact, he claimed, it was Charles Dickens who, ‘in his 
buffoonery and bravery’, really possessed ‘the spirit of the Middle Ages. He was much 
more medieval in his attacks on medievalism than they were in their defences of it.’91 As 
Alexander suggests, I want to forward the view that, starting around 1900, there emerged 
a Christian reading of the Middle Ages that sought to recover the spirit of that time in 
order to competently combat modernity. Chesterton was reaching for a vital authenticity 
rooted in the observation that modernity, which he opposed, was at least consistent in 
its set of assumptions. If he and his fellows were to somehow reproach it, as well as offer 
an ‘alternative’, they had to be equally constant. As it turned out, to achieve this, many 
turned to Catholicism itself, as Cowley noted; making, perhaps, the same sociological 
assessment of it as Berger did. But more than this, when speaking of a second medieval 
revival, this thesis contends that this really entailed a combative approach that accepted 
the challenge of Nietzsche’s ‘absolute loss’, seeking to engage it publicly rather than 
privately, unlike Arnold.  
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Modernism may be mentioned here briefly, in conclusion, although this thesis is not a 
study of modernism itself. There is, however, a case to be made here that what this thesis 
is identifying is a sort of Old Western modernism – meaning a historical perspective, 
incorporating a finely tuned theology, which was forwarded in opposition to modernity. 
Eliot provides us with a useful case in point. Historians, not simply Cowley, have noted 
that Eliot appears to have been something of a living contradiction. Peter Gay, in 
Modernism: The Lure of Heresy from Baudelaire to Beckett and Beyond (2007), notes how 
unlike a modernist Eliot really was, rejecting ‘most if not all of their contemporary culture, 
including features that […] fellow modernists found perfectly unobjectionable’.92 Eliot’s 
‘unimpeachable [literary] modernism’ went hand in hand with ‘a most intense anti-
modernism’.93 For Gay, Eliot presents too much of a problem. He dealt with him as well 
as he could by dubbing him one of ‘the eccentrics […] the anti-modern modernists’.94 Gay 
evidently views modernism, or rather literary modernism – a vital distinction – through 
the lens of a modernism that is essentially avant-garde, as well as aesthetic, in its 
fundamentals. In this sense, as he readily admits, Eliot’s place within this definition takes 
on ‘the awkward quality of apparent self-contradiction’.95  
 
Scruton has also written about ‘the paradox of T. S. Eliot – that our greatest modernist 
should also be our greatest modern conservative’; meaning a general social, political and 
cultural, but not aesthetic, conservativism underscored, and indeed conditioned by, an 
even more comprehensive religiosity.96 However, Scruton argues that ‘this seeming 
paradox’ was no paradox at all since ‘conservatism is itself a modernism’. For Eliot, he 
writes, ‘perceived that it is precisely in modern conditions – conditions of fragmentation, 
heresy and unbelief – that the conservative project acquires its sense.’97 Scruton’s 
‘modernism’ may be said to be more inclusive than Gay’s, in the sense that there is, 
indeed, a place for conservatism as a reflective mode of response to the conditions of 
modernity. What Scruton’s and Gay’s respective definitions have in common, however, 
is a conception of modernism as being what David Peters Corbett has referred to as ‘a 
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critical description of modern experience’.98 Modernism, it seems, implies 
‘oppositionism’ – a ‘critique’ and ‘direct address and evaluation of the conditions of 
modernity’.99 The historian John Lukacs, for example, writes of modernism as entailing ‘a 
breaking away from the bourgeois world’.100 The art historian Charles Harrison shared 
this view.101 While John Carey, too, has forwarded the thesis that ‘the principle around 
which modernist literature and culture fashioned themselves was the exclusion of the 
masses, the defeat of their power, the removal of their literacy, the denial of their 
humanity’.102 It should be noted, however, that modernism has also been forwarded as a 
modernism of reconciliation. This is particularly true in terms of British modernism. Sam 
Smiles, for instance, contributing to The Geographies of Englishness: Landscape and the 
National Past, 1880-1940 (2002), has observed ‘that significant elements within British 
modernism seem to have negotiated an accommodation with the relics of the past’.103 
Alexandra Harris, in her work Romantic Moderns: English Writers, Artists and the 
Imagination from Virginia Woolf to John Piper (2010), has also charted the effort on the 
part of modernists to reconcile conservatism, as well as a sense of locality and national 
pride, with modernist aesthetic principles.  
 
The utility of Scruton’s claim that conservatism is a modernism is that we are no longer 
obliged to couch modernism in such terms, as a negotiation between two opposed 
principles, which has previously resulted in the exclusion of a religious mode of response 
to modernity, thus denying it legitimacy as a modernism; granting, too, that conservatism 
is in some way synonymous with a religious or ‘spiritual’ conception of the universe. Gay’s 
ostensible paradox – ‘anti-modern modernists’ – may be transformed into a tautology. 
Certainly, this runs counter to Harrison’s avowal that ‘the critique of modernism […] has 
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failed if all it does is usher in the conservative as a supposed form of modernity’.104 
However, if we are to take the late Harrison at his word, that ‘modernism may fruitfully 
be thought of as a form of tradition, but one maintained in a kind of critical tension with 
the wider surrounding culture’, a conservative critique must be accorded its rightful place 
within this critique.105 For we should consider the point that there is a difference of 
opinion about what Harrison’s ‘surrounding culture’ – modernity – might be said to 
actually constitute. As Olsen discerns, there is an evident ‘ambiguity in the idea of 
modernity’.106 Indeed, he writes that we should recognise that ‘there has in fact been no 
single modernity which can take its assured place in the (alleged) progress of history, that 
is, that can mark a new and definitive stage of the new, but rather, various competing 
modernities’.107 In this sense, too – returning to Cowley’s notion of a divide amongst 
intellectuals – it may be said that we also have competing modernisms; not in terms of 
literary modernism, which, as we see in Elliot, straddled both sides of the divide, but 
rather a general modernist ‘oppositionism’ to a prevailing modern paradigm, as it was 
perceived by either side. 
 
Finally, a quick word on this thesis’s choice of individuals. There is no point in being so 
impressionistic as to render any such analysis devoid of any substantialised conclusions. 
Therefore, I will concentrate on a limited number of individuals, excluding others, but 
including those who represent a broad range, making up for this loss. Central players, 
such as Chesterton, Belloc and Lewis are included, in part because of their undoubted 
significance, but also because it will allow us to establish a common ground between the 
Inklings and the Catholic revival: between Anglican and Catholic. Paul Nash, M. R. James 
and John Ireland will feature in reference to broader themes of the supernatural itself, 
representing what I think is a tellingly diverse, and not always Christian, range of 
commonality. Eliot and Waugh, who tend to stand apart from any particular Christian 
grouping, will be considered as well, since it is a worthwhile task to attempt to locate 
them within a broader community – though to some extent this has happened, as with 
Tolkien, who also deserves attention. Although there exists a substantial body of work on 
Tolkien, he has so far been excluded from the academic literature concerning a Catholic 
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intellectual grouping in Britain in the twentieth century. One explanation for this is that 
Tolkien has generally been located within the literary cohort of the, not specifically 
Catholic, Inklings, formed around Lewis; though it must be stated that both Birzer and 
Pearce have touched upon Tolkien’s place within a broader awakening of ‘[Christian] 
thought and faith’.108 Persons also featured in this thesis include the poet Roy Campbell, 
since today, as Scruton notes, ‘Campbell is almost forgotten. Few of his writings remain 
in print, and in British literary publications he is mentioned, if at all, only as the notorious 
poet who was on “the wrong side” in the Spanish Civil War.’109 There have been works on 
this poet, however: John Povey’s Roy Campbell (1977); Peter Alexander’s Roy Campbell: 
A Critical Biography (1982); and most recently, Pearce’s Bloomsbury and Beyond: The 
Friends and Enemies of Roy Campbell (2001). Nevertheless, Campbell is an immensely 
interesting character who deserves more attention. Then, finally, there is Dawson, who 
more than any other person will feature heavily in my thesis as a sort of hub. 
 
Dawson is a historian who is a curiously neglected figure. Recently, there has been 
something of a rediscovery of Dawson, however. Until the 1990s he was a forgotten man. 
A biography, written by his daughter, Christina Scott, published in 1984, was the only 
substantial work on his life and works. However, in 1997, a series of essays, titled Eternity 
in Time: Christopher Dawson and the Catholic Idea of History, edited by Stratford 
Caldecott and John Morrill, marked a rekindling of interest in Dawson, who had been the 
subject of a conference in Oxford in 1995, which formed the basis of the later work. Not 
long after this, Dawson’s major works once again found themselves in print; reissued by 
both Ignatius Press and the Catholic University of America Press. Birzer’s work Sanctifying 
the World: The Augustinian Life and Mind of Christopher Dawson (2007) might be said to 
represent a culmination of a renaissance of interest in the so-called ‘Catholic literary 
revival’, which has increasingly found itself centred around the influence of Dawson 
himself. During the last ten years, Pearce, Lothian, Olsen, Lockerd, Schwartz, as well as 
Joseph T. Stuart’s 2009 Ph.D. thesis110, have featured Dawson in their work. As we shall 
see, Dawson was a noteworthy figure who, it might be said, stands at the centre of this 
thesis’s subject too. 
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The date 1900-1970, specified in this thesis’s title, requires a brief explanation. The works 
considered here date from around 1900, in the output of G. K. Chesterton (1874-1936) 
and Hilaire Belloc (1870-1953). There is, after this, a concentration of works produced 
during the interwar years, carried over into the Second World War, as part of a second 
generation, including Christopher Dawson (1889-1970) and Evelyn Waugh (1903-1966), 
for example, lasting to around 1970, when Dawson, a major figure in this thesis, died. 
1970, I believe, is a reasonable cut-off point for the scope of this work.   
 
As for the chapters, they will present themselves accordingly. Chapter one will reveal how 
a broad spread of Christian intellectuals confronted the prospect of what Alan D. Gilbert 
consequently dubbed ‘the epistemological imperialism of science’.111 This deals with an 
identification of modernity as entailing Berger’s ‘crisis of implausibility’. This chapter will 
also forward a definition of the term Old Western Men, which I have borrowed from 
Lewis. Chapter two will focus on an even broader, though not always Christian, diagnosis 
of specifically modern conditions informing the crisis of modernity, as well as the attempt 
to circumvent it through art, music and literature, asserting a sense of spirit or 
otherworldliness in a worldly context. This will reveal Olsen’s ‘transcendentals’ at their 
fullest extent, representing what I think was a key division between artists and writers in 
the twentieth century. Chapter three will then narrow the sights and make a key 
distinction within that group: the reality of the supernatural being thus established, how 
was it relevant? The chapter’s aim is to show how it actually informed a central piety 
amongst Roman Catholics in particular, founded on a philosophy of history that guarded 
against despair. Finally, Chapter four will delve into the Catholic notion of Christendom, 
touching upon political themes of nationalism and internationalism, including their 
proposed connection to culture and spiritual values. This will also serve to further 
underline how the Old Western Men saw religion as profoundly relevant to modern day 
concerns that threatened to shake civilization apart – which ultimately underscores the 
central question that my thesis sets out to answer: to what extent did notions of the 
supernatural inform Cowley’s stated divide between intellectuals in the twentieth 
century? This is what I will set out to establish. 
 
Two final notes, on the title of this thesis, should be forwarded here. ‘Old Western Men’ 
is a phrase taken from C. S. Lewis; a phrase that this thesis is, in part, seeking to give 
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definition to. This will be expanded upon more in the first chapter. However, it should be 
noted that ‘Western’, in this thesis, should not be taken to mean any political or 
geographic identification or allegiance. Instead, it should be considered broadly as a 
particular way of viewing the world as part of a religious outlook. As well as this, although 
the persons included within this work are predominantly men, the word ‘Men’ should not 
be taken to imply any exclusivity in terms of gender. 
 
 
Afterword  
 
This thesis was originally conceived as a work relating to art history, centred around the 
artist Paul Nash and his fascination with trees, history and a ‘spirit of place’. During the 
process of writing this thesis, however, I found myself irresistibly drawn toward the 
broader intellectual context that Nash operated in; beyond the realm of art history itself. 
His work was, I think, a natural outgrowth of its own time, though Nash has come to 
feature only slightly in this thesis. This work is now a history of culture, where art, of 
course, has a legitimate home alongside literature, philosophy and theology. Nash may 
now, I argue, take his place amongst the historical community of the Old Western Men.  
 
In terms of how this thesis might alter our understanding of British visual culture in the 
twentieth century, what we are essentially reconsidering here is the informing spirit of 
the work of such artists as Nash. Recent works on British art of this time have tended to 
locate it within a heightened sense of national identity: The Geographies of Englishness: 
Landscape and the National Past, 1880-1940 (2002), and Romantic Moderns: English 
Writers, Artists and the Imagination from Virginia Woolf to John Piper (2010), for 
instance. A similar view has overtaken Nash too, as an individual artist. However, what 
this thesis seeks to identify is a broader ethic that might be said to transcend nationality 
and the national past in the sense that this ‘past’ is a pre-modern past; not a vague 
nostalgia, but one entailing, I argue, a key religiosity and incarnational view of the world, 
including its landscape. By recognising this, we reinterpret a central ethic that informed 
visual culture at this time.  
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Chapter One 
Via Media – A Thomist ‘Middle Way’ 
 
 
De Descriptione Temporum – the ‘Great Divide’ 
 
Fulfilling his appointment to the newly-created Chair of Medieval and Renaissance 
Literature at Cambridge University, C. S. Lewis presented to a select 1954 audience an 
inaugural lecture on the description of ages: De Descriptione Temporum. In it, he forwarded 
the notion of a ‘Great Divide’ in history; a divide so great that all other divergences 
dissipated before it.1 It was his belief that ‘the greatest of all divisions in the history of the 
West’ ought to be placed ‘between Jane Austen and us’.2 His theory was essentially along 
these lines: that the English redcoats who fought at Waterloo had much more in common 
with the culture of the Ancient Greek hoplites at Marathon than the peoples of the period 
referred to as the ‘modern’. It did not matter that the Duke of Wellington’s men were closer 
in proximity to Lewis’s own day than that of Homer’s, or Aeschylus’s, for that matter. For it 
was a vital point to grasp, Lewis argued, that ‘the age of Jane Austen and Scott’ was really 
‘a specimen of something far larger […] something which had already begun when the Iliad 
was composed and was still almost unimpaired when Waterloo was fought’.3 And although, 
of course, there were ‘important differences within […] [that] chosen area’, Lewis posited 
that in actual fact the ‘whole thing, from its Greek or pre-Greek beginnings down to the day 
before yesterday’ constituted an essential ‘homogeneity’ that was ‘certainly important and 
perhaps more important than its interior diversities’.4 
 
Lewis forwarded a number of justifications for this conclusion. The one that this chapter 
will focus on, in particular, was that the ‘Great Divide’ entailed a fundamental division 
between the religious and the irreligious, or in other words, the spiritual and the material. 
In this sense, Lewis thought it essential that his 1954 audience recognise that ‘whereas all 
history was for our ancestors divided into two periods, the pre-Christian and the Christian, 
and two only, for us it falls into three – the pre-Christian, the Christian, and what may 
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reasonably be called the post-Christian’.5 These were his categories, which were vital to his 
conception of a ‘Great Divide’. For he came to the conclusion that these transitions in belief 
were not ultimately of equal significance. It was the transition from ‘Christian’ to ‘post-
Christian’ which was the ‘more radical’, he argued. The reason was simple. For all their 
differences, Christians and Pagans shared a belief in the supernatural. In this one vital 
sense, a Christian and a Pagan ‘had much more in common with each other than either […] 
[had] with a post-Christian’.6 ‘Post-Christian man is not a Pagan’, Lewis wrote.7 The post-
Christian believed neither in God or gods. This constituted ‘a momentous difference’.8 The 
transition, then, was not specifically a transition of beliefs, but a slide from belief to 
unbelief. This was crucial. For ‘the gap’, he wrote, ‘between those who worship different 
gods is not so wide as that between those who worship and those who do not’.9 And while 
it was true that ‘there were lots of sceptics in Jane Austen’s time and long before’, what 
had occurred since then was a change in ‘presumption’.10 When once ‘some kind and 
degree of religious belief and practice were the norm’, now it was an ‘exception’.11 It would 
be going too far to say that for Lewis this was the ‘Great Divide’ entirely, but it was an 
underlying aspect that very much informed it. That most men and women in history had, 
until comparatively recently, believed just as much as Homer’s Achaeans in some manner 
of spiritual order was an important point to grasp, he asserted. This was what made them 
different from ‘moderns’. This was Lewis’s fundamental thesis. 
  
 
‘Old Western Men’ 
 
Having established this notion of a ‘Great Divide’, Lewis then went on to claim that he was 
himself part of this pre-Christian/Christian grouping. It was in this sense that he very 
deliberately presented himself as the endangered native of an ‘Old European, or Old 
Western, Culture’.12  
 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 5. 
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7 Ibid., 10. 
8 Ibid., 5. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 9 
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I myself belong far more to that Old Western order than to yours. I am 
going to claim that this, which in one way is a disqualification for my task, 
is yet in another a qualification. The disqualification is obvious. You don’t 
want to be lectured on Neanderthal Man by a Neanderthaler, still less on 
dinosaurs by a dinosaur. And yet, is that the whole story? If a live dinosaur 
dragged its slow length into the laboratory, would we not all look back as 
we fled? What a chance to know at last how it really moved and looked 
and smelled and what noises it made! And if the Neanderthaler could 
talk, then, though his lecturing technique might leave much to be desired, 
should we not almost certainly learn from him some things about him 
which the best modem anthropologist could never have told us? He 
would tell us without knowing he was telling. One thing I know: I would 
give a great deal to hear any ancient Athenian, even a stupid one, talking 
about Greek tragedy. He would know in his bones so much that we seek 
in vain. At any moment some chance phrase might, unknown to him, 
show us where modem scholarship had been on the wrong track for 
years. Ladies and gentlemen, I stand before you somewhat as that 
Athenian might stand. I read as a native texts that you must read as 
foreigners.13 
 
Lewis was making a very serious point. He was himself a ‘dinosaur’.14 Or rather, one of the 
‘Old Western Men’15 – his own phrase – who was in possession of what Dennis Danielson, 
writing of this speech as well, in The Cambridge Companion to C. S. Lewis (2010), terms a 
‘pre-modern perspective’.16 Accordingly, Danielson argues that here ‘the relationship 
between Lewis and his modern audience’ is ‘tinged with something akin to mutual 
xenophobia […] if only for reasons of their cultural distance from each other’.17 Certainly, it 
seems that Lewis was suggesting that people belonging to a modern audience were 
‘foreigners’, echoing L. P. Hartley’s opening line in The Go-Between (1953), that ‘the past is 
a foreign country: they do things differently there’.18 Of course, what Lewis was essentially 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 13. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 14. 
16 Robert MacsSwain, and Michael Ward, eds., The Cambridge Companion to C. S. Lewis (2010; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 47. 
17 Ibid. 
18 L. P. Hartley, The Go-Between (1953; London: Penguin Books, 2000), 5. 
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saying in 1954 was that, from his perspective, modernity was a foreign country. As early as 
1918, he had commented that ‘I’m afraid I shall never be an orthodox modern’.19 Later on, 
Lewis came to refer to himself as ‘a dogmatic Christian untinged with Modernist 
reservations and committed to supernaturalism in its full rigour’.20 What he means here is 
that he believes that he views modernity from a decidedly pre-modern perspective. This 
was what Lewis likely intended to convey in his rhetorical device the ‘Old Western Men’, a 
sense of difference and aloofness from modernity, founded on the notion that modernity 
was, according to his definition, irreligious.  
 
What the phrase Old Western Men also conveys, too, is the notion that Lewis was not alone 
in his perception: ‘men’, he writes, not man. Indeed, it is one of the purposes of this thesis 
to reveal that Lewis was far from alone in his definition of modernity. For instance, in a 
letter to the historian Christopher Dawson, Lewis described the effect of reading his work 
Religion and Culture (1948); of ‘greedily reading it at lunch and splashing it with gravy’.21 
This was ‘the most exciting kind of reading’, he rejoiced, ‘exactly what I wanted, going of 
course, far beyond my knowledge but often linking up with the little I do know’.22 In other 
words, Lewis found Dawson’s book ‘strangely “corroborating”’.23 Lewis and Dawson 
feature heavily in this thesis. Although they knew of each other, they were not close 
acquaintances. Dawson would not have such a profound influence on Lewis as J. R. R. 
Tolkien, for example. Lewis’s greatest stimuluses will be touched upon later. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that Dawson affirmed Lewis’s own conclusions. There was, indeed, a clear 
confluence in thought. For example, while Lewis had, in 1954, avowed that ‘whereas all 
history was for our ancestors divided into two periods, the pre-Christian and the Christian, 
and two only, [but] for us […] falls into three – the pre-Christian, the Christian, and what 
may reasonably be called the post-Christian’, Dawson had expressed much the same thing 
two years earlier, in his work Understanding Europe (1952), asserting that ‘the whole 
development of Western culture falls into three main stages – Christian, pre-Christian and 
post-Christian’.24 
                                                          
19 Quoted in Humphrey Carpenter, The Inklings: C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, Charles Williams and 
their Friends (1978; London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006), 12. 
20 Quoted Ibid., 175 
21 Quoted in Christina Scott, A Historian and His World: A Life of Christopher Dawson 1889-1970 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1984), 158. 
22 Quoted in ibid. 
23 Quoted in ibid. 
24 Christopher Dawson, Understanding Europe (1952; Washington D.C.: The Catholic University 
Press of America, 2009), 22. 
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Although it has been suggested that Dawson’s thought, particularly in Progress and Religion 
(1929), formed the substance of one of Lewis’s most significant works, The Abolition of Man 
(1943), what this thesis seeks to underline is the corroborative aspect of the Old Western 
Men.25 It was not a movement with an underlying manifesto or founding constituent, but 
a concatenation of individuals, whose outlook as a collective – constituting a religious mode 
of response to modernity – was primarily synonymous and ‘corroborating’. 
 
The ‘Old’ in Old Western Men I take to be Lewis’s historical perspective, suggesting that he 
was viewing history from a particular historical point in time. He is not merely a ‘Western’ 
man. He is now a ‘dinosaur’. Accordingly, Lewis is actually inescapably ‘modern’, in that he 
is himself a citizen of modernity, even as he questions it. In this sense, we should not take 
Lewis’s soaring rhetoric too literally. He exaggerated for effect in 1954. As we shall see, 
from his own intellectual and religious development – for they go hand in hand – Lewis had 
been an atheist himself; not ‘Old Western’, then. Indeed, as we shall also see, this was often 
the case with such Old Western Men. Many were initially ‘modern’, by Lewis’s standard. 
For example, the novelist Evelyn Waugh was ‘as near to an atheist as one could be’ in 
1930.26 Yet he would later convert to Catholicism. Therefore, as we develop this thesis, it is 
important to note at the outset that, contrary to Lewis’s stated opinion about himself, he 
was not a ‘dinosaur’ as such, but a modern who had journeyed into Hartley’s ‘foreign land’. 
In other words, he had gone native. And by ‘foreign’ we essentially mean ‘medieval’. For 
there is a strong case to be made that the historical perspective mentioned previously was 
one afforded to Lewis and his ilk by the Medieval revival, which provided the foundation 
for a rather more ‘consciously Christian’ revival in the twentieth century, as Michael 
Alexander has attested to. The ‘Old’ in Old Western Men might also be taken to imply, then 
– as I think Lewis does imply – that modernity also entailed a teleological snobbery toward 
the past that he was attempted to redress. 
 
Having now loosely defined what this thesis means by Old Western Men, this chapter will 
build upon this definition and add a number of important qualifications that need to be 
made, particularly in terms of what ‘Western’, in the context of this thesis, should be taken 
                                                          
25 Bradley J. Birzer, Sanctifying the World: The Augustinian Life and Mind of Christopher Dawson 
(Front Royal: Christendom Press, 2007), 7.  
26 Quoted in Philip Eade, Evelyn Waugh: A Life Revisited (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2016), 
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to signify when I argue for the presence of a broad group of Old Western intellectuals 
present in twentieth century British culture. We shall now concentrate on the ‘Western’ 
element. 
 
 
The ‘Western’ Element: ‘to think christianly’ 
 
‘Western’ is a vague expression with a set of associations. For example, Victor Davis 
Hanson’s work Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (2001) 
forwarded a narrative that ‘concentrated on those West-East fault lines that emphasize the 
singular lethality of Western culture at war’.27 Richard Tarnas’s account of the ‘Western 
Mind’ concentrated far more on its intellectual foundations, asserting that even today the 
West’s ‘way of thinking is still profoundly Greek in its underlying logic’.28 And at the ‘basis’ 
of this logic ‘was a view of the cosmos as an ordered expression of certain primordial 
essences or transcendent first principles, variously conceived as Forms, Ideas, universals, 
changeless absolutes […] and archetypes’.29 This characterisation of the Western tradition 
will, to some extent, define what this thesis means by ‘Western’. Yet it will also take into 
account what Nick Spencer, for instance, recently identified as its Christian emphasis: what 
he describes as ‘the role of Christianity in forming Western values that we hold dear’.30 This 
is not to say that the Western tradition is wholly Christian, as Spencer also notes: ‘the tree 
of Western values did grow in Christian soil but it would be a mistake to imagine that soil 
had some precise blueprint for what the tree would eventually look like.’31 
 
Broadly speaking, what this thesis means by ‘Western’ is what the theologian Harry 
Blamires, a protégé of Lewis, forwards as essential Christianity. Writing in his work The 
Christian Mind: How Should a Christian Think? (1963), Blamires explains that Christianity 
‘sees the natural order as dependent upon the supernatural order, time as contained within 
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eternity’.32 ‘For the Christian’, he explains, ‘truth is supernaturally grounded: it is not 
manufactured within nature’.33 Moreover, ‘a prime mark of the Christian mind is that it 
cultivates the eternal perspective. That is to say, it looks beyond this life to another one.’34 
This, Blamires writes, is what it is to think from the purely Christian perspective, ‘to think 
christianly’, which is essentially what the Old Western Men, I argue, were attempting to do 
when responding to modernity: ‘to accept all things with the mind as related, directly or 
indirectly, to man’s eternal destiny as the redeemed and chosen child of God.’35  
 
The Old Western Men may be seen as the tradition that has concluded, as the theologian 
David L. Schindler has done recently, that ‘modern culture marginalizes love’.36 What he 
means here is ‘God-centered love’: or ‘reality’ as ‘an order of love […] a bearer of a “word” 
or “logic” (logos) that presupposes an ordering intelligence […] that gives things their 
deepest and most proper order and meaning, always and everywhere’.37 Schindler sees 
that ‘love’, or ‘order’, is necessarily participatory, in terms of there also being a ‘created 
universe’, we being a ‘constitutive relation […] mediating the love between God and the 
rest of the cosmos’.38 ‘Living within the horizon of modernity’, however, Schindler notes, 
modern man has succumbed to, as well as ‘become accustomed to’, a ‘distorted 
anthropocentrism […] forgetting being and God’.39 In this sense, then, it seems that there 
is, in the words of Schindler’s son, D. C. Schindler, ‘an implicit atheism’ at the centre of 
modernity ‘by effectively separating God’s being from the being of everything else’, 
denying or undermining, therefore, ‘the significance of receptivity’.40 
 
The theme of ‘receptivity’ is fundamental here. For, as Blamires notes, Christianity is also 
‘a religion of things that have happened’.41 It is ‘incarnational’.42 We are happening and 
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exist in history, just as Christianity claims that Christ existed in history. Therefore, unlike 
other religions, ‘to think christianly’ is not a renunciation of the world, because the world 
and its ‘positive richness’ is, in Christianity, seen to be ‘derivative from the supernatural’ 
itself.43 In this sense, the ‘Christian mind’ thinks ‘sacramentally’, meaning that it also has 
roots in the worldly.44 Glenn W. Olsen has also referred to this aspect of Christian thinking 
as a ‘theology of the participation’ – meaning ‘the act-of-being’ – ‘of the creature [us] in 
the life […] of the Creator [God]’.45 This, he notes, is evident ‘especially in the thought of 
Thomas Aquinas’.46 Indeed, to better understand the Old Western Men, who were mostly 
Christian, we must come to grips with Thomism itself. 
 
 
Thomism and the ‘word made flesh’ 
 
It was the view of the Roman Catholic writer G. K. Chesterton that the ‘Western’ element 
in culture has ‘as good a right to be called the Christian element’, since ‘its common sense 
is but the holy familiarity of the word made flesh’.47 Chesterton, a pivotal figure in this 
chapter, and indeed the thesis as a whole, made this claim in his work St Thomas Aquinas 
(1933), a book which should be viewed as a sort of Old Western handbook or pamphlet, 
usefully detailing what is meant by ‘Western’ in the context of this thesis. Like Lewis, 
Chesterton was of the view that moderns viewed existence from ‘the wrong side of the 
tapestry’, meaning that moderns thought secularly.48 Chesterton, as a Christian, assented 
to a religious worldview, of course, but it was also what might be termed a ‘Thomist’ view 
of existence: with a heavy ‘incarnational’ emphasis on the word made flesh. In other words, 
a conception of the universe to a large extent synonymous with, though not exclusive to, a 
theology associated with Catholicism and medievalism. For, as Diarmaid MacCulloch writes, 
‘Aquinas’s huge corpus of writings mark the height of [Medieval] Western Europe’s 
enthusiasm for Aristotle.’49 Tarnas, too, views Aquinas as a pivotal figure who ‘showed the 
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complementarity of the two Greek philosophers, of Plato’s exalted spiritual absolute and 
Aristotle’s dynamically real nature, an integration achieved by using Plato’s participation 
relative not to the Ideas but to Existence’.50 ‘In effect, Aquinas synthesized Plato’s 
transcendent reality with Aristotle’s concrete reality by means of the Christian 
understanding of God as the loving infinite Creator.’51 In this sense, we should view the 
thought of Aquinas not as a rejection of Plato but an essential via media (middle way) that 
rooted Plato’s transcendent reality in the material world: in other words, an ‘incarnational’ 
view of the world. 
 
The effort ‘to think christianly’, and possess an incarnational worldview – facilitating a 
reconciliation between both the temporal and the eternal – is what defined the approach 
that such Old Western Men as Lewis and Chesterton took in the twentieth century: the 
attempt to reconcile mind with matter. That many such men, including Chesterton, were 
Roman Catholic, and indeed converts, is significant since this was the tradition that 
Thomism – with its stress on ‘the word made flesh’ – was arguably most at home.52 
Therefore, it is worth examining what it was in the thought of Aquinas that Chesterton, 
amongst others, found so appealing. And as Chesterton himself claimed, in his 1933 work 
on Aquinas, it was St. Thomas’s great achievement that he ‘reconciled religion with reason’, 
precisely because he possessed an incarnational conception of the universe.53  
 
In 1933, Chesterton commences his study by asserting that Thomism perceives that ‘Plato 
was right, but not quite right’.54 In other words, St. Thomas continued to recognise an 
objective spiritual reality that is common to all religion. However, Thomism, Chesterton 
continually emphasises, constitutes a rejection of what he terms ‘a sort of Platonic pride in 
the possession of intangible and untranslatable truths within’, as if this ‘wisdom’ has ‘[no] 
root anywhere in the real world’.55 It was St. Thomas’s view, which Chesterton shared, that 
such religious truths were embodied in the here and now. As Chesterton writes, ‘St. 
Thomas, for all his love of Greek philosophy, saved us from being Platonists.’56 This is not 
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to say, however, that Thomism is itself a wholesale rejection of Platonism.57 Nevertheless, 
while the Neo-Platonist continued to insist that ‘the mind was lit entirely from within […] 
St. Thomas insisted that it was lit by five windows […] the windows of the senses’.58 
Moreover, this turn toward Aristotelian immanence complemented Christianity since it was 
a central piece of Christian orthodoxy ‘that God and the image of God had come in contact 
through matter with a material world’.59 The Incarnation was in actual fact ‘the opposite of 
abstraction’, Chesterton asserts.60 A large part of Christianity’s substance, then, he argues, 
is that it places a high degree of emphasis on the body; and it is exactly this emphasis on 
the word made flesh that makes Thomism ‘the philosophy of common sense’, since it 
asserts – and in so doing, contradicts Cartesian thought – that the senses can be trusted.61 
As Chesterton proclaims:  
 
The Thomist stands in the broad daylight of the brotherhood of men, in 
their common consciousness that eggs are not hens or dreams or mere 
practical assumptions; but things attested by the Authority of the Senses, 
which is from God.62 
 
This conception that ‘Thomist philosophy is nearer than most philosophies to the mind of 
the man in the street’63 brought Chesterton into, a likely premeditated, conflict with what 
he perceived as modernity itself and its representatives, the intellectuals of his own day, 
the ‘pessimists’, who he believed operated in nonsensical abstractions.64 Chesterton 
addressed them in one passage by paraphrasing St. Thomas himself: 
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I do not believe that God meant Man to exercise only that peculiar, 
uplifted and abstracted sort of intellect which you are so fortunate as to 
possess […] I owe a great deal of what I think to what I see and smell and 
taste and handle; and that so far as my reason is concerned, I feel obliged 
to treat all this reality as real.65 
  
Here Chesterton argued for ‘a middle field of facts […] given by the senses to be the subject 
matter of the reason’, which in the ‘field the reason has a right to rule, as the representative 
of God in Man’.66  
 
Aiden Nichols, writing in G. K. Chesterton, Theologian (2009), has dubbed Chesterton’s 
Thomist approach ‘metaphysical realism’, a ‘commonsense epistemology […] which over 
against all forms of reductionist empiricism and solipsistic Idealism’ insists on a philosophy 
that holds to an objective standard that, as Chesterton himself argues, must in some sense 
be metaphysical and taken on ‘faith’.67 This was certainly what Chesterton meant when he 
wrote, in The Incredulity of Father Brown (1926), that ‘the first effect of not believing in 
God, is that you lose your common sense’.68 His friend, the Belgian intellectual Émile 
Cammaerts would later paraphrase Chesterton, writing that ‘the first effect of not believing 
in God is to believe in anything’.69 And what Cammaert meant by ‘anything’ was what 
Chesterton, or rather his popular character Father Brown, railed against in the detective 
story ‘The Oracle of the Dog’. It was what he ‘noticed more and more in the modern 
world’.70 What it essentially amounted to was ‘something that’s arbitrary without being 
authoritative’:  
 
In all sorts of newspaper rumours and conversational catchwords […] 
People readily swallow the untested claims of this, that, or that other. It’s 
drowning all your old rationalism and scepticism, it’s coming in like a sea; 
and the name of it is superstition.71 
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What the legacy of René Descartes had done was to render void the Christian orthodoxy of 
the word made flesh. Consequently, since the intellect was now left untethered to material 
existence, the intellect had descended into a vacuum of pure abstraction, thus denying 
common sense. At the same time, however, the body, separated from the intellect, had 
brought about a radical disenchantment of material existence. This was Chesterton’s 
common line of thought that was mirrored by the Old Western Men as a whole. As Tarnas 
has stated: ‘Descartes helped emancipate the material world from its long association with 
religious belief.’72 ‘Western’, in this thesis, therefore entails a restoration of the union of 
mind and matter. 
 
 
Losing the Sacred  
 
There is a general proposition, originating in the work of Max Weber, propounding the idea 
that modernity essentially constitutes a radical ‘disenchantment’ of the world.73 David 
Torevell’s work Losing the Sacred: Ritual, Modernity and Liturgical Reform (2000) 
propounds this interpretation: that ‘the Middle Ages’ overriding involvement with an 
embodied experience of the sacred’, which he argues was ‘rooted in the centrality of the 
body as a site and route for an experience of the sacred’, was superseded by ‘a far more 
cerebral approach to the sacred’ rooted in a ‘Protestant emphasis on the word coupled 
with the emergence of a highly suspicious [Cartesian] attitude to the body’.74 Torevell is not 
alone here. Olsen agrees, citing ‘Descartes’s separation of mind from matter’, as well was 
‘the non-sacramental (by Catholic definition) Christianity of Calvin’, which he believes 
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‘prepared the way for the disenchantment of the world’.75 Olsen cites the example of the 
‘Pre-Protestant’ doctrine of ‘the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist’, which ‘kept the 
visible and invisible worlds connected […] for literally in the Eucharist each world was 
present to the other’.76 Peter L. Berger believed, too, that ‘Protestantism served as a 
historically decisive prelude to secularization’.77 ‘The Protestant believer’, he writes, ‘no 
longer lives in a world ongoingly penetrated by sacred things and forces’.78  
 
What emerges here is a link between the ‘disenchantment’ of the world and Protestantism 
itself, which ‘stressed the radical transcendence of God and the utter fallenness of 
humanity’.79 Accordingly, matter ceased to have any real significance; as Torevell writes:  
 
Protestantism entailed seeing the universe in a radically new framework 
which was to have consequences for the location of the sacred. 
Protestant theology began to stress the “idolatry of place” rather than its 
sacredness.80 
 
The Old Western Men at the centre of this thesis essentially sought a return to an 
ontologically ‘pre-modern cosmos’, which, as Torevell describes, was ‘a thing of symbolic 
and spiritual potency, a sacred arena for discovering knowledge and truth, another book 
like scripture, from which one could constantly and easily read off the things of God’.81 This 
‘previous Christian onto-theological synthesis’ had since been severed, Torevell writes, and 
‘replaced by a view that there was nothing rational or beautiful about nature at all; ideality 
was a thing of the mind’.82 This is significant since in this thesis we are also considering 
Alexander’s notion of a second, ‘consciously Christian’, more authentically ‘medieval’, 
revival in the twentieth century; more authentic, I argue, since it entailed a rediscovery of 
exactly this ‘onto-theological synthesis’ detailed by Torevell. When we speak of a second 
Medieval Revival we are, to some degree, speaking of a Catholic revival – which, to some 
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extent, went hand in hand with a revival of Thomism.83 This has been noted before; As 
Joseph Pearce has observed, in Literary Converts: Spiritual Inspiration in an Age of Unbelief, 
‘in the twentieth century, the Neo-Thomist revival paralleled the Catholic revival, one 
feeding off the other’.84 This is particularly evident in the meeting of Catholic minds referred 
to as the ‘Chelsea group’. Here we can observe the Old Western Men in microcosm; 
especially in terms of an essentially corroborative, overtly Christian, response to modernity. 
 
 
The ‘Chelsea Group’ 
 
The Chelsea group, inaugurated in the late 1920s, was a salon held at the Chelsea home of 
Tom Burns where English Roman Catholics met to discuss religion. Notable members 
included the historian Dawson, the poet and painter David Jones, the well-known priest 
and scholar Martin D’Arcy, the radio actor Harman Grisewood, as well as the actor and 
writer Robert Speaight, the later biographer of Chesterton’s great friend and ally Hilaire 
Belloc. Burns was himself an employee of the fledgling Catholic publishing house Sheed and 
Ward, founded in 1926. Burns’ Chelsea home provided a place of intersection for disparate 
Catholic intellects to ruminate on matters of a theological and aesthetic nature. It was here 
that many English Catholics first came into contact with the movement of Neo-Thomism, 
popular on the continent at the time, where a revival of interest in St. Thomas Aquinas, 
instigated by Pope Leo XIII and his 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris, had come to fruition in 
the work of such writers as Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. The Chelsea Group, as well 
as Burns’ short-lived journal Order, sought to popularise the Aristotelian/Thomist 
conception of order, known as Divine Economy, which asserted that ‘the proper end of 
everything is something good’.85 Like Chesterton, Order assented to a pre-Cartesian/pro-
incarnational view, expounded in Thomism, that, as David L. Schindler explains, perceives 
that ‘the logic of creation, expressed metaphysically […] implies a constitutive relation on 
the part of the creature consisting in reception from and movement toward […] God’.86 This 
also prioritised the consecrating role of the ‘moral imagination’. 
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As James R. Lothian has shown, the Chelsea group was not so much interested in ‘social or 
political questions’ as they were with the philosopher Edmund Burke’s conception of the 
moral imagination, coupled with Thomism, as well as the Neo-Thomism of Jacques 
Maritain; ‘training the intellect’ to ‘recognize “right order”’, as Burns put it.87 ‘The Chelsea 
group’, Lothian writes, ‘was convinced that the sacred needed to be restored to everyday 
life’.88 This could be achieved, they believed, by elevating what they saw as the Godly 
‘utility’ of the ‘Thomist’ conception of beauty, including the ‘Burkean’ notion of the moral 
imagination; as Bradley J. Birzer notes: both, ‘they believed, led to truth’.89  
 
Writing in his classic work Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), the philosopher 
Edmund Burke defined the ‘moral imagination’ as that ‘which the heart owns and the 
understanding ratifies’, an understanding that, in 1790, he believed was at risk of being 
‘dissolved’ by a ‘new conquering empire of light and reason’.90 Burke then explained what 
he meant by the term: 
 
[Without the moral imagination] a king is but a man, a queen is but a 
woman; a woman is but an animal; and an animal not of the highest 
order. All homage paid to the sex in general as such, and without distinct 
views, is to be regarded as romance and folly. Regicide, parricide, and 
sacrilege, are but fictions of superstition, corrupting jurisprudence by 
destroying its simplicity. The murder of a king, or a queen, or a bishop, or 
a father, are only common homicide; and if the people are by any chance, 
or in any way gainers of it, a sort of homicide much the most pardonable, 
and into which we ought not to make too severe a scrutiny.91  
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Burns later explained that his group ‘was after’ exactly this notion of the ‘moral 
imagination’ that ‘“aspires to the apprehending of right order in the soul and right order in 
the commonwealth”’.92  
 
The moral imagination, in conjunction with Maritain’s philosophia perennis – ‘over and 
against materialism in its myriad forms’ – constituted, in a sense, a rejection of the world. 
As Burns remembered later, ‘it astonishes me now what little attention my group – with 
the exception of Christopher Dawson – paid to politics as such’.93 Grisewood noted, too, 
that the issue of politics only ‘arose as an inference from aesthetic and philosophical 
beliefs’.94 Tom Villas, in his 2013 study on British Catholics’ relationship with fascism, 
confirms this, writing that Burns’ milieu ‘sought a spiritual transcendentalism which echoed 
aspects of the European right while criticising its political authoritarianism’.95 In particular, 
Villas exonerates Dawson with regards to the claim that he was a fascist.96 And although 
Burns tells us that Dawson was the ‘exception’ to the group’s lack of interest in politics, it 
should be noted, as it has been, that Dawson’s focus on politics, particularly in the 1930s, 
in such works as Religion and the Modern State (1935), sought to warn British readers 
against the rise of authoritarianism, on both sides of the political divide – see chapter four. 
 
Insofar as the Chelsea group was ‘worldly’, its intellectual impetus was terrestrial to the 
extent that, in its Thomist worldview, beauty was an echo of a higher ‘spiritual’ order, which 
I argue is a very Old Western concern; what Adrian Walker dubs ‘the More-Than-World […] 
within the world’.97 Here the Chelsea group emphasised aesthetics over politics. This was 
true ‘order’, one rooted in transcendentalism, in which art was, indeed, an end in itself. 
Consequently, what such intellectuals as Grisewood advocated was a sort of ‘Christian 
modernism’ that was modelled on a Thomist framework: 
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“The proper end of anything is something good”, St. Thomas had written. 
The art works of Cocteau, of James Joyce, of the post-impressionists in 
France and of Ben Nicholson and David Jones in England seemed to us to 
have realised their “proper end”; since the expressions of good are 
related in the celestial order, there should in the terrestrial order be no 
estrangement.98 
 
This brought the Chelsea group into conflict with the Catholic world around them who, as 
Grisewood described, ‘tended to judge all art works according to their conformity with 
Christian precept’.99 In attempting ‘to assert an autonomy for art’, they were also seeking 
to break down ‘the distinction between sacred and profane’.100 Grisewood expressed this 
notion neatly when he wrote that they ‘did not believe that the art of Salvator Rosa was 
“religious” because he painted so many pious Madonnas and the art of Renoir was not 
because he painted none’.101  
 
As well as opposing their fellow Catholics, the Chelsea group also saw themselves as a 
conservative equivalent of the aesthetes of the Bloomsbury group, as Grisewood 
recounted:  
 
Bloomsbury was fashionable and trendy; we were relatively unknown 
and espoused unpopular causes. Bloomsbury was leftist; we were 
decidedly rightist. Bloomsbury was late Victorian English; we were 
twentieth-century European. We were tenaciously Catholic; Bloomsbury 
was confidently agnostic. In the words of Samuel Butler, they regarded 
the end of Christianity as “virtually settled”; we looked forward to a 
renaissance.102 
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What emerges from this statement, of course, is the sense that Grisewood perceived 
himself and his own group as representing one side of the divide between English 
intellectuals: Malcolm Cowley’s stated divide, essentially, in Exile’s Return (1934). Certainly, 
Burns found himself on the side of ‘divinely inspired tradition’103, not Bloomsbury’s rather 
more reductionist view of religion:  
 
My first contacts with Bloomsbury baffled rather than shocked me. I 
could make little of its denigrating approach to so many values that I held 
to be sacred […] I was not awed by Bloomsbury intelligence. Its religious 
requirements appeared to be satisfied by [James George] Frazer’s Golden 
Bough and its sexual mores seemed to derive from Trobriand Islanders.104 
 
Burns characterised his own side as ‘what Bloomsbury would call a Catholic sub-culture’, 
but what he preferred to dub a Catholic ‘super-culture’.105 Moreover, Burns subscribed to 
Lewis’s notion of a ‘great divide’ in history, noting that in his ‘endless talk and rumination 
with friends like David Jones and Christopher Dawson and Harman Grisewood’, they came 
to face what they perceived to be ‘“the Break” – an alienating event in what was known of 
our civilization: more a slow-burner than an event, in fact’.106 For it appeared to them, he 
remembered, ‘that the Reformation, the age of Revolution and Industrialism had eroded 
the territory of the sacral in daily living’.107 ‘Modern man’, it seemed, ‘was losing a vital 
dimension in his life, the utilitarian motive was self-sufficient’.108 It might be said, then, that 
the great difference between Chelsea and Bloomsbury was that the former, as Burns wrote, 
believed that ‘a culture without religion was no culture – and scarcely civilised’.109 
 
Burns also had an important role at Sheed and Ward, which included playing ‘midwife’, as 
he put it, to the output of Dawson, many of whose works were published by the husband 
and wife joint venture of Frank Sheed and Maisie Ward.110 As Lothian has written, this new 
publishing house, which published the works of such writers as Chesterton and Maritain as 
well, ‘helped foster a new focus on theology and spiritual concerns’ that ran parallel to the 
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Chelsea group.111 Burns provided a point of intersection. While seeking to address ‘a 
modern audience that consisted of those ignorant of Christianity’, Lothian points out that 
Sheed and Ward were also attempting to find ‘a new St. Thomas’, but a St. Thomas who 
would not simply be a mere ‘repetition of Scholasticism’.112 What was needed, Ward 
believed, was an exposition of Thomism tailored for a modern audience:  
 
The revelation of eternal truth made by God to man has to be explained 
in human language. The Greek and Latin Fathers, the Medieval 
Schoolmen, the men of the Nineteenth Century all had to explain it to the 
world around them in language that the world understood. But the divine 
reality remained substantial, unalterable.113 
 
 
Via Media 
 
Sheed and Ward, in seeking a new St. Thomas, provided a vital outlet for the Catholic 
literary revival. However, insofar as there was a revival in Thomist thought, too, this was 
represented more broadly in a number of writers and artists. In this sense, Old Western 
Men as a term of definition is perhaps more apt, since not all such men were self-described 
Thomists, or even aware that their conception was broadly Thomist. However, when 
reduced down to its bare essentials, or rather Chesterton’s 1933 version of it, Thomism 
provides us with a definite template, or via media; admitting to the ‘More-Than-World’, 
but also, vitally, in a true Thomist sense, the More-Than-World within the world. 
 
It can be argued fairly that Chesterton was Thomist in outlook. Jay P. Corrin’s argument 
that ‘the Chesterbelloc was solidly Thomistic in its philosophical orientation’ has found no 
detractors – and Corrin includes Belloc in this estimation of Chesterton.114 Whether Lewis 
was Thomist is a different matter. Lewis, indeed, is an interesting case in point, in terms of 
how far he was prepared to take the incarnation principle. However, I think that Lewis’s 
shying away from Thomism, as we shall see, was not founded on any fundamental 
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disagreement with what we might term Chesterton’s brand of Thomism. Instead, it was 
rather more an issue of emphasis. As Stewart Goetz has recently observed, Lewis believed 
Thomism’s conclusions to be too materialistic.115 It was for this reason – taken in 
conjunction with Lewis’s mistaken notion that an assent to Thomism was required by the 
Papacy – that he never converted to Catholicism, Goetz has concluded.116 Lewis’s St. 
Thomas is not the same St. Thomas as Chesterton’s, but Lewis would not, I think, have 
disapproved of Chesterton’s ‘commonsense epistemology’ expressed throughout his 1933 
work on St. Thomas. What Lewis was after, too, he expressed, was ‘a via media between 
syllogisms and psychoses’.117 But by ‘syllogisms’ he essentially meant Chesterton’s version 
St. Thomas, it may be said, and by ‘psychoses’ he meant the sensuality of D. H. Lawrence. 
And although Lewis wrote that ‘Thomas Aquinas and D. H. Lawrence do not divide the 
universe between them’,118 Pearce writes that Aquinas nevertheless came to exert ‘a strong 
pull’ on the very centre of Lewis’s via media, through Thomas’s disciple Dante, in The 
Pilgrim’s Regress (1933); see Pearce.119 Whether we accept this argument or not, Lewis’s 
via media was a search for ‘the path of truth’:  
 
In true Coleridgean fashion, Lewis now believed that the true path 
between the “syllogisms” of the head and the “psychoses” of the heart 
was through the establishment of the correct relationship between faith 
and reason.120 
 
Indeed, as we shall see later on in this chapter, it was Samuel Taylor Coleridge, rather than 
St. Thomas, who provided Lewis with a solid intellectual grounding, in much the same 
manner that Aquinas provided Chesterton with his centre. In defining what it means to be 
Old Western, then, it is precisely this attempt at achieving a vital via media that provides 
us with a common grounding. Although there are shifts in emphasis, between the 
imagination (mind) and an epistemology rather more material (matter), the uniting ethic 
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is, as Pearce indicates, ‘the marriage of faith and reason’.121 We see this, too, in the output 
of both Dawson and Waugh. 
 
 
Evelyn Waugh’s St. Helena 
 
Waugh’s novel Helena, published in 1950, presents us with an interesting contrast to both 
the work of Chesterton, and later Dawson, in the sense that Waugh’s Thomism is implicit 
rather than explicit. As we shall also see, Waugh’s via media places an emphasis on reason. 
His novel Helena, which is founded on the historical St. Helena, the mother of Constantine 
the Great, is a predominantly fictional account of the life of the saint who allegedly 
discovered the True Cross in Jerusalem in the early fourth century. Waugh constructs his 
narrative around this one claim: that Helena’s great discovery ‘[turned] the eyes of the 
world back to the planks of wood on which their salvation hung’.122 In other words, in an 
age that rejected matter, the Cross underlined the Incarnation as a matter of fact.  
 
David Wykes has previously emphasised the extent to which Waugh set out to forward the 
character of Helena ‘as a near-caricature of the British empiricist […] utterly impatient of 
all mystery and obfuscation’.123 Douglas Lane Patey has noted, too, that in the novel ‘Helena 
is a practical, common-sensical girl always asking questions’.124 Waugh’s approach here 
actually complements his choice to elevate Helena as the discoverer of the True Cross as 
he evidently holds to the Thomist principle that faith is reconcilable with reason. Indeed, in 
1950 Waugh presented this scholastic epistemology as common sense, much like 
Chesterton had in his book on Aquinas, rejecting an absolutism of spirit in favour of a via 
media between Platonic transcendentalism and Aristotelian immanence.  
 
In Waugh’s novel, Helena’s empiricism necessitates an answer rooted in the worldly. At a 
key point in the book Helena attends a lecture on Gnosticism, a Catholic heresy that 
rejected matter in favour of pure spirit, a ‘“truth”’, says the lecturer, that ‘“by nature 
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transcends material proof”’, being ‘“beyond time and space’”.125 However, he is unable to 
answer Helena’s question, ‘How do you know?’126 After the lecture, Helena enters into a 
conversation with Lactantius, a Christian and historic advisor to her son Constantine. 
Unable to understand a word the Gnostic said, Helena enquires about Lactantius’s Christian 
god: ‘“if I asked you when and where he could be seen, what would you say?”’127 Lactantius 
answer is crucial, as it underpins the novel’s Thomist premise: ‘I should say that as a man 
he died two hundred and seventy-eight years ago in the town now called Aelia Capitolina 
in Palestine.’128 Moreover, Lactantius adds, there are ‘“accounts written by witnesses”’, as 
well as ‘“the living memory of the Church”’ itself, which testify to a Christ that inhabited 
history.129 These are statements purposefully couched in a language of reality.  
 
Waugh summarised what Helena really meant to him in a talk he made in 1952: that the 
empress essentially stood for, as well as reaffirmed in her own day, as well as his own, ‘the 
unreasonable assertion that God became man and died on the Cross; not a myth or an 
allegory; true God, truly incarnate, tortured to death at a particular moment in time, at a 
particular geographical place […] a matter of plain historical fact’.130 It is, indeed, clear that 
it was Christianity’s materiality, not merely its immateriality – the belief that ‘God became 
man’ and was in fact crucified at a specific time in history – that Waugh sought to 
emphasise in 1950. Writing to his friend John Betjeman that same year, he noted that ‘by 
going straight to the essential physical historical fact of the redemption’ Helena’s story in 
effect ‘snubbed’ Aldous Huxley’s reduction of religion, in The Perennial Philosophy (1945), 
to a narrow set of ultimately spiritual fundamentals.131 What the Cross stands for, 
therefore, is Christianity’s vital historicity; as the novel itself concludes, ‘It states a fact.’132  
 
Waugh’s Thomism, stressing reason – arguing that it is reconcilable with faith – is set out 
most clearly in his work Helena. It is telling, perhaps, that he would repeatedly insist that it 
was his finest novel.133 It may be that Waugh believed that this work was the purest 
exposition of his newfound faith in Catholicism, which he had converted to in the early 
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1930s. Here in this work, Waugh achieves a via media through Helena’s recovery of the 
material Cross. 
 
 
Christopher Dawson 
 
Dawson, contrary to Waugh, approached Thomism explicitly while also rejecting Waugh’s 
emphasis on empiricism. Much like Lewis, Dawson’s view of St. Thomas was troubled by 
what he perceived to be Thomism’s apparent emphasis on reason – just what Waugh 
appeared to find so admirable. Again, Chesterton’s St. Thomas marked out what it was that 
Dawson venerated in Aquinas. Indeed, he evidently saw much to cherish in the way 
‘medieval philosophy had assimilated the Aristotelian ethical and sociological principles 
and integrated them into the structure of Christian thought’.134 For Dawson, this via media 
– what he termed this ‘harmonization of the two orders’ – was the great intellectual 
achievement of the Middle Ages.135 Moreover, he traced this tradition back to the 
formation of Christendom itself. For instance, Dawson made sure to stress that Augustine, 
for all his Neo-Platonism, was ‘also a Latin, and his Latin sense of social and historical reality 
led him to do justice to the social and historical elements that are implicit in the Christian 
tradition’.136 There is also Dawson’s commentary on St. Francis of Assisi, which praises this 
saint in a similar manner, regarding him ‘the embodiment in flesh and blood of the new 
spirit’ that would come to characterise the medieval achievement; breaking the barrier 
‘between faith and life’, and thus constituting a ‘union of soul and body’.137 We should note 
Dawson’s use of ‘flesh’ and ‘body’ here, chosen specifically to emphasis the point that the 
development of Christianity in the West went hand in hand, he tells us, with a rejection of 
what he labels, in one instance, ‘the old established tradition of oriental spiritualism and 
Neoplatonic idealism’.138 This led to St. Thomas, the culmination of this rejection,139 which 
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would come to be known as Thomism.140 Man is now ‘the point at which the world of spirit 
touches the world of sense, and it is through him and in him that the material creation 
attains to intelligibility and becomes enlightened and spiritualized’.141 ‘This is the 
fundamental principle of St. Thomas’, Dawson concludes: that the Incarnation 
complements nature itself, becoming an analogy, as well, of ‘the bond of union between 
[the] material and the spiritual worlds’.142 A via media.  
 
Dawson did, however, have concerns about the legacy of St. Thomas, as can be perceived 
in his couching of Thomism in such subdued phraseology as the building up of ‘an 
intelligible world slowly and painfully from the data of the senses, ordered and 
systematized by science’.143 For a historian noted for his elevation of the imagination in the 
field of knowledge, as we will see later, such language hinting at a systemisation of thought 
is telling.144 More explicit, however, is Dawson’s view that Aquinas’s legacy, in the form 
post-Thomas Scholastics; for it was Dawson’s view that ‘it inaugurated a period of 
intellectual criticism and culture change which […] proved fatal to the synthesis of religion 
and culture’.145 
 
As well as this, there was also Dawson’s lament that the Thomist incorporation of every 
level of material existence in a spiritual whole brought Augustine’s conception of the City 
of God down to the level of the Earthy City, entailing theocracy: Papal monarchy, for 
example.146 Dawson’s Christendom – see chapter four – was a synthesis of religion and 
culture, not religion and politics. Just as Coleridge would be Lewis’s preferred model for a 
via media, Dawson’s most archetype was actually Dante, not Aquinas:   
  
The Divina Commedia of Dante, the greatest literary achievement of the 
Middle Ages, in which every aspect of life and every facet of personal and 
historic experience is illuminated by a metaphysical vision of the universe 
as an intelligible unity. And behind the Divina Commedia there is the work 
of St. Thomas […] devoted to the building up of a great structure of 
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thought in which every aspect of knowledge is co-ordinated and 
subordinated to the divine science – Theologia – the final transcendent 
end of every created intelligence.147 
 
 
Method vs. Ideology 
 
As Lothian suggests, Thomism, or rather Neo-Thomism, was at its best when applied as a 
method rather than as an ideology spouting a set of rigid conclusions.148 It might be argued 
that Dawson was right to suggest that Thomism had problematic consequences in its 
worldliness, in terms of its political ramifications, compared to the otherworldliness of 
Augustinism. Indeed, we should take note of Lothian’s 2009 work on the English Catholic 
intellectual community, 1910-1950, which emphasises the contrast between the ‘political 
and economic focus of the Bellocians’ – including Chesterton – and the focus on ‘theology 
and philosophy’ of the ‘Dawsonites’.149 Unlike the Bellocians, Dawson’s ‘hopes’ for the 
future were ‘spiritual, rather than […] political or economic’.150 Perhaps it should not 
surprise us that Chesterton, a Thomist without Dawson’s reservations, should place such 
an importance on politics, which was perhaps naïve. When we, instead, consider the Old 
Western Men as a whole, as a method or perspective, for it is not an ideology, I think, we 
should take into account Adam Schwartz’s conclusion: that Thomism provided Chesterton 
with a ‘comprehensive, integrative system’ of metaphysics; a ‘realism’ that supplied ‘a 
secure starting point’, as opposed to the ‘idealist’, and all too abstract, ‘abyss’ that was 
‘Augustine’s latent Platonism’.151 Schwartz’s study on Chesterton, Dawson, Jones, and 
Graham Greene, each a convert to Roman Catholicism, concludes that an ‘incarnational 
emphasis on the goodness of both spirit and matter’ was ‘central’ to their ‘personal and 
religious identity’.152 This chapter affirms Schwartz’s 2012 conclusion that such converts 
were informed by both Augustinian and Thomist thought, even though ‘they differed about 
which lode had the most valuable ore’.153 What we are generally aiming at describing here, 
then, is an Old Western synthesis, as mentioned before, that incorporates shifting, though 
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not ultimately contradictory, tones of emphasis in search of a via media between mind and 
matter. In achieving this union, many intellectuals, such as Lewis, were actually converted 
to Christianity themselves. It was, indeed, a very long and personal journey of discovery.   
 
 
Romantic Religion 
 
R. J. Reilly’s 2006 book Romantic Religion (second edition) argues the case that the work of 
Lewis, as well as that of Owen Barfield, Charles Williams and Tolkien, should be viewed as 
a ‘revival of the elements of nineteenth-century romanticism’.154 In the context of his own 
work, Reilly forwarded a broad definition of ‘Romanticism’, or rather he reduced it to one 
key element that he believed to be common to the work of such poets as Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, Keats, Blake, and Shelley; that is, of Romantics being ‘in touch with something 
other than themselves’.155 ‘Thus I call Kant’s “transcendental” philosophy romantic; I call 
Coleridge’s doctrine of the primary and secondary imagination romantic; I call 
Wordsworth’s view of Nature romantic’, Reilly writes.156 In other words, romantic 
experience is a religious experience, he asserts. In this sense, then, the work of Barfield, 
Lewis, Williams, and Tolkien, Reilly argues, entailed a revival of ‘a historical attitude brought 
about by the romantic reaction to Newtonian mechanical laws’157, a renewal that 
constituted a fundamental ‘meeting of minds’158, which sought in the twentieth century ‘to 
defend romanticism by showing it to be religious, and to defend religion by traditionally 
romantic means’.159 ‘Romantic experience’, otherwise known ‘subjective experience’160, 
therefore had its uses, insofar as ‘romantic experience’ might bring the individual ‘closer to 
God’.161 A. N. Wilson, too, has declared Lewis ‘a Romantic egoist in the tradition of 
Wordsworth and Yeats’.162 I concur with both Reilly’s and Wilson’s assessment, that what 
we are studying here is indeed a ‘revival’ of romanticism, but a revival that ran parallel to 
Alexander’s second Medieval revival, in the sense that both sought a via media, meaning a 
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marriage between faith and reason, or mind and matter. As has been noted before, this 
marriage was not Lewis’s starting position. Examining how Lewis came to God through 
romanticism will serve to reveal how Reilly’s forwarding of a ‘romantic religion’, as well as 
this thesis’s employment of ‘Thomism’ in the context of the Old Western Men, actually 
intersect. As stated earlier, Lewis’s Thomas is essentially Coleridge, derived through his 
friendship with Barfield. Yet there was Chesterton, who was also to play a key role in Lewis’s 
development. Both served to liberate Lewis’s imagination from the proposed tyranny of 
modern rationalism and positivism. It is instructive to see just how effective they were in 
guiding him in this process.  
 
It is the central point of Lewis’s autobiography Surprised by Joy (1955) to relate to us how 
he ‘passed from Atheism to Christianity’.163 The fundamental quandary that Lewis faced up 
until 1929, when he finally converted to theism, was how he might reconcile his 
‘imaginative life’ with the life of the ‘intellect’ – ‘the two hemispheres of my mind’, he 
wrote, which ‘were in the sharpest contrast. On the one side a many-islanded sea of poetry 
and myth; on the other a glib and shallow “rationalism”.’164 Lewis’s initial ‘impression’ of 
‘religion in general’ was essentially reductionist, then, believing it to be ‘utterly false’, yet 
‘a natural growth, a kind of endemic nonsense into which humanity tended to blunder’.165 
Contact with James George Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890) had only served to 
strengthen this belief. Frazer’s influence is clear in a letter Lewis wrote to Arthur Greeves 
in 1916, for example: 
 
You ask me my religious views: you know, I think, that I believe in no 
religion. There is absolutely no proof for any of them […] All religions, that 
is, all mythologies to give them their proper name are merely man’s own 
invention – Christ as much as Loki. Primitive man found himself 
surrounded by all sorts of terrible things he didn’t understand – thunder, 
pestilence, snakes […] These he kept off by cringing to them, singing 
songs and making sacrifices.166 
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While religion was itself curious, to the anthropologist or the sociologist, Lewis could not 
get over the notion that to actually believe in it was not intellectually respectable: 
‘superstition of course in every age has held the common people but in every age the 
educated and thinking ones have stood outside it, though outwardly conceding to it for 
convenience.’167 At first, then, Lewis found himself on the other side of the ‘Great Divide’ 
that he would go on to stipulate in 1954; the same side as George Orwell, for instance, who 
in 1942 expressed his view that: 
 
In theory it is still possible to be an orthodox religious believer without 
being intellectually crippled in the process; but it is far from easy, and in 
practice books by orthodox believers usually show the same cramped, 
blinkered outlook as books by orthodox Stalinists or others who are 
mentally unfree.168 
 
Virginia Woolf’s reaction, in 1928, to T. S. Eliot’s conversion to Christianity reflected very 
much the same attitude as Orwell’s: 
 
I have had a most shameful and distressing interview with dear Tom Eliot, 
who may be called dead to us all from this day forward. He has become 
an Anglo-Catholic believer in God and immortality, and goes to church. I 
was shocked. A corpse would seem to me more credible than he is. I 
mean, there’s something obscene in a living person sitting by the fire and 
believing in God.169 
 
Lewis himself, however, even in his most fervent atheism, was never entirely comfortable 
accepting the view that to be religiously orthodox was tantamount to being an intellectual 
cripple. Spiritually, at least, it did not satisfy him. As he would later write, ‘nearly all that I 
loved I believed to be imaginary’, while ‘nearly all that I believed to be real I thought grim 
and meaningless’.170 What is more, quite maddeningly, ‘the only non-Christians’ who 
seemed to him ‘to know anything were the Romantics and a good many of them were 
                                                          
167 Ibid. 
168 George Orwell, and Peter Davison, ed., Keeping Our Little Corner Clean, 1942-1943 (1998; 
London: Secker & Warburg, 2001), 66. 
169 Virginia Woolf, Nigel Nicholson, and Joanne Trautmann, eds., The Letters of Virginia Woolf (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1997), 457-58. 
170 Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 197. 
63 
 
tinged with something like religion, even at times with Christianity’.171 Lewis’s problem 
here, in truth, was that really he was a romantic himself. Indeed, it was exactly that 
‘imaginative life’, which he had possessed from childhood, which was holding him back 
from a total immersion in atheism. Although Lewis did not know it at the time, it was his 
latent romanticism that would open the way back to a reconciliation between reason and 
faith. 
 
Looking back, Lewis believed that it was, indeed, his ‘romanticism’ that had saved him from 
becoming ‘a Leftist, Atheist, satiric Intellectual of the type we all know so well’.172 From an 
early age, he had found himself ‘in the midst of the Romantics’.173 Without a doubt, he 
wrote, before he had even begun to seriously contemplate Christianity he was ‘waist deep 
in Romanticism’.174 Nevertheless, for a while, this ‘romanticism’ was latent rather than 
active. It would take his personal acquaintances with certain individuals of an identifiably, 
self-confessed religious type to give him permission to act upon what was essentially an 
instinct, but an instinct that so far had no foundation in reason, which was above all what 
Lewis required. 
 
Much has already been made of the effect that particular individuals had on Lewis’s 
‘imaginative growth’; by Wilson and Reilly, for instance.175 Indeed, there is the influence of 
Lewis’s friend Arthur Greeves, who, as Wilson has written, ‘occupied a position of unique 
importance in Lewis’s life’.176  
 
It was in writing to Greeves that he decided, very often, the sort of person 
he wanted to be. We could very definitely say that if it had not been for 
Arthur Greeves, many of Lewis’s most distinctive and imaginatively 
successful books would not have been written.177  
 
Then there was George MacDonald and his 1858 fantasy Phantastes, a faerie Romance for 
Men and Women, which Lewis chanced upon in 1916. Lewis remembered that unlike the 
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work of Thomas Malory, Edmund Spenser, William Morris, and William Butler Yeats, 
MacDonald’s fairyland introduced to him an entirely novel notion: ‘holiness.’178 When Lewis 
read Phantastes, his ‘imagination was, in a certain sense, baptised’, he remembered.179 
Wilson, in particular, has already provided us with a useful account of this. Still, it may be 
that the effect of Phantastes had been overstated, even by Lewis. Whether or not it really 
had a transformative effect on him or not, it seems that what Lewis was really after, at least 
after 1916, was a contemporary example – a via media – that was capable of resolving 
those two hemispheres of the mind that might be brought together; meaning the example 
of an evidently high-intellect who nevertheless had the temerity to believe. One such 
example was W. B. Yeats. 
 
In the poet Yeats, whom Lewis had met in 1921 in Oxford, was a poet who actually ‘believed 
[…] He really thought that there was a world of beings’, wrote Lewis.180 What was important 
here was that Yeats was not a Christian. If he had been Lewis would ‘have discounted his 
testimony’, since in 1921 he still believed ‘Christians [to be] “placed” and disposed forever’, 
he admitted.181 In Yeats, however, Lewis ‘learned that there were people, not traditionally 
orthodox, who nevertheless rejected the whole Materialist philosophy out of hand’.182 In 
fact, it was not just Yeats, but a panoply of writers and friends, including Barfield and 
Tolkien, who granted Lewis leave to liberate himself from the restraints of rationalism. 
Yeats’ importance, at a time when Lewis was still suspicious of the claims of Christianity, 
was that Yeats was a non-Christian who believed, nonetheless, in another realm other than 
material existence.  
 
During the 1920s Lewis was becoming increasingly aware that what he had previously taken 
for granted – the ‘authority’ of ‘what I believed to be the findings of the sciences’ – was 
being challenged by ‘an opposite authority’.183 In fact, this challenge was coming in from all 
sides, including his own work in the field of literature. Wilson, for example, attributes, 
rightly I think, the importance of his studies in English at university, which served to redress 
the overbearing material and rationalist influence of the classics.184 ‘Reading English’, 
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Wilson writes, ‘confronted him with questions which would not go away about the nature 
of Man, questions which infuriatingly formed themselves into religious shapes’.185 But this 
only took Lewis a little way. He was reconsidering his position, but nevertheless still 
required an actual epistemological framework that would lead him to an active belief which 
would, in effect, christen his imagination. This he finally attained through his friend Barfield, 
who passed on to him the theories of the poet Coleridge. 
 
Francis J. Morris and Ronald C. Wendling have written that both Lewis’s and Barfield’s 
‘intellectual journeys trace out in biographically circumstanced real time the 
complementary but antagonistic routes that Coleridge’s earlier epistemological vision 
projected as the paths to knowledge’.186 Barfield later recalled that ‘the point at issue at 
the time’ was whether ‘the kind of mental activity which goes to the appreciation of art or 
poetry [could] be applied epistemologically’.187 What role might the imagination have to 
play in the seeking of knowledge? Pope John Paul II made this question the central issue in 
his 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio, explaining that, from the Catholic point of view, ‘our 
vision of the face of God is always fragmentary and impaired by the limits of our 
understanding. Faith alone makes it possible to penetrate the mystery […] enabling the 
mind in its autonomous exploration to penetrate within the mystery by use of reason’s own 
methods, of which it is rightly jealous.’188 As Morris and Wendling write, ‘Lewis’s 
temperament and intellect were […] first set suspiciously against this notion’.189 
Knowledge, Lewis believed, could only by inferred from experience relating to the external, 
the object, not the realm of subjective experience, which he distrusted. The difference 
between Barfield and Lewis was explicit, as Barfield explained: ‘[I wanted] to combine sharp 
logical thought with imagination somehow in the same act; and Lewis always wanted to 
keep them separate. He was taking a holiday from logic when he was using imagination. I 
always wanted to get them together somehow.’190 Barfield’s ‘Coleridgean notion’191 – that 
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the imagination enables the observer to perceive the materially imperceptible – entailed a 
creative coming together of subject and object; what Coleridge termed ‘a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM’.192 Coleridge’s philosophy of 
nature and consciousness, which Barfield ‘elucidated and expanded’ upon, Morris and 
Wendling continue, was no less than a rejection of ‘Cartesian dualism’ itself193, which since 
seventeenth century had ‘dominated the Western mind’, insisting upon the ‘isolation of 
consciousness from the phenomena it contemplates’.194  
 
The divide that Morris and Wendling themselves insist on is essentially Coleridge’s notion 
of the vital intercommunication between subject and object opposed to Cartesian 
isolationism, ‘a picture of a world wherein inert phenomena – the only and ultimate reality 
– are peered at longingly by an isolated human consciousness sealed inside a vacuum of 
meaningless’.195 Lewis would later describe his communications with Barfield on this 
matter as ‘one of the turning points of my life’.196 ‘Our logic’, he concluded, ‘was 
participation in a cosmic Logos’.197 Lewis would achieve a via media this way. Although it 
was Coleridge who opened the door for him, then, not Aquinas, it may be argued that 
Thomist thought did influence him, through Chesterton.  
 
 
The Influence of G. K. Chesterton on C. S. Lewis 
 
It was during the First World War, while Lewis was recovering in hospital from trench 
fever in 1918, that he first came into contact with the work of Chesterton: 
 
I had never heard of him and had no idea of what he stood for; nor can I 
quite understand why he made such an immediate conquest of me. It 
might have been expected that my pessimism, my atheism, and my 
hatred of sentiment would have made him to me the least congenial of 
all authors.198 
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Although Lewis’s acceptance of Chesterton was not immediate, he nevertheless enjoyed 
his work. ‘I liked him for his goodness’, Lewis recalled.199 Then sometime around 1929, a 
significant year for Lewis, he read Chesterton’s The Everlasting Man (1925); it was to prove 
pivotal in Lewis’s spiritual and intellectual development. ‘For the first time’, he wrote, he 
‘saw the whole Christian outline of history set out in a form that seemed to me to make 
sense’.200 Chesterton’s 1925 work was intended as a repudiation of H. G. Wells’ The Outline 
of History (1919-20), which had portrayed the history of mankind as an essentially 
Darwinian progression, famously bestowing less attention to the life of Christ and his 
historical implications than it did on the attempted Persian conquest of Greece. 
Chesterton’s critique of Wells’ work was that it basically reduced man to little more than a 
progressive offshoot of primordial slime.  
 
What Chesterton did in The Everlasting Man was to put Wells in his place by restoring man, 
including Wells himself, to his rightful place beside Christ. ‘Man is not merely an evolution’, 
Chesterton wrote, ‘but rather a revolution’.201 Although, as Lewis recounted, he ‘contrived 
not to be too badly shaken’ by the author’s avowal that there was much more to man than 
a highly evolved splotch of gunk, there was no going back for Lewis after having read The 
Everlasting Man.202 As Lewis himself remarked in 1955: ‘in reading Chesterton, as in reading 
MacDonald, I did not know what I was letting myself in for. A young man who wishes to 
remain a sound Atheist cannot be too careful of his reading.’203 Indeed, he could not help 
but conclude that ‘Chesterton had more sense than all the other moderns put together’.204 
 
Lewis believed The Everlasting Man to be the ‘best popular defence of the full Christian 
position’.205 Writing to Sheldon Vanauken in 1950, Lewis remarked that his BBC radio 
broadcasts, defending Christianity, made during the war – which were later published as 
Mere Christianity (1952) – were very much inspired by Chesterton’s own spirited 
justifications for the Christian faith in 1925.206 Chesterton evidently had a profound 
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influence on Lewis and his own work. Donald T. Williams, for example, believes that The 
Everlasting Man was very likely ‘a source for many of Lewis's most characteristic ideas’.207 
Humphrey Carpenter, too, in his work on the Inklings, has written of ‘the breezy outdoor 
Chestertonian Christianity of Lewis’.208 In particular, Carpenter believes that Lewis shared 
with Chesterton ‘a very boyish element’.209 Not surprisingly, Pearce’s work C. S. Lewis & The 
Catholic Church (2003) makes much of Lewis’s connection to Chesterton; though other 
works, it should be noted, such as The Cambridge Companion to C. S. Lewis (2010), edited 
by Robert MacSwain and Michael Ward, barely mention the influence of Chesterton’s 
output on Lewis. Nevertheless, Chesterton’s presence in Lewis’s intellectual development, 
confirming his instinctual reach for a via media, is clear. Lewis plainly recognised a kindred 
spirit in Chesterton that is telling in itself. Indeed, Chesterton, more than any other Old 
Western intellectual, looms large elsewhere too; not only Chesterton the philosopher, but 
also Chesterton the historian.  
 
 
The Historical Imagination 
 
Having so far focused for the most part on the theme of reconciling reason with faith and 
the imagination, it is worth turning our attention toward the application of the imagination 
as an Old Western ethic in the interpretation of history itself. This is especially relevant to 
this thesis, not simply because we are focusing on a group of intellectuals who perceived 
themselves as combatting modernity, and what they saw as its positivistic underpinnings, 
but also because a large part of this combat was played out in the arena of history. Indeed, 
it should not surprise us that such an Old Western emphasis on the moral imagination also 
found expression in other streams of thought, such as history.  Here again, as we shall see, 
Chesterton’s influence is clear. Although it is arguable that his influence is evident most of 
all in the writings of the historian Dawson. In terms of an Old Western response to 
modernity, a key part of that revaluation was an adoption of a historical method that was 
essentially imaginative and contemplative.  
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What Dawson had in mind when considering the fundamental function of the writing of 
history was its use ‘as a weapon against the modern age’.210 Writing in the introduction to 
his work The Making of Europe (1932), Dawson forwarded his conviction that ‘history 
should be the great corrective’ to what Bertrand Russell, ‘rightly’, in his opinion, labelled a 
‘parochialism’ in time, dubbing it ‘one of the great faults of our modern society’.211 Dawson 
agreed. Modern man was in danger, it seemed, of succumbing to a narrow-mindedness 
rooted in the here and now, one that paradoxically blinded him to the problems of the 
present. History’s utility, as Dawson saw it in the 1930s, was that it might, indeed, serve as 
a vital corrective in his own time, as he wrote in 1932: 
 
One of the great merits of history is that it takes us out of ourselves – 
away from obvious and accepted facts – and discovers a reality that 
would otherwise be unknown to us. There is a real value in steeping our 
minds in an age entirely different to that which we know: a world 
different, but no less real – indeed more real, for what we call “the 
modern world” is the world of a generation, while a culture like that of 
the Byzantine or the Carolingian world has a life of centuries.212 
 
This corrective was of especial importance, then, when coming to grips with an age radically 
different to one’s own; a period such as the Dark Ages, or the early Middle Ages, which 
Dawson believed was a ‘neglected and unappreciated subject’, largely because it did ‘not 
manifest itself in striking external achievements’.213 Moderns, who were far more 
materialistic and secular in their worldview, he argued, were quite naturally drawn to the 
‘superficial attractiveness’ of the Renaissance, for example, rather than to the ‘internal 
organic process’ that had actually brought that external brilliance – the ‘“easy” periods’ of 
study for moderns – into being in the first place.214 For there was no doubt in Dawson’s 
mind that the time of the Dark Ages was actually ‘the most creative age of all, since it 
created not this or that manifestation of culture, but the very culture itself’.215 And since 
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Dawson believed that ‘the real forces that rule the world are spiritual ones’216, as he wrote 
later in 1935, any study that would serve to accentuate the ‘spiritual forces that have gone 
to the making of Europe’, he wrote in 1932, was surely worth the effort, if only because it 
combatted exactly that ‘parochialism in time’ that Dawson had decided it was the purpose 
of history to correct.217  
 
Dawson should be viewed as a similar figure to the historian Herbert Butterfield, his near 
contemporary, who, as C. T. McIntire has shown, saw ‘the intrusion of religion into 
historical study’ as ‘a matter of dissent’.218 In particular, Dawson saw that he was well 
placed to play the intermediary between the Dark Ages and the present since he was a 
Roman Catholic. As he wrote in 1932, ‘it is impossible to understand medieval culture 
unless we have a sympathy and appreciation for medieval religion, and here the Catholic 
historian possesses an obvious advantage’.219 While most modern historians were ‘cut off 
from the European past by a spiritual barrier and […] forced to study it from outside with 
the disinterested curiosity of the archaeologist who disinters the relics of a dead culture’, 
Dawson, as a Roman Catholic, was studying it as a living tradition from the inside.220 This 
was significant, wrote Dawson, because ‘to the Catholic the so-called ‘dark ages’ were ‘ages 
of dawn, for they witnessed the conversion of the West, the foundation of Christian 
civilization, and the creation of Christian art and Catholic liturgy. Above all, they were the 
Age of the Monks.’221 Dawson was essentially echoing the conclusion of his fellow Catholic 
convert Chesterton – an important figure in his development as a historian – who in 1908 
wrote that ‘the most absurd thing that could be said of the Church is the thing we have all 
heard said of it. How can we say that the Church wishes to bring us back into the Dark Ages? 
The Church was the only thing that ever brought us out of them.’222 This was a view that 
Dawson evidently shared with Chesterton. They were both part of Alexander’s stated 
revival of interest in the Middle Ages, which in their own case was synonymous with 
conversion to Catholicism.  But Dawson also saw that it might be ‘very difficult for anyone 
                                                          
216 Christopher Dawson, Religion and the Modern State (1935; London: Sheed and Ward, 1936), 
152. 
217 Dawson, Making of Europe, 255. 
218 C. T. McIntire, Herbert Butterfield: Historian as Dissenter (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004), 413. 
219 Dawson, Making of Europe, 5. 
220 Ibid., 7. 
221 Ibid., 5. 
222 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (1908; New York: John Lane, 1909), 174. 
71 
 
who is not a Catholic to understand the full meaning of this great tradition’.223  For example, 
Dawson cited the example of ‘monasticism’, which he believed was a formative influence 
in the development of Western culture; which ‘to the ordinary secular historian […] must 
remain as alien and incomprehensible a phenomenon as the Lamaism of Thibet or the 
temple priesthood of the ancient Sumerians’.224  
 
While Dawson saw that he obviously possessed an advantage over secular, and even 
Protestant, historians – being able himself to communicate that tradition to a modern 
audience, he believed – he also recognised that this advantage had not insignificant 
disadvantages. For example, he noted in 1932 that for the last century and more’ there had 
‘certainly been a tendency among Catholic writers to make history a department of 
apologetics and to idealise medieval culture in order to exalt […] religious ideals’.225 This 
was ultimately counterproductive, Dawson concluded: ‘this way of writing history defeats 
its own ends, since as soon as the reader becomes suspicious of the impartiality of the 
historian he discounts the truth of everything that he reads.’226 Dawson was likely referring, 
in part, to the writings of the Chesterton and Belloc: the ‘Chesterbelloc.’ In 1955, Dawson 
noted that he had ‘never been a Bellocite’, and resented the suggestion by those ‘so 
violently anti-Chesterbelloc’ who claimed that he was one of them.227 As we shall see, 
however, Dawson was greatly influenced at least by Chesterton, although he looked less 
favourably on Belloc; as Christina Scott, Dawson’s daughter, later remembered: 
‘Christopher admired Chesterton’s work and also came to know him later. He preferred 
Belloc as a poet rather than as a historian, for he considered his views one-sided and 
unreliable, nor did he feel at home with Belloc’s particular brand of triumphant 
Catholicism.’228 However, there was not, in fact, much to choose between them in terms of 
a so-called triumphalist Catholicism on the part of the Chesterbelloc. After all, this is the 
same Dawson who would dub Chesterton ‘one of the greatest champions of Christian 
culture in our time’.229 Rather, Dawson’s disparagement of Catholic ‘apologetics’ was not 
rooted in the idea that it was wrong as such, but rather, I think, that it was identifiably 
Catholic, and overtly brash in its communication, meaning that it instantly provided any 
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opposing school of history the excuse to decry it for its apparent bias. Dawson was 
particularly sensitive to such accusations; in part because, in 1933, he had been refused a 
professorship at Leeds University on the grounds that he was, indeed, a Roman Catholic: 
‘they had much the same attitude to Catholics as the Nazis have to the Jews!’, he 
complained.230 
 
Dawson’s introduction to The Making of Europe might, therefore, be seen as a pre-emptive 
clearing of the throat, distancing himself from the Chesterbelloc, for fear of being accused 
of bias; concluding that ultimately ‘this is not a history of the Church or a history of 
Christianity; it is a history of culture […] and if the non-religious reader should feel that an 
undue amount of space or of emphasis has been given in this book to theological or 
ecclesiastical matters, he must remember that it is impossible to understand the past 
unless we understand the things for which the men of the past cared most’.231 It was not 
his purpose ‘to prove a theological point or to justify a religious point of view, but to explain 
the past’, he made sure to note.232 Indeed, Dawson saw that in actual fact he was himself 
combatting the prevailing ‘provincialism’ of the time, which had for a long time manifested 
itself in ‘the Pharisaic self-righteousness of the Whig historians’ whose writing about history 
involved a limiting and, what he termed, ‘unhistorical […] subordination of the past to the 
present’.233 This brings us to another problem that Dawson sought to confront in his 
writings, particularly on the writing about history itself; which was how the non-Catholic 
might, indeed, transcend the parochialism of his own time. Ironically, Dawson’s solution 
was that very lack of partiality that he so much guarded against: the historical imagination. 
In this sense, his solution to the problem of a lack of sympathy directed toward the past 
was rooted in the same accommodation that Lewis would make regarding the problem of 
reconciling mind with matter.  
 
It was the historian Hebert Butterfield’s view that ‘it is through something like a creative 
act of the historical imagination’ that we make ‘the actual effort of historical 
understanding’.234 In his most famous work The Whig Interpretation of History (1931), 
Butterfield elucidated his view that ‘real historical understanding is not achieved by the 
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subordination of the past to the present, but rather by our making the past our present and 
attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own’.235 In this sense, then, 
the historian ought to be ‘something more than the mere passive external spectator’.236 It 
was Butterfield’s view, then, that ‘something more’ was required if the historian was to 
make ‘the past intelligible to the present’.237 That ‘something’ was what he termed 
‘imaginative sympathy’.238 Butterfield’s ‘case against the whig historian’ was that he 
essentially brought that ‘effort of understanding to a halt’, particularly ‘in the case of the 
men who are most in need of it’: ‘tories and conservatives and reactionaries.’239  
 
It is difficult to imagine that, prior to the writing of the introduction to The Making of 
Europe, Dawson had not read Butterfield’s famous denunciation of Whig history published 
the year before his own work. Dawson studied historians as well, in the same way that 
Butterfield, too, ‘promoted historical thinking about the study of history itself’, as McIntire 
writes.240 Moreover, Dawson, like Butterfield, was also part of what McIntire terms ‘the 
major revival of Christian interpretations of history among religious thinkers and historians 
after the Second World War’ – though this process should be located in the 1930s, and 
perhaps even earlier in the work of Chesterton and Belloc, as we shall see.241 And it seems 
likely that Butterfield’s treatise confirmed a notion already present in Dawson, that of the 
importance of an imaginative or spiritual understanding regarding history. We see this 
understanding displayed, for example, in Dawson’s writings on the historian Edward 
Gibbon, author of The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–89).  
 
First, we should note that it was Dawson’s view that Gibbon’s ‘position as the classical 
historian of the Decline of the Roman Empire’ was largely because he ‘identified himself 
with his subject, as no other historian has done […] He felt as a Roman; he thought as a 
Roman, he wrote as a Roman.’242 This, he believed, was at the root of Gibbon’s greatness 
as a historian. But it was also the foundation of his greatest failing, since, as Dawson wrote, 
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‘anyone who lives his subject […] is bound to be a partisan’.243 In Gibbon’s case, his 
partisanship made him particularly ‘unjust to Christianity, [especially] the Catholic 
Church’.244 For ‘Gibbon’s great defect as an historian’, Dawson wrote – ‘a very serious one, 
since it invalidates his judgment on the very issues which are most vital to his subject’ – 
was his ‘complete lack of sympathy and understanding for the religious forces which have 
exerted such an immense influence on Western culture’.245 For what Gibbon lacked most 
of all was ‘spiritual vision and historical imagination’, he explained.246 This, Dawson 
believed, was what accounted for his great ‘failure of understanding’ when attempting ‘to 
deal with the problem of the rise of Christianity’, which ultimately proved ‘invisible and 
unintelligible’ to Gibbon, a historian who had ‘no understanding of specifically religious 
values’, Dawson tells us.247 Dawson attributed to Gibbon that ‘provincialism’ in time, 
therefore, which he had attributed, in 1932, to the modern historians of his own time: 
‘Gibbon’s religious prejudices rendered it impossible for him to understand the positive 
achievements of mediaeval religion and culture.’248 Dawson employed the example of 
Gibbon, it seems, to forward his own point, one that he shared with Butterfield, that history 
required ‘something more’ if the historian was to rise above the prejudices of his own time: 
metahistory.  
 
In 1951 Dawson contributed an article, titled ‘The Problem of Metahistory’, to History 
Today in response to the historian Alan Bullock’s condemnation of metahistory, that same 
year in the same publication; metahistory meaning an imaginative understanding of the 
past that relied as much on the creative force of intuition as it did on isolated facts. Dawson 
argued that ‘metahistory’, in this sense, was ‘pervasive’ and, indeed, ‘inevitable’, ever since 
it had ‘entered into relations with philosophy’.249 Dawson suggested that what Bullock was 
actually after – ‘the pure historian uncontaminated by any extraneous metahistorical or 
sociological elements’ – was the ‘antiquarianism’ of the seventeenth century.250 Although 
Dawson conceded that antiquaries ‘were the real founders of modern historical 
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scholarship’251, he also pointed out that Bullock had neglected the role of metahistory ‘in 
the modern historical development’.252 Indeed, it was Dawson’s conviction that the 
prestige that history had attained in the modern world was due not to the ‘pure historians’, 
but ‘the new types of philosophic historians’, such as Alexis de Tocqueville.253 In this sense, 
Dawson’s problem with modern historians was that they had not recognised their own lack 
of impartiality. But Dawson went further, arguing that a certain amount of subjective 
understanding was vital to the historian if it allowed access to a reality that would 
otherwise remain unknown to him. Dawson had, of course, argued this point in 1932. The 
essential difference, then, between Dawson and Bullock was that the latter believed that it 
was the role of historian to discover what had happened in history, while the former, 
Dawson, sought to discover the laws that determined the course of history itself. In 
reference to this, Dawson took Tocqueville as the ‘classical’ example of a ‘metahistorian’, 
being a historian possessed by a ‘spiritual vision’ that, far from being ‘the enemy of true 
history’, was ‘its guide and its friend’, a ‘metahistorical vision’ founded upon ‘religious 
contemplation’ rather than ‘scientific generalisation’.254 What Dawson was really aiming at, 
then, was a recognition of the possibilities and legitimate uses of metahistory, which he 
believed complemented rather than undermined the study of history. In this sense, it might 
be argued that Dawson’s own vision was essentially inclusive and reconciliatory, as is 
evident in the passage that most appropriately summed up his own view on the virtue of 
metahistory, which again exhibits in almost blatant form Butterfield’s influence too, that of 
‘something more’:   
 
The academic historian is perfectly right in insisting on the importance of 
the techniques of historical criticism and research. But the mastery of 
these techniques will not produce great history, any more than a mastery 
of metrical technique will produce great poetry. For this something more 
is necessary.255 
 
Dawson differs very much to Richard Tarnas’s description of a type of ‘academic history’ 
that has ‘now disengaged itself from the task of discerning great overarching patterns and 
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comprehensive uniformities in history’, limiting itself ‘to carefully defined specialized 
studies, to methodological problems derived from the social sciences, to statistical analyses 
of measurable factors such as population levels and income figures’.256 Dawson, it may be 
said, was responding to what E. H. Carr later termed the ‘great age for facts […] an age of 
innocence’, the nineteenth century, when ‘historians walked in the Garden of Eden, 
without a scrap of philosophy to cover them’.257 So while ‘the positivists, anxious to stake 
out their claim for history as a science, contributed the weight of their influence to this cult 
of facts […] the nineteenth century was weak in medieval history, because it was too much 
repelled by the superstitious beliefs of the Middle Ages […] to have any imaginative 
understanding of medieval people’.258 Carr, also of Dawson’s generation, was himself a 
representative of this principle of imaginative understanding, concurring that ‘history 
cannot be written unless the historian can achieve some kind of contact with the mind of 
those about whom he is writing’.259 As John Lukacs writes, too, historians such as R. G. 
Collingwood, born in the same year as Dawson, in 1889, represent a time ‘during the 
twentieth century’ when ‘the Cartesian and objectivist and scientific conception of the 
world and of human knowledge was surely on the wane’.260 Indeed, Collingwood, writing 
in such works as The Idea of History (1946), also viewed ‘historical thought’ as being ‘in one 
way like perception’, serving ‘as the touchstone by which we decide whether alleged facts 
are genuine’.261 In this sense, he wrote, ‘the historical imagination […] is properly not 
ornamental but structural’.262 Dawson, Butterfield and Carr were therefore not alone in 
their estimation of what they saw as the vital utility of the imagination in the understanding 
of history; Collingwood writing that ‘historical thinking is that activity of the imagination by 
which we endeavour to provide […] the idea of the past […] with detailed content’.263 But 
we should, perhaps, question Carr’s assertion that Collingwood was the ‘only British thinker 
in the […] [twentieth] century who has made a serious contribution to the philosophy of 
history’.264 Although Dawson is still a neglected figure, his own theories paralleled 
Collingwood’s own. So, too, did Butterfield’s own theories. 
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In a piece titled ‘Memories of a Victorian Childhood’, written in 1949, Dawson recalled that 
it was largely due to the influence of his parents that the ‘essential connection between 
story and history’ was made clear to him, ‘so that I came to know the past not so much by 
the arid path of [Charles Dickens’] The Child’s History of England, as through the enchanted 
world of myth and legend’.265 This was vital, Dawson explained, since he ‘discovered very 
early that history was not a flat expanse of time, measured off in dates, but a series of 
different worlds’, each possessing ‘its own spirit and form and its own riches of poetic 
imagination’.266  ‘No doubt this initiation into the past had its disadvantages from the 
practical utilitarian point of view’, he conceded, ‘but it was education in the true sense of 
the word’.267 And the result of this ‘education’ would ultimately find perfect expression in 
his essay ‘The Kingdom of God and History‘, published in 1938, in which Dawson expressed 
his view that ‘the essence of history is not to be found in facts but in tradition’.268 This 
notion stemmed from his realisation, which we can date back to his childhood, that ‘the 
pure fact is not as such historical’, but ‘only becomes historical when it can be brought into 
relation with a social tradition so that it is seen as part of an organic whole’.269 He offered 
the reader an example:  
 
A visitor from another planet who witnessed the Battle of Hastings would 
possess far greater knowledge of the facts than any modern historian, yet 
this knowledge would not be historical knowledge for lack of any 
tradition to which it could be related; whereas the child who says 
“William the Conqueror 1066” has already made his atom of knowledge 
a historical fact by relating it to a national tradition and placing it in the 
time-series of Christian culture.270 
 
What Dawson was essentially driving at here was the idea that a disciple of his, the historian 
John Lukacs, would expand upon later – in Historical Consciousness: The Remembered Past 
(1968) – the idea that ‘the value of Facts may depend on their relationships even more than 
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on their accuracy’.271 Lukacs shares Dawson’s conception of history in the sense that it is 
his view, too, that ‘historical knowledge is the knowledge of human beings about other 
human beings’, and that ‘this is different from the knowledge which human beings possess 
of their environment’.272 This in itself involves a vital recognition of the boundaries of 
history itself; that ‘history is not a science in the modern sense of the word’, Lukacs argues, 
since ‘historical information is incomplete […] inaccurate and not measurable’.273 Rather, 
the ‘very purpose of historical knowledge is not so much accuracy as a certain kind of 
understanding’.274 In this Dawson and Lukacs are in agreement; and are counted amongst 
those, including Arnold Toynbee and Herbert Butterfield, generally referred to by Gerald J. 
Russello, in 2007, as the ‘philosophical historians’, who ‘believed that history is the memory 
of humanity’, its ‘interpretation’ being the ‘attempt to plumb the mysteries of the human 
condition’.275 This conception necessarily entailed what Lukacs described in 2002 as ‘an 
attempt at participation’ on the part of the historian, attempting to gain ‘a glimpse of 
intuitive understanding’ that would precede, but also engender, ‘knowledge’ itself, 
therefore rejecting ‘the antiseptic, or wholly detached, ideal of objectivity’, believing that 
‘understanding is more important than is certainty’.276 This takes us back to Dawson’s 
‘Memories of a Victorian Childhood’, which expressed the same view that Lukacs would 
later make his own, that ‘the old myths are better not only intrinsically, but because they 
lead further and open a door into the mind as well as into the past’.277 
 
This was the old road which carries us back not merely for centuries but 
for thousands of years […] a whole series of ages – a river of immemorial 
time which has suddenly dried up and become lost in the seismic cleft 
that has opened between the present and the past.278 
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Dawson, like Lewis too, expressed a foreboding about a perceived break with the past, 
which, in his own words, was no less than ‘a change in human consciousness’ itself, one 
that was ‘far greater than we have realised’.279 It is important, then, that we note here that 
Dawson and Lewis shared a similar, if not exact, categorisation of modernity; a spiritual 
divide rather than one that was strictly material. For Dawson, at least, what had been lost 
as a result of that breach was also the cumulative knowledge of the human condition that 
found expression historically through story or myth. Having, therefore, identified this 
divide, Dawson came to the conclusion that the only way to bridge this divide between past 
and present was to return history to the essential connection between story and history 
that had existed as an essential instinct in Dawson since childhood, an intuition that was 
ultimately, he believed, visual. The very material fabric of history would, it seemed, lead 
the materialist back toward a metahistorical contemplation, and rediscovery, of the past. 
 
It was Dawson’s view, as early as the 1920s – in the unpublished essay ‘Art and Society’ – 
that ‘nothing is more difficult for the natural man than to understand a culture or social 
tradition different from his own’, since this would necessitate ‘an almost superhuman 
detachment from inherited ways of thought and education and […] social environment’.280 
And ‘no amount of detailed and accurate external knowledge’ could ‘compensate’ for a 
‘lack of that immediate vision which springs from the comprehension of a social tradition 
as a living unity’.281 ‘We cannot bridge the gulf by a purely scientific study of social facts, by 
the statistical and documentary methods that have been so much used by modern 
sociologists’, he explained.282 Ultimately, only ‘an immense effort of sympathetic 
imagination’ could bridge ‘the gulf of mutual incomprehension that separates cultures’.283 
And it was one of Dawson’s chief convictions that ‘an appreciation of art’ was ‘of the first 
importance’ in bringing this task of imaginative understanding to fruition.284 ‘We can learn 
more about medieval culture from a cathedral than from the most exhaustive study of 
constitutional law.’285 For Dawson this was a vital realisation, one learnt in childhood, as he 
would later explain elsewhere:  
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I learnt more during my schooldays from my visits to the Cathedral at 
Winchester than I did from the hours of religious instruction in school. 
That great church with its tombs of the Saxon kings and the medieval 
statesmen-bishops, gave one a greater sense of the magnitude of the 
religious element in our culture and the depths of its roots in our national 
life than anything one could learn from books.286 
 
As well as Dawson’s introduction to Winchester Cathedral, his earlier youth was perhaps 
even more significant, since he had spent the first six years of his life at Hay Castle in Wales, 
where he was born on 12 October 1889. ‘[Hay] probably influenced me more than any 
[other place]’, he later wrote.287 ‘Full of history and legend, it was a romantic house for a 
child in his early years’, Scott writes.288 Then there was Hartlington, in Craven, in the 
Yorkshire Dale, where Dawson spent the next years of his upbringing, on the site of a 
previous manor that the Dawson family had held since 1687. But it was not simply the 
family connection, on his father’s side, which so much excited Dawson – rather, the whole 
area oozed history and romance, including nearby Bolton Abbey: 
 
And as myth passed into history, so history in its turn left its visible 
imprint on the world I knew. The scattered farms and hamlets of Craven 
often preserved the names that one found in the Sages – Grims and 
Helgis and Thorlaks – and it was on Stainmoor on the northern frontier 
of Craven that one of the great figures of Viking saga and poetry met his 
end.289 
 
Vitally, then, although he was undoubtedly bookish, it seems that Dawson’s initiation into 
the past was not intellectual or antiquarian as such, but aesthetic and imaginative – and 
even monkish. As Dermot Quinn observes, in Eternity in Time: Christopher Dawson and the 
Catholic Idea of History (1997), Dawson’s ‘imagination was primarily visual. History was not 
an abstraction but a thing to be seen, in churches and graves, in the soil itself.’290 Moreover, 
it should be noted, too, that it was contemplative; and in an even more refined sense, 
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lonely, which arguably complemented Dawson’s notion of a particular type of historian 
possessing a ‘spiritual vision’, as a sage, almost. 
 
The novelist Ralph Ricketts, who visited Dawson a number of times in Budleigh Salterton in 
the 1950s, recollected ‘the impression of loneliness’ in Dawson’s ‘incongruous setting […] 
exiled in a world of tea cups and retired colonels […] a voluntary exile’, a result of ‘his 
extreme sensibility’.291 Dawson was certainly shy and retiring, as Scott attested to in her 
biography of her father in 1984.292 It should be noted first, however, that Dawson held part-
time posts as a lecturer at the universities of Exeter (1930-36), Liverpool (1934), Edinburgh 
(1946-48), and Harvard (1958-62). Therefore, Dawson’s ‘voluntary exile’ was not total, nor 
was it entirely self-imposed. Nevertheless, the picture of Dawson as ‘the lone individual’, 
as Birzer termed him, is not a false portrait.293 As Scott writes, her father often ‘seemed 
silent and withdrawn’.294 Even his great friend E. I. Watkin found it difficult to penetrate 
through what he dubbed Dawson’s ‘outward impassivity’.295 Scott has conjectured that the 
origin of ‘Christopher’s lonely personality’ was a result of ‘his solitary but happy childhood 
and his unhappy schooldays, when he could not feel himself one of the herd’.296 As a child, 
she writes, ‘he preferred the more solitary activities of climbing trees, exploring caves or 
riding his pony’.297 Then there was boarding school, where he was sent in 1899, where 
Dawson, in his own words, was forced to live alongside ‘a hoard of savages with no common 
interests or ideas or beliefs or traditions’; a telling choice of words, perhaps, since it 
suggests that what truly appalled Dawson was not so much the school’s brutality, but rather 
the absence of exactly that spiritual and introspective element that he believed was so vital 
to the understanding of history.298 Scott has even posited that ‘the sufferings of his 
schooldays – both physical and mental – […] had a disastrous and permanent influence on 
his whole life’.299 It might, however, have been formative, serving Dawson well. He 
retreated into himself, into a sort of exile, that same exile that Ricketts observed in the 
1950s. Dawson was somewhere else, exploring other (historical) realities: ‘a world 
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different, but no less real – indeed more real’, as he wrote in 1932. As Watkin observed of 
his friend Dawson in 1912: ‘he is full of mysticism and history.’300 
 
Francesca Murphy has written that ‘Dawson had a type of imaginative insight rather than 
a type of method’.301 Dermot Quinn writes similarly of Dawson, that he was ‘a visionary 
historian, imaginatively aware of great movements of people and civilizations’.302 Scott, 
who knew Dawson best, has characterised his career as being, essentially, ‘the lonely life 
of a freelance scholar and writer’.303 To certain extent, his perennial ill health – he suffered 
from a weak chest – ‘created the situation in which he was able to write his books’, she 
writes.304 However, ‘had he not been content to live the quiet and sequestered life of a 
scholar, “ploughing a lonely furrow”, as he once put it, he would never have been able to 
achieve his great work’.305 Dawson’s first serious work, The Age of Gods (1928), was a 
product of what Dawson referred to as ‘fourteen years of isolated study’.306 The image that 
we are presented with, from personal acquaintances as well as retrospective study, and 
indeed personal admission, points us toward the outline of a solitary figure in search of a 
‘spiritual vision’ that would itself lead to a hitherto hidden insight into the past; as Watkin 
observed, ‘he finds in revelation the necessary key to the interpretation of history’.307 We 
might also add that it appears that an element of loneliness, or rather isolation, was vital 
to Dawson’s process. Indeed, while Bullock insisted on one form of quarantine, a supposed 
antiquarianism, Dawson imposed, or perhaps simply fell into, a remoteness all of his own, 
but one that was not as absolute as Bullock’s, in terms of the admitted knowledgeability of 
the study of history. However, in another vital sense, Dawson found himself in good 
company in discerning the supposed right precincts of history; the roaring company of the 
Chesterbelloc. Here, once again, we return to the influence of Chesterton. 
 
Writing to Chesterton in 1932, forwarding him a copy of The Making of Europe, Dawson 
credited him with having introduced him to the ‘spiritual’ constituent in history:  
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Years ago when I was an undergraduate your Ballad of the White Horse 
first brought the breath of life to this period for me when I was fed up 
with [William] Stubbs and [Charles] Oman and the rest of them.308  
 
Chesterton’s epic poem – lauding Alfred the Great’s victory over the Danes at the Battle of 
Edington – was a work that sought to establish the idea that Christianity had saved the 
English in their hour of need. Alfred’s win in 878 was not merely a military success, it was 
also spiritual triumph, Chesterton claimed. Dawson confided to Chesterton that he, too, 
had attempted to ‘give a proper place to spiritual factors’.309 For it was ‘characteristic of 
modern “left-wing” thought’ that ‘academic history’ should ‘leave out everything that 
matters’, Dawson added.310 One result of this, he posited, was that it engendered a fatal 
‘boredom […] in people’s minds’, resulting in ‘a positive anti-historicism’.311 Here, then, in 
his letter to Chesterton, Dawson acknowledged the importance of Chesterton in his own 
development as a historian, opposing what he supposed was a left-wing historical 
establishment that neglected ‘spiritual factors’. Chesterton himself also believed in some 
manner of imaginative historical insight, it seems. Indeed, Joseph McCleary has noted 
Chesterton’s ‘intense imaginative appreciation of particulars’ when studying the past.312 It 
is telling, for example, that Chesterton, in The Victorian Age in Literature (1913), praised 
the philosopher and historian Thomas Carlyle as ‘a seer’ who possessed ‘a grand power of 
guessing’.313 It was this, Chesterton asserted, which was at the root of Carlyle’s 
accomplishment as a historian: 
 
He saw the English charge at Dunbar. He guessed that Mirabeau, 
however dissipated and diseased, had something sturdy inside him […] 
He supported the lawlessness of Cromwell, because across two centuries 
he almost physically felt the feebleness and hopelessness of the 
moderate Parliamentarians.314 
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In terms of Chesterton himself possessing an observable imaginative sympathy – one that 
is also noticeably anti-Whig, in that it reversed the so-called Whig historian’s subordination 
of the past to the present – one example of this may be observed in A Short History of 
England (1917), in Chesterton’s portrait of Richard III’s final moments at the Battle of 
Bosworth:  
 
Whatever else may have been bad or good about Richard of Gloucester, 
there was a touch about him which makes him truly the last of the 
medieval kings. It is expressed in the one word which he cried aloud as 
he struck down foe after foe in the last charge at Bosworth – treason. For 
him, as for the first Norman kings, treason was the same as treachery […] 
the sin of false friends and faithless servants. Using his own voice like the 
trumpet of a herald, he challenged his rival to a fight as personal as that 
of two paladins of Charlemagne. His rival did not reply, and was not likely 
to reply. The modern world had begun.315 
 
Here Chesterton actively takes offence on behalf of Richard, and in doing so disowns 
modernity itself. In the matter of a couple of sentences, Chesterton comes clean – his bias 
is clear, but forwarded to us in the manner of an insight, or rather an imaginative 
understanding, one that is not a ‘modern’ understanding of treachery as such, but 
Richards’s understanding. As McCleary has written, Chesterton’s ‘powerful imagination 
served to enhance his intellectual grasp of specific contours of English history’.316 He was, 
perhaps, particularly adept at entering into the medieval mind, for example; and as with 
Dawson, this imaginative sympathy was often visual. Chesterton also took the example of 
the cathedral to heart, contrasting ‘the cold Pagan architecture’ and ‘the dingy dress of this 
Rationalistic century’ with ‘the grinning gargoyles of Christendom’, which Chesterton 
argued demonstrated that ‘Christianity is itself so jolly a thing that it fills the possessor of 
it with a certain silly exuberance, which sad and high-minded Rationalists might reasonably 
mistake for mere buffoonery and blasphemy’.317 ‘This difference holds good 
everywhere.’318 We should note ‘might reasonably mistake’: implying that Chesterton 
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believed that there was, indeed, a natural failure of understanding at large amongst those 
divorced from the medieval mind.  
 
As well as this, Chesterton’s insight also extended to myth. Indeed, Dawson’s 
understanding of history, of the interplay between history and story, was much the same 
as Chesterton’s, who for example wrote that ‘the paradox remains that Arthur is more real 
than Alfred’.319 For the Dark Ages ‘the age of legends’, writes Chesterton.320 And we ought 
to pay attention to those legends, he argues. Although the nineteenth century historian 
elevated Hengist, the Dark Ages really belonged to Arthur, a ninth century figment of the 
imagination; the reason being, Chesterton supposed, that ‘nobody thought [Hengist] 
important enough to lie about’.321 What Chesterton meant, and what Dawson would likely 
have agreed with, was ‘that we should remember that if this was not their real past, it was 
their real memory’.322 In this sense, he concluded, ‘it is a paradox that the past is always 
present’, for history is not ‘what was, but whatever seems to have been; for all the past is 
a part of faith’.323 This at once acknowledged the limits of history, in one sense, in 
epistemological terms, while also recognising its possibilities; that history is itself a creative 
process, but also that a legend, though a ‘lie’, speaks to a higher truth, which is the primary 
concern of the ‘philosophical’ historian. Here, too, Belloc was also in concurrence. 
 
In an essay titled ‘On Legend’, published in 1932, Chesterton’s great Catholic ally Belloc also 
lamented that legend in his own day had ‘been so much neglected as almost to fall out of 
use’.324 What he really meant here was that legend no longer appeared to be taken as 
seriously as truth. Belloc, a firm believer in legend, therefore interceded on its behalf, 
writing that though legend might, indeed, be ‘a mere piece of fiction’, its ‘historical value’ 
lay in its being a fiction ‘relating to, exalting, and fixing in the mind, reality of permanent 
value’.325 For what taking legend seriously really amounted to was ‘listening with profit to 
a story […] a story told about some real person, real virtue, or real spiritual experience’, a 
story ‘of such a quality that it illuminates and satisfies the recipient while […] [giving] further 
substance to the matter to which it is attached’.326 Legend was not, on the other hand, 
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Belloc made sure to point out, to be confused with ‘Myth’ – such as the ‘official anti-
Catholic history’ at large in England at the time, he argued – which was simply ‘falsehood 
passing for historical truth’.327 Rather, it was Belloc’s central point that legend, though 
‘picturesque’ and sometimes verging on ‘fairy story’, nevertheless contained an element of 
truth, be it actual or philosophical.328 As for the reason why ‘Legend’ had apparently gone 
‘out of fashion’, and in his view had been ‘abused and ridiculed and at last almost lost’, 
Belloc believed that it was because men had fallen ‘into a habit of measuring everything 
exactly and neglecting whatever could not be exactly measured’.329 Here there is an 
essential confluence in thought between himself and Dawson. Belloc also went so far as to 
assert that ‘this mechanical mood’ was ‘the great intellectual disease of our time’, arising 
‘from the success achieved in physical and other sciences through exact measurement’.330 
When we consider Belloc’s essay ‘On Legend’, then, it is apparent that he in a sense 
anticipated, and was a part of, the school of thought referred to generally as that belonging 
to the ‘philosophical historians’, who put a premium on historical ‘understanding’, as a sort 
of spiritual vision, rather than historical ‘accuracy’, a view that Belloc evidently approved 
of:  
 
Legend ranges from the fairy story at one end of the spectrum to the 
exquisitely told and admirably illustrated true anecdote at the other end; 
while in between lies the great mass of legends which have in them a 
greater or less proportion of historical fact, but nearly always the same 
proportion of value to holiness and right living.331 
 
There are others comparisons between Belloc and Dawson, however. Belloc, a Roman 
Catholic too, was also an isolated figure; ‘an outsider in twentieth-century British society’, 
writes Victor Feske.332 Indeed, Feske’s excellent portrait of Belloc, in Belloc to Churchill: 
Private Scholars, Public Culture, and the Crisis of British Liberalism, 1900-1939 (1996) paints 
a vivid portrait of Belloc railing against the ‘entrenched guardians of the official 
historiographical orthodoxy that he was slowly learning to detest’.333 Like Dawson, Belloc 
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placed a very great emphasis on imaginative understanding, which can be condensed into 
a number of statements that Dawson himself could have written: that ‘it is not bad to make 
[the Battle of] Waterloo fall on a Monday, but it is bad history to say it was won on the 
playing fields of Eton’;334 that ‘history is to know on one’s first vision [and then] to confirm 
and build by an immense deal of coincident work of research & judgement one’s original 
knowledge’;335 and that ‘history’, Belloc wrote, ‘is a matter of flair rather than of facts’.336 
And as Robert Speaight, Belloc’s first biographer observed in 1957, referring to his subject’s 
historical novel The Girondin (1911):  
 
It is imagination – a much larger thing than invention – that makes fiction 
live; and Belloc’s imagination was as keen when he was coping with the 
past as it could be clumsy when he was coping with the present. His 
invented characters were was real as those handed to him by history 
because his imagination had entered, equally, into both.337 
 
One question that deserves to be answered is whether, as historians, Dawson’s and the 
Chesterbelloc’s positive view of the Dark Ages, as well as the Middle Ages, conformed to 
Butterfield’s ideal of the historian touched with ‘imaginative sympathy’ or, instead, to 
Dawson’s idea of Gibbon identifying with his subject. Did they come to their conclusions as 
moderns themselves or as Catholics? There is, however, a third option; that their starting 
position was itself imaginative, and that this sympathy, in turn, led them to identify wholly 
with it. In other words, they came to think as Christians, much like Lewis had, having come 
to understand Coleridge. In effect, they were moderns who went native, having gained, or 
rather regained, a ‘living membership’ with the past, an imaginative membership, as 
Dawson concluded it must be. Certainly, at least for Dawson and Chesterton, who were 
both converts to Catholicism, this may be a possibility; as, indeed, John Henry Cardinal 
Newman proclaimed, in a revised 1878 edition of An Essay on the Development of Christian 
Doctrine: ‘to be deep in history is to cease to be a Protestant.’338 Just as it was possible for 
Lewis to reconcile reason with faith, it was one of the virtues of a liberated imagination, 
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and historical sympathy, that the Old Western ethic was also applicable to the 
understanding of history as well.  
 
 
Chapter One Conclusion 
 
The importance of the imagination – in terms of the process of realising religious, as well 
as historical, truths, which were in a sense synonymous – was that the imagination might 
serve to counter the modern trend toward positivism and its supposed corollaries. 
Intuitively in some cases, and consciously in others, it was a defining mark, it shall be seen, 
of the Old Western response to modernity, that it forwarded the supernatural reality as 
real, the central underpinning of existence, but also – and this is key – of spiritual 
experience too: the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world. For there was the notion, too, 
that it was a condition of modernity that man had been robbed of this experience of the 
sacred, an experience that was vital to the recognition of the true nature of existence itself; 
Tolkien, for example, would refer to as the ‘Perilous Realm’. What followed, then, as part 
of the Old Western imaginative ethic, was an attempt to return modern man to the realm 
of ‘spiritual’ actuality through a literary, and indeed artistic, re-enactment of the 
supernatural in real-time, but also in real place, meaning a spirit of place. Again, then, the 
imagination had a key role to play leading men to truth. As well as this, the Old Western 
response itself would attain its broadest, and not specifically Christian, effect. This visionary 
rejoinder to the modern was not so much Catholic as it was truly catholic in its message 
and appeal to a modern audience in combatting the notion of an ‘idolatry of place’.
Chapter Two 
The ‘More-Than-World’ within the world 
 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to illustrate how the Old Western Men, who believed in a 
supernatural order, nevertheless registered a loss of ‘transcendence’ in the twentieth 
century, attributable to some manner of break with the past, but more particularly, the 
medieval past and a sacramental view of reality. We touched on this, in part, in the previous 
chapter, of course. Theology mattered. However, there were other aspects of modernity – 
industrialism, urbanism, as well as modern science – that were also perceived to render 
conditions unfavourable to the admittance of the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world.  In 
terms of a second medieval revival, then – in search of a vital via media – the Old Western 
Men may also be defined as the attempt to rekindle a sense of wonder; entailing, in 
essence, a key revitalisation of a medieval, very much incarnational, mode of response to 
secular materiality.  
 
 
A Thomist Sense of Wonder 
  
Even when I thought, with most other well-informed, though unscholarly, 
people, that Buddhism and Christianity were alike, there was one thing 
about them that always perplexed me; I mean the startling difference in 
their type of religious art. I do not mean in its technical style of 
representation, but in the things that it was manifestly meant to 
represent. No two ideals could be more opposite than a Christian saint in 
a Gothic cathedral and a Buddhist saint in a Chinese temple. The 
opposition exists at every point; but perhaps the shortest statement of it 
is that the Buddhist saint always has his eyes shut, while the Christian 
saint always has them very wide open. The Buddhist saint has a sleek and 
harmonious body, but his eyes are heavy and sealed with sleep. The 
mediaeval saint’s body is wasted to its crazy bones, but his eyes are 
frightfully alive. There cannot be any real community of spirit between 
forces that produced symbols so different as that. Granted that both 
images are extravagances, are perversions of the pure creed, it must be 
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a real divergence which could produce such opposite extravagances. The 
Buddhist is looking with a peculiar intentness inwards. The Christian is 
staring with a frantic intentness outwards. If we follow that clue steadily 
we shall find some interesting things.1 
 
G. K. Chesterton’s contrast between Buddhism and Christianity, in Orthodoxy (1908), may 
be viewed as an early affirmation of what was to become the author’s strident avowal of 
Thomist theology as an indispensable via media in the twentieth century. Here Chesterton 
very much anticipated his work St Thomas Aquinas (1933),  in the sense that, long before 
he became a Roman Catholic, he was essentially rejecting what he would later term ‘a sort 
of Platonic pride in the possession of intangible and untranslatable truths within; as if no 
part of their wisdom had any root anywhere in the real world’.2 What Chesterton was 
emphasising in his example of the ‘frightfully alive’ eyes of the Christian saint, ‘staring with 
a frantic intentness outwards’, was the notion that the Christian stares ‘in astonishment’ at 
the world precisely because ‘Christian admiration […] strikes outwards, towards a deity 
distinct from worshiper’.3 The ‘pantheist’, on the other hand, ‘cannot wonder, for he cannot 
praise God or praise anything as really distinct from himself’.4 What Chesterton was saying 
here, essentially, was that a sense of wonder, or enchantment, was synonymous with a 
mode of thought that was identifiably ‘mediaeval’ and Christian.  
 
As chapter one has already suggested, it is a mark of the Old Western ethic that it defined 
modernity in terms of a Cartesian separation of mind from matter. Their idea was that 
modernity had severed the link between what we might loosely term Platonic 
transcendence and Aristotelian immanence. In response to this, Chesterton, amongst 
others – as part of a second, more ‘consciously Christian’, medieval revival, sought to 
reconcile this dualism by restoring the medieval concept of what Adrian J. Walker terms 
the appearance ‘of the More-Than-World from within the world’, entailing an ‘intersection 
of nature and grace’.5  
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Walker writes that the ‘appearing of the More-Than-World in the world unites, without 
confusion or separation, things that conventional thinking tends to hold apart […] 
overcoming dualism without leaving behind duality.6 As David Torevell explains, too, in 
Losing the Sacred: Ritual, Modernity and Liturgical Reform (2000), this was a Christian 
concept of the ‘sacred’ common to the Middle Ages, founded on ‘an embodied experience 
of the sacred’.7 In other words, a ‘sacramental view of reality’.8 Here, the Dominican Friar 
Ephraem Chiffley explains, the ‘sacred’ is an expression of the ‘revelation of God in Christ 
through the incarnation […] ritually expressed’.9 In the same way that liturgy is itself a 
participation, or intersection, of nature with and grace, embracing the supernatural, nature 
has a vital utility; what David L. Schindler has referred to as ‘the necessary and legitimate 
instrumentality of nature […] as a sign and expression of […] the intrinsic or transcendental 
truth and goodness and beauty of things […] in relation to God’.10 As Harry Blamires 
proclaims, ‘God calls; and all the vehicles of natural and human beauty are at his disposal 
in tugging at the soul of man with the vision of the glory’.11 However, as Glenn W. Olsen 
claims, this sacramental conception, ‘that there is a reality beyond the visible’, was 
gradually lost, ‘beginning in the late Middle Ages and continuing to the present’.12 Olsen, in 
this sense, sees modernity as constituting ‘a muffling of transcendence’.13 Chiffley 
essentially concurs, remarking that ‘modern society [...] does encounter certain problems 
with conceiving of the cosmos as an objective reality bearing the capacity for meaning’.14 
Moreover, Chiffley, in ‘The Altar: Place of Sacrifice and Sacred Space in the Religious 
Building’, perceives that this is because Protestantism – synonymous with post-medieval 
society – has tended ‘to adopt a theology of sacred space which takes every opportunity to 
avoid an “idolatry of place”’.15 This runs contrary to Catholicism, which, Chiffley implies, 
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emphasises ‘the numinosity of place’.16 For Catholic theology takes a ‘different view of the 
relationship between nature and revelation in which the nature of rite and sacred space 
[…] is given its appropriate theological emphasis’; ‘an entirely Catholic instinct’ that 
functions within an ‘immanentist context’, working ‘to investigate created nature as a 
means of coming to understand more deeply the supernatural revelation of Christ’.17  
 
It was this revival of a medieval ‘numinosity of place’, of Aristotelian matter re-sanctified 
and invested with sacred meaning, which this chapter will now underline as being 
fundamentally Old Western, in response to an ‘idolatry of place’ that was considered to be 
fundamentally modern. 
 
 
A Loss of Enchantment 
 
In 1935 the English poet Laurie Lee was travelling down through Spain, an experience which 
would later form the core of his work As I Walked Out One Midsummer Morning (1969). At 
one point, in a ‘nameless’, though of course typically Spanish, village, we are told, he settled 
down for the evening in a smoky barn, illuminated inside by a glowing fire, around which 
men and animals gathered. This, Lee explained, was the ‘pattern of Spanish life’, a life 
‘which could have been that of England two centuries earlier’.18 For ‘across the 
whitewashed walls’, he noticed, ‘the shadows of man and beast flickered huge like 
ancestral ghosts, which since the days of the caves have haunted the corners of fantasy, 
but which the electric light has killed’.19 There was in this description more than a hint of 
the otherworldly or numinous. And it was, indeed, with a note of melancholy that he 
thought this scene, or rather this experience, a tableau lost in England, perhaps forever.20 
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What is implied here is that electricity was one of the many facets of modernity that had 
conspired to deprive society of those ‘corners of fantasy’ that had so much entertained 
Lee’s imagination in that nameless barn in what might as well have been medieval Spain.  
 
There was, indeed, a sense that, as a consequence of modernity, the world, including those 
who were bound to it, had become de-natured; ‘take away the supernatural, and what 
remains is the unnatural’, Chesterton wrote in 1905.21 A thought that had overtaken those 
such as Lee in England, where modernity was particularly pronounced, arguably, insofar as 
it was not Spain, was a loss of enchantment or wonder. And the electric light was, for Lee 
at least, an appropriate symbol of that waylaying, in the sense that it was a likely cause. We 
should note this. When we consider this supposed loss of enchantment – a category of 
literature in itself, a poignant reflection on the secularisation of the West in general, 
meaning the decline of Christianity, essentially – we are also considering the conditions 
that prompted, or at the very least served to accelerate, that process in the eyes of the Old 
Western ethic.  For this reason, this portion of Lee’s work is telling. What it tells us, or what 
we may suppose from this scene in the barn, is that Lee himself thought it far easier to 
believe in dragons and goblins and other such beings in the medieval context of the 
fireplace. In this sense, too, theology was not so important. Rather, it was suburbia, in 
particular, which was viewed as being especially inimical to the imagination and its sense 
of wonder. 
 
During the interwar period, there existed the notion that something akin to a hideous, 
unrestrained monster was assaulting England’s green and sacred pastures. And what it 
amounted to was a broad de-consecration of the land itself. Clough Williams-Ellis’s England 
and the Octopus (1928), as well as Britain and the Beast (1937), riled against the sprawl of 
modern suburbia, particularly in the Home Counties. ‘Aliens incursive into the Home 
Counties’ summed up what was fast overtaking the south of England.22 This conception, 
expressed by Williams-Ellis, amongst others, did, despite the overbearing rhetoric, have a 
basis in fact. The interwar period, we should note, saw an average of 300,000 houses built 
annually, mostly as suburbs, reaching an eventual peak of 350,000 in 1936. 60,000 acres of 
rural land, much of it in the south of England, was built on every year.23 As a result, those 
such as Sheila Kaye-Smith, for example, were left indignant at ‘our lovely Kent and Sussex 
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lanes, stripped, gashed, widened’.24 Sussex, importantly, received a particular attention to 
detail, very much evident in Howard Marshall’s contribution to Williams-Ellis’s work; 
including his focus on the region around the Cuckmere Valley, as well as the increasingly 
suburbanised stretch of coast between Seaford and Brighton. And though such works as 
Britain and the Beast were not constrained in terms of their geographical coverage of 
Britain as a whole, there was, nonetheless, a sense that the Home Counties – perhaps 
because of their close vicinity to London – attained an honorary, protectionist title, exactly 
because this was where modernity, in the form of suburbia, was making its presence felt 
most of all. Britain and the Beast was a carefully considered response to this. And such 
bodies as the Council for the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE), inaugurated in 1926, as 
well as such enactments as the Restriction of Ribbon Development Act, in 1935, constituted 
an attempt to prevaricate upon ‘the disorganised, unsightly, and highly dangerous method 
of ribbon development’.25 The author Evelyn Waugh would surely have welcomed this, 
having deplored, in his novel Vile Bodies (1930), the nauseating sight, seen from an 
aeroplane, of the so-called ‘sceptre’d isle, this earth of majesty, this something or other 
Eden’, pathetically reduced to a ‘straggling red suburb; arterial roads dotted with little cars; 
factories, some of them working, others empty and decaying; a disused canal; some distant 
hills sown with bungalows; wireless masts and overhead power cables’.26 These were the 
conditions of modernity that made it increasingly difficult to believe ‘this something or 
other Eden’. Waugh’s use of Shakespeare’s description here, it is important to note, is not 
so much patriotic as it is religious. The earth was fast being made spiritually inert by the 
advances of secular modernity. And despite the efforts of Williams-Ellis, there remained 
the sense that what was being fought out in such counties as Sussex was a rear-guard 
action, one that always appeared on the brink of defeat. This was one such context that 
spurred on Lee to eulogise Spain, perhaps, which had so far not experienced what Waugh 
described in Vile Bodies. What we also see here is that, insofar as Sussex, in particular, was 
a battlefield, this war was being fought in a specific place; and this is significant in itself. For 
what the ‘electric light’ and ‘suburbia’ threatened was not abstract theology alone, but a 
locatable ‘fairy wildness’, Sussex itself, which bestrode both the material and the spiritual 
plane of existence – to such an extent that when Sussex was threatened so, too, was Eden. 
In this sense, we shall now go beyond the common identification of the countryside as ‘a 
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key element in English national identity’.27 While such works as The Geographies of 
Englishness: Landscape and the National Past, 1880-1940 (2002), Romantic Moderns: 
English Writers, Artists and the Imagination from Virginia Woolf to John Piper (2010), and 
English Journeys: National and Cultural Identity in 1930s and 1940s England (2012), have 
recently forwarded this narrative, this section will emphasise what might be termed the 
‘geographies of the sacred’. 
 
Sussex provides us with a compelling example and case study of the perceived loss of 
enchantment in the twentieth century being rooted in a specific time and place. And what 
was threatened was belief itself; a belief in fairies, for example, which came to stand as an 
allegory, or rather a stand-in, for a belief in a spiritual conception of the universe itself. 
Already Peter Brandon has detailed, in The Discovery of Sussex (2010), how the county, 
south of London, came to be ‘honoured in book after book’, to the point that ‘exalting 
Sussex was done as a matter of course’.28 Owing to the rise of the railways, as well as the 
near proximity of the city, there was, he explains, a ‘“discovery of Sussex’, tantamount to 
‘Sussex-mania’.29 In particular, Hilaire Belloc and Rudyard Kipling, who adopted the county 
as their home, ‘helped Sussex acquire a new, super-charged identity’.30 Brandon has noted 
three strands that informed this conception: a critique of laissez-faire capitalism; the 
denunciation of ‘the insidious “Londonisation” of the Sussex countryside’; and a ‘love of 
the rural life’.31 However, I would like to forward a fourth strand here: which is Sussex as a 
sacramental expression of the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world. Although Brandon 
writes that the Sussex of writers such as Belloc and Kipling ‘was a vision of Eden’, in the 
sense that it was idyllic, it may also be argued that Belloc, especially, took this view far more 
literally.32 
 
Writing in H. J. Massingham’s English Country (1934), for instance, the poet Edmund 
Blunden wrote a eulogy for the county that he knew so well, explaining that he saw ‘in 
much of Sussex a fairy wildness’.33 This, Blunden admitted, was the Sussex of his childhood: 
‘naiads were common with me in those days – for this was the fairy Sussex. Even hunting 
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the hedges there in winter for the dormouse in his drey had some thrill of a troll-and-elf 
creation in it.’34 This was, of course, a vision of Sussex that transcended, or rather ignored, 
the worldly reality of county life; for example, that of 304 children in the village of Cuckfield, 
as late as 1936, one third suffered from malnutrition.35 As Massingham noted, then, 
Blunden’s love letter to Sussex was an ‘elegiac, exquisitely lettered memorial of the Sussex 
of reverie rather than reality, in which the very phrases he often uses wistfully recall the 
old poets of the countryside (not to mention that there is a blossoming bough of his own 
poetry)’.36 However, this was actually the problem at the heart of the loss of enchantment 
in the twentieth century. This ‘fairy Sussex’ was increasingly seen to be a vision relegated 
to ‘reverie’ rather than ‘reality’. We see this unease expressed most obviously in the work 
of Belloc. 
 
Belloc’s short novel The Four Men: A Farrago (1911) – dubbed by Brandon ‘the most 
passionate and original book on Sussex ever written’37 – recounts a plaintive trek across 
Sussex, taking in what remained of what Blunden had described as a ‘fairy wildness’. Belloc, 
like Lee, too, was signalling the ostensible end of fairy Sussex. Indeed, he had written that, 
living in Sussex, ‘one feels a little like a man watching a survival, or like living upon one of 
the group of islands remaining out of the lost Atlantis’.38 Writing in The Four Men, Belloc 
explained that he ‘would, if he could, preserve this land in the flesh, and keep it there as it 
is, forever’.39 But since he knew that, in the face of the ‘Beast’, as expressed by Williams-
Ellis later, he could not, he would, instead, ‘keep her image’, meaning that he would 
immortalise it in prose before it was ‘forgotten’ and made ‘different’ by modernity: 
 
For many years I have meant to write it down and have not; nor would I 
write it down now, or issue this book at all, Sussex, did I not know that 
you, who must like all created things decay, might with the rest of us be 
very near your ending. For I know very well in my mind that a day will 
come when the holy place shall perish and all the people of it and never 
more be what they were.40 
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Sussex, Belloc saw, was ‘approaching its doom’.41 And here, too, there is the sense that 
Belloc’s Sussex shared something with J. R. R. Tolkien’s Middle-earth at the conclusion of 
The Lord of the Rings (1954-55); in fact, The Four Men in a way anticipated this work. For 
Belloc’s words chime with the wizard Gandalf’s own pronouncement, near the end of 
Tolkien’s work, that ‘“the Third Age of the world is ended, and the new age is begun; and it 
is your task to order its beginning and to preserve what may be preserved. For though much 
has been saved, much must now pass away.”’42 What marks both Belloc’s Sussex and 
Tolkien’s Middle-earth, at the conclusion of their respective epochs, is a loss of 
enchantment. The Elves, one of the races populating Tolkien’s world, are departing Middle-
earth forever; just as the Ents, an enchanted species of walking and talking trees, are also 
said to be in decline. ‘“The New Age begins,”’ Gandalf says to one such tree, ‘“and in this 
age it may well prove that the kingdoms of Men shall outlast you, Fangorn my friend.”’43 
‘Treebeard’s face became sad. “Forests may grow,” he said. “Woods may spread. But not 
Ents.”’44 Here, then, we are forced to face the melancholy thought that such beings are no 
longer considered to be a reality.  
 
Belloc himself evidently disapproved of what was happening to his county. Already, in such 
commuter towns as Burgess Hill and Haywards Heath, ‘towns of the London sort’, as Belloc 
relates to them, modernity had established beachheads in Sussex.45 This is made clear in 
The Four Men, as the character ‘Myself’, perhaps Belloc himself, sets out on his journey 
with his three companions, ‘Grizzlebeard’, the ‘Poet’ and the ‘Sailor’, across the ‘fairy 
wildness’ of Sussex, which is a vision of an enchanted Sussex that can only be maintained 
by deliberately avoiding such railway towns as Haywards Heath and Burgess Hill, which 
Belloc condemns as that ‘detestable part of the county, which was not made for men, but 
rather for tourists or foreigners, or London people that had lost their way’.46 Here another 
notion, and indeed an extra level of complexity, is touched on here, in that it is not so much 
that modernity had killed off the fairies, but instead deprived them of their natural habitat: 
a vital rurality. 
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Rudyard Kipling’s work Puck of Pook’s Hill (1906), a novel that, like Tolkien’s and Belloc’s 
own works, forwarded the notion that the supernatural and all of its attendant auxiliaries 
– fairies, trolls and talking-trees – had retreated in the face of the modern world. It also 
posits, implicitly, that people themselves, or rather those country people disposed to 
believe in fairies, had been lost to modernity. Kipling’s chapter ‘Dymchurch Flit’ is a 
particular example of this. The two children Dan and Una, Kipling’s main characters, have 
unwittingly conjured up the famous Puck, of Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
on Midsummer Eve. Like Treebeard – ‘the oldest living thing that still walks beneath the 
Sun upon this Middle-earth’47 – Puck describes himself as ‘the oldest Old Thing in England’, 
a fairy, being one of the ‘People of the Hills’, though ‘unluckily the Hills are empty now’, he 
adds mournfully: ‘I’m the only one left.’48  
 
There’s no good beating about the bush: it’s true. The People of the Hills 
have all left. I saw them come into Old England and I saw them go. Giants, 
trolls, kelpies, brownies, goblins, imps; wood, tree, mound, and water 
spirits; heath-people, hill-watchers, treasure-guards, good people, little 
people, pishogues, leprechauns, night-riders, pixies, nixies, gnomes, and 
the rest – gone, all gone!49  
 
‘“But they didn’t all flit at once”’, we are told. ‘“They dropped off, one by one, through the 
centuries.”’50 However, the ‘Dymchurch Flit’, Puck relays, was ‘the biggest flit of any’.51 This 
tale within a tale is particularly curious since the reason cited for the flight of the fairies 
from England is the Reformation – which was seen by many Catholic intellectuals, such as 
Belloc and Chesterton, to have ushered in modernity, being seen as tantamount to the rise 
of Protestantism. Kipling is not so explicit, and he might not have subscribed to this view at 
all, although the conversation between old Hobden and Puck, in disguise, which Dan and 
Una are in the know, is perhaps telling. The Pharisees (fairies), we are told, were content in 
England ‘“till Queen Bess’ father’, Henry VIII, ‘come in with his Reformatories”’.52 
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“He used the parish churches something shameful. Justabout tore the 
gizzards out of I dunnamany. Some folk in England they held with ’en; but 
some they saw it different, an’ it eended in ’em takim’ sides an’ burnin’ 
each other no bounds, accordin’ which side was top, time bein’. That 
terrified the Pharisees: for Goodwill among Flesh an’ Blood is meat an’ 
drink to ’em, an’ ill-will is poison.”53 
 
‘“This Reformation tarrified the Pharisees”’, and ‘“they packed into […] [Romney] Marsh 
from all parts”’, crying ‘“Fair or foul, we must flit out o’ this, for Merry England’s done with, 
an’ we’re reckoned among the Images.”’54 In the end, we are told, the Pharisees sailed ‘“to 
France, where yet awhile folks hadn’t tore down the Images”’.55 This ‘flit’, a sort of 
supernatural Dunkirk, Puck attributed to the death of the Middle Ages in the tumult of the 
sixteenth century.  
 
Puck, in a sense, is a sort of Loch Ness figure, in that he ought not to have survived the 
ending of his own Age. Nor, indeed, should old Hobden have survived. He, too, might be 
seen to be a remnant of the Middle Ages. Perhaps this is implied by Kipling, though in a 
roundabout manner, when Puck tells Dan and Una that ‘“I came into England with Oak, 
Ash, and Thorn, and when Oak, Ash, and Thorn are gone I shall go too.”’56 This seems to 
suggest that the fate of the last supernatural being in England depends on the survival of 
rural England itself, a vital prerequisite, whose representatives, in this case, might be said 
to be old Hobden and Tom Shoesmith, who Puck impersonates in the telling of this tale. 
Their rustic speech, as well as Kipling’s substitution of the word ‘fairies’ with the old Sussex 
dialect equivalent, ‘Pharisees’, marks them out as true Sussex men, in the sense that, as 
Belloc would have recognised, they are most certainly not ‘London people that had lost 
their way’. And Old Hobden, it is implied, does believe in the fairies when he throws a small 
piece of potato toward the door for them. Puck, impersonating Tom, presses him on the 
subject: ‘“D’ye believe or – do ye?”’57 Old Hobden’s reply is evasive, yet somehow 
confirming: ‘“I ain’t sayin’ nothin’, because I’ve heard naught, an’ I’ve seen naught. But if 
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you was to say there was more things after dark in the shaws than men, or fur, or feather, 
or fin, I dunno as I’d go far about to call you a liar.”’58 What we might take from this is that 
the fairies are not dead, then, so long as men such as old Hobden, a rural remnant of the 
Middle Ages, survive to believe in them.  
 
There is a scene in Belloc’s The Four Men that, rather significantly, takes place on All 
Hallow’s Eve, when Grizzlebeard asks Myself if he has ‘“ever seen the Fairies?”’59 Such a 
question places Belloc’s work in a literary tradition that Carole G. Silver terms ‘the fairy lore 
complex. The fairies – never quite believed in – are always leaving but never gone.’60 As 
Nicola Brown has written, too, in her own study of the subject:  
 
Fairies are part of the lost enchantment of the world. The enchanted 
world, in its purest sense, was inhabited by the gods of animistic religions: 
supernatural beings with whom, in the course of daily living, primitive 
man had to interact, and through whom the unknowable chanciness of 
the world was mediated and made meaningful.61  
 
‘To dream of fairies is to dream of the world modernity has lost; to imagine the fairies’ 
farewell is to say goodbye to it forever.’62 Belloc, however, was not prepared to say 
goodbye to the fairies forever. For what The Four Men also constitutes, apart from a eulogy, 
is an attempt at recovery – or rather a re-discovery and affirmation of the ‘More-Than-
World’ within the world. Belloc’s work, unlike that of Kipling’s, was, in this sense, a 
departure from the fairy-lore tradition of the nineteenth century. Moreover, it was 
consciously Christian. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 Ibid. 
59 Belloc, The Four Men, 55. 
60 Carole G. Silver, Strange and Secret Peoples: Fairies and Victorian Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 192. 
61 Nicola Bown, Fairies in Nineteenth-Century Art and Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 182. 
62 Ibid. 
101 
 
Reaffirming ‘Faërie’ 
 
“I do not think I have ever seen them: alas for me! But I think I have heard 
them once or twice, murmuring and chattering, and flattering and 
mocking at me, and alluring me onwards towards the perilous edges and 
the water-ledges where the torrent tumbles and cascades in the high 
hills.”63  
 
The character Myself believes in fairies, though he has not seen them. Although at the 
outset of The Four Men Belloc’s work is suffused with melancholy and foreboding, there is 
a sense, which develops as the four men delve deeper into Sussex, that Blunden’s ‘fairy 
wildness’ is still out there if the reader is willing to follow Belloc wholeheartedly. In other 
words, Belloc finds a way for us to recover what we believe we have lost forever. And the 
way back is through the imagination. If the flame that is seemingly so necessary to enliven 
those ‘corners of fantasy’, evinced by Lee, is no longer available to us, it might still be 
reproduced in the arts, including literature, as part of the Old Western ethic. This, I posit, 
was what Belloc was attempting to do in The Four Men. For there is a key scene, which 
takes place on 31 October, ‘on this night of all nights in the year’, writes Belloc, when ‘there 
is most stir and business among the things that are not seen by men, and there is a rumour 
in all the woods; and very late, when men are sleeping, all those who may not come to 
earth at any other time, come and hold their revels’.64 Myself sits that night in the ‘fire-lit 
darkness’ – much the same as Lee did in the barn in Spain – engulfed, it appears, in a 
darkness that is nevertheless very much ‘alive’.65 ‘Still wakeful’, and ‘remembering All-
Hallows and what dancing there was in the woods that night’, Myself ‘slipped to the door 
very quietly […] and went out and watched the world’.66 
 
Belloc’s first biographer Robert Speaight believed that The Four Men represented a 
‘watershed’ moment in Belloc’s ‘life and work’.67 ‘I put my whole heart into that book’, 
Belloc was once heard to say.68 Yet Speaight forwards the work to us as a product of 
shattered illusions in which ‘many hopes had been disappointed’ – pointing out, too, that 
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the story concludes with Myself alone on the South Downs on 2 November, the Day of the 
Dead.69 Of course, Sussex is doomed, in terms of it becoming a mere suburb of London. 
However, it may be that Belloc escapes this. He had entered into his own world, where the 
Sussex of reverie was very much a reality; and hence, incarnational. Belloc was happy to be 
there. And it is exactly this material Sussex interlocking with the Sussex of reverie that 
Belloc bequeaths to us as reality. In this manner, The Four Men culminates in a profound 
sense of elation at this recovery. As Belloc himself pens:  
 
… and therefore even youth that dies 
May leave of right its legacies 
[…] 
… and of mine opulence I leave 
To every Sussex girl and boy 
My lot in universal joy.70 
 
The source of that ‘joy’ is Belloc’s discovery of ‘this Eden which is Sussex still’.71 In fact, the 
Garden of Eden, Belloc tells us, is locatable, just ‘“under Duncton”’!72 In 1906, Belloc had 
also referred to Sussex as ‘that part of England what is very properly called her Eden’.73 It 
is no mere coincidence that by being able to access, once more, those ‘corners of fantasy’, 
Belloc’s journey is actually a religious experience that affirms a Thomist reading of the 
landscape that wholly rejects the ‘idolatry of place’: for ‘all four of us together received the 
sacrament of that wide and silent beauty, and we ourselves went in silence to receive it’, 
Belloc writes.74 In recovering a belief in the supernatural we also rediscover our religiosity 
and thus reject the modern. We become Chesterton’s Christian saint, wild eyed, staring 
outwards toward a material manifestation of the eternal reality made real in the 
incarnation. In this sense, too, Tolkien’s conception ‘Faërie’ – a theory that ultimately found 
most perfect expression in his work The Lord of the Rings – might also said to be Old 
Western in its employment of the imagination to realise a higher reality. 
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Tolkien’s ‘Perilous Realm’ 
 
There is a general view that The Lord of the Rings, in particular, reflects in some manner 
Tolkien’s Christian faith. However, the extent to which this aspect of the work has been 
emphasised by scholars has differed. Christopher Wrigley believes that The Lord of the 
Rings ‘is rife with Christian thought and feeling’, for instance.75 Jeffrey L. Morrow concurs, 
writing that ‘Tolkien’s stories of Middle Earth are, in some sense, about the real world; that 
is, about the world God created and in which God is active’.76 They ‘deserve to be 
understood as a form of Christian fiction’.77 Bradley J. Birzer also links this work with the 
author’s affirmation ‘that the hope of the modern world lay in a return to some form of the 
Christiana Res Publica’.78 Joseph Pearce, too, has dedicated a work to uncovering ‘the 
hidden meaning of The Lord of the Rings’.79 For Pearce, this meaning is more specifically 
Roman Catholic; though Birzer and Morrow also underline Middle-earth’s theological, 
arguably Catholic, underpinnings. Tom Shippey, on the other hand, while admitting that 
the work ‘contains within it hints of the Christian message’, sees it in terms of ‘a heathen 
or a pre-Christian world’.80 Ronald Hutton takes a similar view, noting that though Tolkien’s 
fiction ‘can be made to seem compatible with Christianity in general’, they are, 
nevertheless, ‘not only devoid of any formal practice of religion by their characters, but are 
enjoyed by huge numbers of readers who lack any sense that these books are specifically 
Christian works’.81 Paul E. Kerry, however, posits that Tolkien did not seek to feature 
Christianity explicitly because this would reduce the potency and readability of the work. 
This was ‘the theoretical challenge that Tolkien faced’: that ‘exhibiting monotheism would 
force Tolkien to define its relationship to actual Judaism and Christianity […] Much of the 
debate over the relationship between Christianity and Tolkien’s fiction is over how he 
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negotiated this trap.’82 What we should note here, then, is that no Tolkien scholar views 
Middle-earth as a wholly material world.  
 
‘Faërie’ was a literary concept developed by Tolkien. It was delineated most clearly in his 
work On Fairy-Stories (1947). Here he laid out in clear view his motivation for writing 
fantasy. In doing so, he made sure to point out that ‘the definition of a fairy-story’ had very 
little to do with fairies, but was instead primarily concerned with ‘the nature of Faërie: the 
Perilous Realm itself’.83 As Verlyn Flieger writes, Tolkien’s ‘essential concept’, in regards to 
this, ‘never altered’.84 Faërie ‘did not denote a supernatural creature but rather a 
supernatural region of enchantment’.85 This is an important point to grasp, as Tolkien 
writes:  
 
[Faërie] contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, 
witches, trolls, giants, or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, 
the sky; and the earth, and all things that are in it: tree and bird, water 
and stone, wine and bread, and ourselves, mortal men, when we are 
enchanted.86  
 
Moreover, Faërie, as explained in his work On Fairy-Stories, is ‘plainly not primarily 
concerned with possibility, but with desirability’.87 ‘The magic of Faërie is not an end in 
itself, its virtue is in its operations: among these are the satisfaction of certain primordial 
human desires’, Tolkien informs us.88 In another sense, it is a rebellion, for Faërie, or 
‘fantasy’, ultimately means ‘freedom from the domination of observed “fact”’ – and it was 
for this reason that Tolkien said that he believed his subject to be ‘not a lower but a higher 
form of Art, indeed the most nearly pure form, and so (when achieved) the most potent’.89 
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We should make sure to note Tolkien’s use of the phrase ‘observed “fact”’, as well as his 
careful consideration of the word ‘supernatural’, which he termed ‘a dangerous and 
difficult word in any of its senses, looser or stricter’.90 Certainly, he wrote, the word 
‘supernatural’ ought not to be applied to fairies themselves. And this was the moment, 
which is easy to miss, when Tolkien revealed the essential theology at the heart of his 
conception of Faërie: for in reality, which, paradoxically, fairy tales for Tolkien are all about, 
‘it is man who is, in contrast to fairies, supernatural (and often of diminutive stature); where 
they are natural, far more natural than he’.91 This was really an expression of a notion that 
was itself a product of his Roman Catholic faith; a simple principle that while fairies, in 
Faërie, were an imaginary creation of Man,92 Man himself is a creation of God, and is, 
therefore, a ‘supernatural’ creation.  This is what Michael Tomko means when he writes 
about ‘the spiritual depth of […] [Tolkien’s] countercultural response to modernity’.93 
Essentially, this was what The Lord of the Rings was. For, as Tomko writes, Tolkien’s work 
‘re-presents and embodies a Catholic view of the world’, as well as the author’s ‘own 
sincere expression of relief and joy in discovering it’.94 We can see a parallel with Belloc 
here, of course. Tolkien’s vision need not be a specifically Catholic vision. To clarify Tomko’s 
point here, the purpose of Faërie is to remind the reader, who has been brought up by 
modernity to only accept ‘observed “fact”’, that they are themselves ‘supernatural’ beings, 
and that, being enchanted, life itself is a wholly ‘religious’ experience. As Chesterton, who 
would become Catholic, had written in 1908: ‘we have all forgotten what we really are.’95 
Tolkien also encourages us to view the world through the eyes of Chesterton’s gawping 
gothic saint. There is, then, an evident closeness between Chesterton and Tolkien as well.  
 
Writing in one of his chief works, Orthodoxy, Chesterton’s chapter ‘The Ethics of Elfland’ 
expressed a vision very similar to Tolkien’s later conception of the ‘Perilous Realm’, that 
‘Fairyland is nothing but the sunny country of common sense’.96 And it was for this reason 
that he ‘would always trust the old wives’ fables against the old maids’ facts’.97  
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My first and last philosophy, that which I believe in with unbroken 
certainty, I learnt in the nursery. I generally learnt it from a nurse; that is, 
from the solemn and star-appointed priestess at once of democracy and 
tradition. The things I believed most then, the things I believe most now, 
are the things called fairy tales. They seem to me to be the entirely 
reasonable things.98  
 
Chesterton was, in this sense, ‘more inclined to believe the ruck of hard-working people 
than to believe that special and troublesome literary class’ to which he belonged.99 And he 
shared, or rather anticipated, Tolkien’s concept of Faërie, which he termed, for want of a 
better term, ‘Elfland’. Fairyland was supposed to be ‘astonishing’, and for one very singular 
purpose:  
 
We all like astonishing tales because they touch the nerve of the ancient 
instinct of astonishment. This is proved by the fact that when we are very 
young children we do not need fairy tales: we only need tales. Mere life 
is interesting enough. A child of seven is excited by being told that Tommy 
opened a door and saw a dragon. But a child of three is excited by being 
told that Tommy opened a door […] These tales say that apples were 
golden only to refresh the forgotten moment when we found that they 
were green. They make rivers run with wine only to make us remember, 
for one wild moment, that they run with water.100  
 
It was for this reason, too, that Tolkien complained that ‘fairy stories’ had ‘in the modern 
lettered world been relegated to the “nursery”’.101 In fact, he wrote, ‘the association of 
children and fairy-stories’ was largely ‘an accident’ of history.102 And it is telling, too, that 
Tolkien claimed that he had only acquired ‘a real taste’ for fairy stories ‘after his ‘“nursery” 
days’.103 Tolkien had much the same idea as Chesterton, then, and it was for this reason, as 
well, that he even went so far, in 1956, to say that he found it ‘a pity’ that ‘children’ had 
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‘become interested, even engrossed, in The Lord of the Rings […] [for actually] it was not 
written for them’.104 
 
Tolkien’s creation ‘Middle-earth’ was necessarily how he described it in 1955:  
 
A monotheistic world of “natural theology”. The odd fact that there are 
no churches, temples, or religious rites and ceremonies, is simply part of 
the historical climate depicted […] [although] the “Third Age” was not a 
Christian world.105  
 
Again, writing this time in 1953, Tolkien noted:  
 
The Lord of the Rings is of course a fundamentally religious and Catholic 
work; unconsciously so at first, but consciously in the revision. That is why 
I have not put in, or have cut out, practically all references to anything 
like “religion”, to cults or practices, in the imaginary world. For the 
religious element is absorbed into the story and the symbolism.106  
 
Ultimately, Tolkien thought it ‘fatal’ for a fairy story to be noticeably ‘Christian’, though he 
believed it ‘must, as all art, reflect and contain in solution elements of moral and religious 
truth (or error), but not explicit, not in the known form of the primary “real” world’.107 And 
an indivisible ‘element’ of that ‘truth’, was the ‘Perilous Realm itself’. Accordingly, The Lord 
of the Rings, it may be argued, is an allegory of the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world.   
 
Writing to his publisher Stanley Unwin, in 1937, Tolkien commented that ‘the presence 
(even if only on the borders) of the terrible’ was what gave the ‘imagined world its 
verisimilitude. A safe fairy-land is untrue to all worlds.’108 ‘Faërie’, Tolkien insists, is, and 
must be, a ‘perilous land’.109 What Tolkien was responding to here was the author Richard 
Hughes’ suggestion, to Unwin, that certain parts of Tolkien’s story The Hobbit (1937) might 
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prove ‘too terrifying for bedtime reading’.110 Tolkien, to the contrary, thought that the 
‘terrible’ was actually an essential aspect of Middle-earth, or rather Faërie: ‘the realm or 
state in which fairies have their being.’111 The ‘terrible’ was a large part of its appeal. 
Dragons, especially Tolkien’s dragons, are dangerous. And he freely admitted that he 
‘desired dragons with a profound desire […] at whatever cost of peril’.112 Of course, his 
‘timid body did not wish to have them in the neighbourhood’, not in Oxford at least.113 And 
yet, he concluded, ‘the dweller in the quiet and fertile plains may hear of the tormented 
hills and the unharvested sea and long for them in his heart. For the heart is hard though 
the body be soft.’114 Tolkien desired a sombre world not without risk; a universe of 
consequences, or meaning, as well as potential misdeeds and wrong turns, but not without 
light either: a reflection, perhaps, of Man as a supernatural creature, but also of Life as a 
religious experience in itself, pointing toward an objective cosmic order. Tolkien certainly 
believed that it was. Indeed, he desired it, ‘at whatever cost of peril’.  
      
 
Mirkwood 
 
What the Old Western Men harboured was a desire, as expressed by Tolkien, which, as a 
result of the modern world, indeed because of it, required an active response capable of 
challenging modernity. Faërie was such a response; a key element of which was, Tolkien 
explained, ‘recovery’, meaning ‘a return and renewal of health’, the ‘regaining of clear 
view’.115 One method of achieving this – which was employed on a broad scale, in literature, 
art and music – was to make use of Faërie, or the ‘Ethics of Elfland’, to reenchant a 
landscape that modernity had ostensibly rendered supernaturally inert. In this sense, art’s 
purpose was to sprinkle fairy dust over a landscape and re-awaken Pan or Treebeard from 
their slumber. Trees and woods now attain a particular prominence in Faërie. It is, 
therefore, worth taking note of the work of Tolkien, but also that of the artist Paul Nash 
and the composer John Ireland, who, in their work, managed something of a ‘recovery’, 
reenchanting the landscape in the face of modernity. In doing so, what they also did, 
invariably, was to introduce an element of menace, which was so important to the 
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rendering of a ‘perilous realm’, setting aside the warmth and comfort of Tolkien’s Shire in 
order to step across the border into the world of the supernatural – where we discover that 
it is, in fact, real. For, of course, this is something that we are meant to experience, as we 
do, in the case of The Lord of the Rings, through Frodo and the other journeying hobbits; 
as we will also do later with Nash and Ireland. The literary device that served most of all to 
achieve this effect of shocking the disbeliever out of his disbelief might be best summed up 
as ‘Mirkwood’.  
 
The Old Forest is ‘“a dark bad place, if half the tales be true”’, says Daddy Twofoot, in 
Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings.116 But are the tales true? Deep in ‘the comfortable heart of 
the Shire’, the idyllic home of the hobbits, the majority are disbelievers in the 
supernatural.117 Although some hobbits, ‘whose business took them to the borders [of the 
Shire] saw strange things […] most hobbits still laughed at them’.118 ‘“Queer things you do 
hear these days, to be sure”’, says Sam Gamgee to Ted Sandyman in The Green Dragon in 
Bywater; ‘“queer things”’ which Ted disparages as being mere ‘“children’s stories”’ for the 
‘“fire-side”’: 
  
     “No doubt…”, retorted Sam, “and I daresay there’s more truth in some 
of them than you reckon. Who invented the stories anyway? Take 
dragons now.” 
     “No thank ’ee,” said Ted, “I won’t. I heard tell of them when I was a 
youngster, but there’s no call to believe in them now. There’s only one 
Dragon in Bywater, and that’s Green,” he said, getting a general laugh.119 
 
Ted Sandyman constitutes a rare intrusion of modernity into Middle-earth. For most 
hobbits, apart from such notable examples as Sam, discount entirely anything that they 
have not seen with their own eyes. On a superficial level, then, it might seem that the 
hobbits are a representation of ‘Merrie England’ itself: they are, after all, described by 
Tolkien in the prologue as being a ‘merry folk’ dwelling in ‘a well-ordered and well-farmed 
countryside’.120 There is also the view of Tom Shippey, one of Tolkien’s most noted 
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biographers, who believes that the Shire represents ‘political misrule’, as well as a ‘crisis of 
confidence’, which is itself ‘an allegory of England in the aftermath of the war [1939-45]’.121 
But as quaint as the hobbits may seem to us, they are, in one vital sense, entirely ‘modern’, 
in that they are generally unwilling or unable to believe in the supernatural. This is all the 
more curious since Tolkien once wrote that he was ‘in fact a hobbit (in all but size)’.122  
 
In The Green Dragon Sam and Ted move on to discuss ‘“these Tree-men, these giants”’.123 
‘“They do say that one bigger than a tree was seen up away beyond the North Moors not 
long back”’, says Sam.124 His cousin, Hal, had claimed that he had seen one: ‘“This one was 
walking.”’125 ‘“Then Hal can’t have seen one”, said Ted. There was some laughing and 
clapping: the audience seemed to think that Ted had scored a point.’126 These ‘Tree-men’, 
or rather the ‘Ents’, we find out later, turn out to be very real creatures. Ted is wrong to 
dismiss such reports, though, of course, at the time the majority of the hobbits in The Green 
Dragon are on his side. Tolkien will shock us out of our comfortable complacency by forcing 
us to journey outside of the borders of the Shire and into ‘Mirkwood’. 
 
Tolkien writes that the hobbits ‘only lived on the borders of the Wild, and were mostly 
unaware of it’.127 The Wild is the area outside of the Shire, an inhospitable land, which is 
only prevented from encroaching on it because rangers, unbeknownst to the hobbits, 
patrol and protect its borders. In their ‘pleasant corner of the world’, the hobbits heed ‘less 
and less the world outside where dark things moved’, thinking ‘that peace and plenty were 
the rule in Middle-earth and the right of all sensible folk. They forgot or ignored […] the 
labours of those that made possible the long peace of the Shire.’128 It is not unduly 
surprising, then, that most hobbits, such as Ted Sandyman, tended to disbelief strange tales 
of the uncanny and the supernatural. For the most part, they assume that such tales of 
‘Tree-men’ or dragons must be false. There are those, however, such as Frodo, who begin 
to wonder ‘about the wild lands’ across the river.129 Of course, in The Lord of the Rings, 
Frodo and the hobbits are cast into the Wild by Tolkien, as part of the story, where they 
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discover for themselves the true nature of the world and its enchantment. It is there, for 
example, that they encounter forests for the first time; the Old Forest, Lothlórien, Fangorn 
, and (in the instance of Bilbo in The Hobbit) Mirkwood, all of which are important symbols 
in the work of Tolkien; mysterious arboreal realms, ancient to the point of nigh-
immeasurability, the last remaining bastions against the encroaching high-tides of the 
contemporary. They can be, and often are, dark, dank and dangerous places. ‘Mirkwood’, 
for example, first coined in English by William Morris in 1888, was taken from the Old Norse 
for ‘dark wood’, Myrkviðr, as Tolkien explained:  
 
Mirkwood is not an invention of mine, but a very ancient name, weighted 
with legendary associations. It was probably the Primitive Germanic 
name for the great mountainous forest regions that anciently formed a 
barrier to the south of the lands of Germanic expansion […] It was never, 
I think, a mere “colour” word: “black”, and was from the beginning 
weighted with the sense of “gloom”.130 
 
Myrkviðr is a keystone in Tolkien’s vision of Faërie, loaded with potential menace and 
doom, though not intrinsically wicked in undertone, nor entirely benign; ‘I am not on 
anybody’s side, because nobody is altogether on my side’, Treebeard, who represents 
Fangorn, says to Merry and Pippin.131 In this sense, the enigmatic region of the wood, a safe 
harbour for the supernatural to shelter in, became an essential asylum for Tolkien’s moral 
imagination, a place of mystery that a hobbit, as well as the reader. 
 
It is fitting that it is the Old Forest that the hobbits enter in to when they leave the Shire for 
the first, and possibly the last, time. What is more, they make their way into it with a mind 
full of rumour and dark foreboding. ‘“Are the stories about it true?”’ asks Pippin.132 
Apparently ‘“the stories about it are a nightmare”’.133 It is here, of course, as George Clark 
and Daniel Timmons note in their study on Tolkien’s forests, where ‘the first real villain to 
be met [with]’, the entrapping and most certainly belligerent Old Man Willow; the Old 
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Forest is ‘the first really dangerous, frightening adventure that they experience’.134 In 
Middle-earth ‘old-wives’ tales almost invariably turn out to be true. This is, of course, 
facilitated by, and in doing so justifies, Faërie. ‘“Indeed we have heard of Fangorn [Forest] 
in Minas Tirith,” said Boromir. “But what I have heard seems to me for the most part old 
wives’ tales, such as we tell to our children […] [though] it is now many lives of men since 
any of us visited it, to prove or disprove the legends that have come down from distant 
years.”’135 Merry and Pippin, who in the story are forced to take refuge in Fangorn, where 
they meet Treebeard, find out for themselves that what Boromir and Ted Sandyman 
dismiss as tales for infants should be carefully considered by adults too. As Celeborn of 
Lothlórien counsels the hobbits, in regards to Fangorn: ‘“do not despise the lore that has 
come down from distant years; for oft it may chance that old wives keep in memory word 
of things that once were needful for the wise to know.’”136 
 
Such places as Fangorn – ‘frightfully tree-ish’, and making themselves ‘felt as a great 
brooding presence, full of secret presence, full of secret purpose’137 – are indeed wondrous 
and pleasingly menacing instances of enchantment. And as Matthew Dickerson and 
Jonathan Evans write:  
 
Looking toward the future, Middle-earth is threatened with becoming a 
much diminished world when places like Fangorn and the Old Forest 
cease to exist, for once the environment is completely reshaped, the life-
forms that subsist within it lose the rooted sense of place on which they 
depend for meaning and for life itself.138  
 
Nevertheless, Tolkien’s forests survive for the meanwhile, safe in Faërie. Discovering, and 
then emphasising, the notion of genius loci (a spirit of place), was part of Tolkien’s purpose. 
So, too, was it the case with Paul Nash, who did the same, but with a brush rather than the 
pen. And what Tolkien referred to as ‘Mirkwood’ Nash saw as genius loci. Both essentially 
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rejected what Chiffley sees as the Protestant stress on the ‘idolatry of place’ in favour of a 
‘numinosity of place’, or spirit of place, which was essentially incarnational in emphasis.  
 
 
Paul Nash 
  
Nash shared a vision very much analogous with Tolkien’s ‘Myrkviðr’, particularly of trees as 
living beings, noting in a letter to Gordon Bottomley, in 1912, that ‘I have tried […] to paint 
as tho [sic] they were human beings […] because I sincerely love & worship trees & know 
they are people & wonderfully beautiful people – much more lovely than the majority of 
people one meets’.139 In a key sense, then, Nash conformed to what Tolkien believed was 
‘one of the primal “desires” that lie near the heart of Faërie: the desire of men to hold 
communion with other living things’.140 But there was also a darkness evident in much of 
his work and thought. Although Nash’s work is not itself Christian, it is, it might be argued, 
an Old Western expression of the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world. 
 
Nash’s autobiography Outline (1949) is permeated with the artist’s relationship with trees, 
woods and woody clumps. Indeed, the arboreal nature of the English landscape, as well as 
a spirit of place, is the one constant theme in Nash’s artistic career. Where Tolkien had 
Faërie to fall back on, Nash had genius loci; in fact, they were remarkably similar. Both of 
them desired enchantment, a world animated by a sense of spirit, and which contained an 
element of menace.  
 
Nash made a point, in Outline, of relating the memory of his ‘first taste of the country’, 
when, as a child on an outing to Kensington Gardens, he ‘became aware of trees, felt the 
grass for the first time, saw an expanse of water, listened to a new kind of silence’.141 Here, 
near the Tea Gardens, and vitally engaged by the peculiarity of a particularly old tree, was 
the genesis of Nash’s sense of genius loci:  
 
Hereabouts the Gardens have almost a wild quality and coming in from 
the open spaces round the Pond, you have a sense of entering a wood. 
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On the outskirts stands an ancient beech, leaning precariously forward 
and, for some years now, held up by a crutch […] full of personality as a 
tree and dangerously like a witch, if that is how your mind works. For me 
it held a compelling charm [...] Sometimes it was poetically pale and 
enchanted and could suggest a magical presence, not, however, by its 
personal figuration, but by some evocative spell which conjured up 
fantastic images in the mind. You might say it was haunted, but indeed 
that influence was spread all round its neighbourhood. This tree merely 
guarded the threshold of a domain, which, for me, was like hallowed 
ground.142  
 
Importantly, the charm and the lure of the prospect of menace – ‘dangerous like a witch’ – 
played a key role in Nash’s notion of a spirit of place: 
 
There are places, just as there are people and objects and works of art, 
whose relationship of parts creates mystery, an enchantment, which 
cannot be analysed […] There was a peculiar spacing in the disposal of the 
trees, or it was their height in relation to these intervals, which suggested 
some inner design of very subtle purpose, altogether defeating the 
conventional lay-out of the Gardens and ignoring their respectable 
character […] It was strangely beautiful and excitingly unsafe! Who came 
here came at his peril […] It was here that Indians lurked behind the trees, 
or an ogre might appear – according to my mood.143 
 
‘Excitingly unsafe’ is the vital word here. One gets the sense that Nash would have been 
very at home in Tolkien’s Fangorn, or in the Old Forest, or Mirkwood. And however 
constructed and mythologised the artist’s own account was of his experience in Kensington 
Gardens, the forwarding of the formative influence of nature and, in particular, the ancient 
beech tree, acting upon the impressionability of Nash the boy, tells as much about the man. 
‘He was conscious always’, he claimed, ‘of the influence of the place at work upon […] [his] 
nerves’ – his mind was forever engaged by ‘the promise of a joy utterly unreal’.144 Again, as 
with Belloc, the revelation of some manner of spiritual realm leads to joy. 
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1. The Combat, by Paul Nash, 1910, pen, ink and wash on paper, 35.6 x 25.8 cm – © 
Victoria and Albert Museum, London. 
 
 
Nash’s The Combat (fig.1), otherwise known as the Angel and Devil, a work of ink, pencil 
and wash, made in 1910, has been appraised extensively by art historians as a kind of visual 
genesis for Nash’s artistic imagination. Andrew Causey asserts that its composition is 
‘instructive for the whole course of his development as an artist’, representing ‘a short but 
intensive period of introspective study early in his career in which he projected personal 
feelings on to natural forms’.145 This is also the view, expressed by Malcolm Yorke, too, for 
example, that though ‘the drawing has a certain weirdness it ‘is otherwise […] [an] awkward 
and […] badly drawn angel and a flying devil looking as fierce as a budgerigar’.146 Causey 
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agrees, writing that such expressions ‘in which Nash seems to have indulged when he was 
a student’, affecting an ‘imaginary detachment which was a result of his upbringing and 
threatened to curtail his development’, are ‘alarming’.147  
 
He was inclined to value art more on account of its subject than the 
success or relevance of its style or technique […] His taste inclined 
towards the academic historical and mythological painters. But release 
from the thrall of Rossetti and the ninetieth century, and the acquisition 
of an independent basis for development appropriate to his period, was 
a prerequisite of Nash’s progress. His imaginative detachment had 
allowed him to be carried away by a kind of art which had not really been 
digested and made his own, and by the example of another artist’s 
lifestyle.148  
 
There was, indeed, something here out of step with Nash’s own time, something which 
Lewis, of course, noted in Tolkien’s work: a ‘heroic romance, gorgeous, eloquent, and 
unashamed […] suddenly returned at a period almost pathological in its anti-
romanticism’.149 Perhaps what Causey so much disapproves of in Nash’s The Combat is that 
very principle: that of Mirkwood itself. It is true that the figure in drawing displays a 
particular naiveté and ineptness on the artist’s part. However, it is also the case that 
assessments of The Combat have assigned much too much prominence to Nash’s figures, 
while neglecting what constitutes the picture’s most accomplished and lasting facet: the 
appetising spread of sprouting ‘Myrkviðr’ in the valley below. Indeed, in Nash’s much-
maligned verse, attached to The Combat, it is the dark wood that serves to define the drama 
of the piece:  
 
A place of gibbet-shapen trees & black abyss. 
Where gaunt hills brooded dark & evil 
Girdled by dense wet woods & rushing streams 
A dread place only seen in dreams 
Of which there is no history but this 
That on yon’ stony shouldered tor 
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An angel fought a devil.150 
 
Causey has in one sense noted the image’s menace, insofar as ‘the representation of 
opposed forces […] [meaning] the angel and devil themselves, hill and valley, light and dark 
[…] a series of polarities’.151 Yet Causey neglects the wood itself, so essential in its import, 
as ‘a place of gibbet-shapen trees & black abyss’, which, like Tolkien’s Mirkwood, is invested 
with a vital spirit of place, or Faërie, where this combat may be permitted to take place. 
And like Tolkien’s Middle-earth in parts, particularly his forests, it is an observably dark and, 
indeed, menacing place. And what it is important here is that this was what Nash very much 
desired, ever since he was a child, by his own account. 
 
In Outline, a work dedicated to charting his emotional and intellectual foundation as an 
artist, Nash makes the most of relating those experiences that impressed him as a child, 
such as at his old home ‘The Grange’:    
 
The Grange was everything that the name suggests; or is it that I have 
always identified that name with the character of the house I knew? It 
was rambling and shady, shut in by shrubberies and heavy trees. It had a 
sense of airlessness and gloom […] If ever a house could be said to be 
haunted – in the abstract – without the illustration of a ghost, The Grange 
was haunted. Or was it I who was haunted?152 
 
The oppressive yet homely reclusiveness of The Grange, a place where Nash’s commentary 
forwards the view of a happy haunting, one that is far from traumatic, and indeed so 
palatable to the young boy and his temperament that his elder-self ponders whether it was, 
in fact, he who was carrying out the haunting, is illustrative of how ‘gloom’ contributed to 
Nash’s development as an artist. ‘Shut in’ by ‘heavy trees’, Nash’s native temperament was 
one of introspection, of isolation, but not necessarily, as we might fathom, one intent on 
shutting out the world, or rather all worlds, ushering in a sort of bosomy safety, but instead 
one founded on another domain of pleasing menace. There was something of fairy-land in 
this too, in its dark magic, implying danger, as Tolkien once described it: ‘Faërie is a perilous 
land […] In it are pitfalls for the unwary […] The realm of the fairy-story is wide and deep 
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and high and filled with many things: all manner of beasts and birds are found there; 
shoreless seas and stars uncounted; beauty that is enchantment, and an ever-present 
peril.’153 The forest or wood is, of course, a romantic commonplace set within the landscape 
of the fairy-tale, and by implication prefiguring the fantasies of its adolescent readership. 
In this fashion, the writer H. E. Bates attempted to explain the enduring childhood appeal 
of woods:  
    
To a child there must be something about it that is not quite real. It 
belongs very nearly to the world of mystery. A field can be seen and 
understood and explored. Whereas in a wood the wood is very much 
hidden by the trees: there are countless darknesses, unknown places. It 
is an exploration into the unknown. It is at once a joyful and fearful place. 
Children are never frightened in fields, except by cows or by the hostile 
appearance of irate hats.154  
 
In this sense, it might be argued that trees were the formative influence in Nash’s 
imagination, offering an unsafe seclusion on which a dynamic English art might subsist. If 
in the universe of C. S. Lewis children entered the imagination through the creaking doors 
of a wardrobe, Nash entered his Narnia through the pillared borders of the woodland realm 
– and particularly, as a child, ‘Hawk’s Wood’:  
 
This wood was the peak of our discoveries when, as children, we came 
originally to Iver Heath. It represented then our most daring adventures 
into unknown country. Its curious solitude was one of its charms, for we 
very seldom met anyone on the road outside and, in spite of its precincts 
being sacred to pheasants, we had no awkward encounters with keepers 
as far as I can remember. The fear of such made us alert and sensitive to 
every sound as we crawled through the hedge into the undergrowth, and 
added to the thrill of our explorations.155  
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And of course, Frodo, too, in The Lord of the Rings, is much like Nash the child, coming to 
view the unknown country beyond the borders of the Shire as a land ripe for discovery; for 
‘the old paths seemed too well-trodden […] [Frodo] looked at maps, and wondered what 
lay beyond their edges: maps made in the Shire showed mostly white spaces beyond its 
borders.’156 Also contained within these white spaces is the prospect of peril, as Bilbo 
reminds Frodo: ‘“Do you realize that this is the very path that goes through Mirkwood, and 
that if you let it, it might take you to the Lonely Mountain or even further and to worse 
places?”’157 Indeed, ‘“It’s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out of your door […] You step 
into the Road, and if you don’t keep your feet, there is no knowing where you might be 
swept off to.’”158  
 
This sense of mystery, and of the potentially ‘dangerous business’ of pursuing the path 
wherever it may lead, never left Nash. It persisted and was still evident even as he began 
to mature as an artist. We can see this in his watercolour Wittenham Clumps (fig.2), 
produced sometime between 1911 and 1913. He ‘felt their importance long before […] [he] 
knew their history’, Nash wrote of the Clumps; ‘an ancient British Camp’ that ‘stood up with 
extraordinary prominence’.159 ‘Ever since I remember them’, he explained, ‘the Clumps had 
meant something to me […] They were the Pyramids of my small world.’160 Realising that 
he ‘might well make a dozen drawings and still find new aspects to portray’, the ‘one aspect’ 
he felt compelled to convey was ‘the strange character of the place, one image which, in 
its form, would contain the individual spirit’.161 The magnetism of the Wittenham Clumps, 
for Nash, ‘was due almost entirely to their formal features rather than to any associative 
force […] It was the look of them that told most, whether on sight or in memory.’162 At work 
here was perhaps the same instinctual sensibility that was present all those years before in 
Kensington Gardens. As Herbert Read, one of Nash’s greatest champions, wrote in 1944: ‘I 
use the doubtful word “intuition” because what we are concerned with in the most 
distinctive work of Paul Nash must be called an intuition of the genius loci.’163 And as Fraser 
Jenkins noted in Paul Nash: The Elements (2010), ‘Nash’s pictures are impossible to 
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paraphrase, but in the most powerful of them, including some apparently ordinary 
landscapes and still lifes, there is a sense of something additional out of sight that was 
determining his vision.’164  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Wittenham Clumps, by Paul Nash, 1911-13, watercolour, ink and chalk on paper, 
30.9 x 39.5 cm – © Tullie House Museum & Art Gallery, Carlisle. 
 
 
Indeed, there is something out of site, if we consider Nash’s intuition – which might be said 
to be Old Western – being a focal point between past and present, between materiality 
and the spiritual realm, a point of intersection that was implicitly incarnational in its 
attribution of spirit to place. Again, Read noted the sense of the invisible in Nash’s 
landscapes:    
 
In their isolation, these objects immediately revealed their significance; 
or they might be combined into an ideal landscape, like the “stumps of 
trees, weeds, and animals of various kinds,” which Gainsborough used to 
bring in from the fields. Such objects are probably unconscious symbols, 
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but it is simpler to say that they possess magic. Primitive people ascribe 
a supernatural animation to stones and trees, especially when these have 
an unusual shape or position. We dismiss their childish superstitions, or 
used to; nowadays we are learning to suspect a real foundation for their 
most irrational behaviour […] The world can no longer be comfortably 
divided into detached categories of animate and inanimate, visible and 
invisible, real and unreal.165  
 
In a very dynamic way, trees and woods, as well as clumps of wood such as the Wittenham 
Clumps, through their history, so evidently brandished in the face of the contemporary, 
collapsed such opposites, abolishing the border between past and present, in a way that 
made something of a conjurer of Nash. Indeed, perhaps it is better to think of Nash as more 
of a shaman. It was not so much the historic that appealed to Nash, though it was perhaps 
a prerequisite, so much as it was what Tolkien would have recognised as his vision of Faërie. 
Nash’s desire for ‘Pan-ish places down by the river […] full of strange enchantment’ was 
what drove him in the production of such works as The Combat and Wittenham Clumps: ‘a 
beautiful legendary country haunted by old gods long forgotten.’166 
 
As Read noted, Nash’s art owed a great deal to what might be described as ‘childish 
superstitions’, ascribing ‘a supernatural animation to stones and trees’.167 Writing to Nell 
Bethell in 1909, Nash wrote that ‘I quite believe in Pan & when I should be cast upon the 
hospitality of the woods and hedgerows I should study Nature and make never ending 
drawings & make use of Life by learning something deep and never never dull’.168 In such 
places of mystery as the Wittenham Clumps, Pan still lurked – this was the premise of 
Nash’s approach to woods in his art, one that might be detected in his final series of 
Wittenham from Boar’s Hill during the Second World War; a group of oils, including the 
1944 oil on canvas Landscape of the Vernal Equinox III (fig.3), that Roger Cardinal has rightly 
labelled ‘the acme of Nash’s landscape production’.169 However, art was not the only 
medium that conjured up a supernatural animation of the landscape. Nor were trees and 
woods the sole subject of that attention.  
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3. Landscape of the Vernal Equinox III, by Paul Nash, 1944, oil on canvas, 63.50 x 
76.20 cm – National Galleries of Scotland, Edinburgh; photo by Antonia Reeve. 
 
 
‘Legend’ 
 
The composer John Ireland’s Legend for piano and orchestra (1933) summons up much the 
same inauspicious atmosphere as Nash’s and Tolkien’s evocation of malevolent Myrkviðr. 
Ireland’s landscape, however, is the South Downs – or more precisely, Harrow Hill, a 
prominent rise atop those downs, south of Storrington in West Sussex. The opening horn 
solo sets the scene: one of remembrance, but also of absence and mystery; an eerie 
downland, the peoples long removed, save their spirits, which still might wander and play 
aloft the smooth burghs, barrows which might actually be their own sepulchres. In Legend, 
Ireland leads us through this landscape, from the village called Burpham, along an ancient 
trackway, known locally as the ‘Leper’s Path’, to Harrow Hill. Ireland’s composition 
meanders its way between two alternate moods: the blithe, exultant on the crest of the 
downs, and the disturbed. Indeed, at first, we, the rambler in this piece, might be perturbed 
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by the scene that Ireland presents us with: a barely concealed menace lurks in the hills 
above, along the way. And as we advance up the path, once trodden upon by the leper, 
centuries before, a chill takes over and we are suddenly assailed, in this instance, by the 
unsympathetic strings of the orchestra, which violently climax in a disconcerting 
melodrama, implying peril. However, this mood passes. The downs are empty and 
unthreatening again, though they retain their air of mystery and memory. As well as this, 
we feel ourselves to have been oppressed by some manner of malignant spirit. And at its 
conclusion, too, we are once again subject to the prospect of a haunting atop the South 
Downs, as the theme that announced the piece in the first-place repeats itself; Ireland 
wishes us to remain haunted, having experienced it himself when he was on Harrow Hill. 
Legend is, in fact, an account of his own contact with a supernatural happening. 
 
Harrow Hill was a location on the South Downs very much favoured by Ireland. Its ancient 
hillfort and flint mines, as well as the earthworks, within sight of an abandoned medieval 
village, no doubt attracted him. When asked how the South Downs had influenced his work, 
Ireland remarked that there were ‘a good many traces of the ancient’ there, ‘the burial 
mounds and so forth’, and he had ‘always felt moved by that sort of thing’.170 
 
My Legend for Piano and Orchestra was inspired by an experience of that 
kind. I was intrigued by an old track leading to the ruins of an ancient 
church. During the Middle Ages the track was used by lepers. Although 
they were not allowed to mix with ordinary people they could not be 
denied the right to worship God, and so they were allowed to enter the 
church by another entrance and to peer through an opening in the wall 
called “The Lepers’ Squint”. Things like that would often start up certain 
thoughts and images, and these would be reflected in my music.171 
 
What also inspired Legend was the occurrence on Harrow Hill, noted before. Jocelyn Brook 
later relayed Ireland’s experience:   
  
Soon after he had sat down and unpacked his sandwiches, he was 
suddenly aware that a number of children had invaded the open space in 
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front of the bank on which he was sitting. His first feeling was one of 
annoyance at being thus unexpectedly disturbed in so lonely a place. A 
moment later he realized that the children were in fact no ordinary 
children: they played and danced together on the downland turf, but in 
complete silence; and they were dressed in white garments of a curious 
and archaic pattern. Ireland watched them for some time: that they were 
“real” enough he had, at first, no doubt whatsoever. Then reason 
reasserted itself: could they be real – these silent, dancing children in 
their strange white raiment? The composer glanced away for an instant, 
then looked up again: the “children” had vanished.172 
 
Ireland wrote these ghostly dancing children into the Legend as a theme. Appropriately, 
Ireland dedicated the movement – the first in a planned concerto that was never to be 
completed – to the Welsh author of supernatural stories Arthur Machen. His effect on 
Ireland has been documented by, amongst other, Colin Scott-Sutherland. It was Ireland’s 
contact with the writing of Machen – The Hill of Dreams (1907) and The Great God Pan 
(1890), in particular, Scott-Sutherland writes – that was to prove one of the most formative 
influences in his development as a composer: primarily because he found ‘himself drawn 
to this writer who seemed conscious of, even in contact with, something supernatural. The 
remote peace of the countryside that had for so long attracted him took on now a 
mysterious and sinister significance.’173  
 
Faërie being thus established through literature, painting and music, we must now cast 
Nash and Ireland aside. For it is important that we draw a distinction between those such 
as Nash and authors such as Tolkien, who saw a moral and specifically religious significance 
in Faërie. In this sense, it should not surprise us that while Nash and Ireland were not 
particularly religious, those such as Tolkien, Chesterton and Belloc were devout Roman 
Catholics, who built their respective Mirkwoods in tandem with a theological framework. 
Nevertheless, Nash and Ireland are examples of a desire – a uniting and, I think, Old 
Western desire – to return to a medieval conception of time and space. In this sense, they 
perceived the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world.  
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‘The Ethics of Elfland’: The Meaning of the Sinister 
 
The ‘Perilous Realm’ may be said to be loaded with moral and religious significance. As 
Tolkien himself explained, although the tales of Beatrix Potter were not strictly fairy stories, 
they did, however, ‘lie near the borders of Faërie’, a nearness that was ‘due largely to their 
strong moral element’, by which he meant ‘their inherent morality’.174 Although Peter 
Rabbit was a ‘beast-fable’, what it shared with ‘Faërie’ was ‘the great mythical significance 
of prohibition’.175 ‘Thou shalt not – or else thou shall depart beggared into endless regret. 
The gentlest “nursery-tales” know it. Even Peter Rabbit was forbidden a garden, lost his 
blue coat, and took sick. The Locked Door stands as an eternal Temptation.’176 Another vital 
aspect of Faërie, then, was its moral dimension: 
 
And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the 
garden thou mayest freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof 
thou shalt surely die.177 
 
The clearest example of the supernatural enforcing a prohibition in Tolkien’s universe 
actually pre-dates, on Middle-earth at least, The Lord of the Rings, in the story of ‘the Fall’ 
of the Númenóreans, a race of men who dwelt on the island of Númenor, and fell ‘because 
of a Ban or prohibition, inevitably’, writes Tolkien.178 They ‘were forbidden to sail west 
beyond their own land because they were not allowed to be or try to be “immortal”’.179 A 
huge fleet sailed out to Valinor in an attempt to reach the ‘Undying Lands’, or ‘Blessed 
Realm’, the province of the Valar, Tolkien’s equivalent of angels or divine beings, who are 
themselves subservient to the one ‘God’. The Númenórean fleet is, of course, as it must be 
in Tolkien’s universe, destroyed as a result of ‘their fall from grace’, and Númenor itself is 
engulfed by a giant wave.180 The survivors flee to Middle-earth.  
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Injunctions were very important to Tolkien. The most significant ban, of course, in Tolkien’s 
world, and the one that comes closest to a Biblical prohibition, is that given to the 
Númenóreans. They are, we know, punished for failing to take this religious commandment 
seriously. A vicious retribution is brought down on them for failing to take note of the 
‘Perilous Realm’ itself. However, there was another don, too, with a similarly unforgiving 
streak: Montague Rhodes James. It was James more than Tolkien, perhaps, who, through 
his tales of the supernatural, was able to more succinctly express an ‘Old Western’ anxiety 
that, in the absence of the supernatural, civilization itself might crumble. James would set 
out as a sort of Old Testament God himself to visit cruel terrors on those unbelievers who 
he believed had brought into being a ‘chaos of ideas’, synonymous with modernity. Tolkien 
enabled his readers to enter the ‘Perilous Realm’ and escape the conditions of modernity. 
James, on the other hand, would force the ‘Perilous Realm’ on modernity itself. What he 
desired was a more immediate manner of retribution; and in this sense, too, a very visceral 
‘Edwardian restart’ of the medieval revival, in which demons, ostensibly consigned to the 
amusing margins of the medieval manuscript, were raised from their slumber and brought 
to bear on moderns themselves. In the world of James, demons are an even more 
immediate, and altogether more material, manifestation of the apparent ramifications of 
the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world. 
 
 
Montague Rhodes James 
 
Arthur Christopher Benson, Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, noted ‘what a 
strange creature’ M. R. James was: ‘so absolutely the same, so stubbornly Tory, so 
inaccessible to all ideas, so hating discussion and speculation […] If it were not for his 
humour he would be frozen, dull, inaccessible; the very worst kind of Don.’181 If James was 
not unintellectual, he was apparently anti-intellectual. It is an important distinction to 
make. Nathaniel Wedd recounted an incident when James overheard two men in the 
depths of philosophic conservation: ‘[James] rapped sharply on the table with his pipe and 
called out: ‘“no thinking, gentlemen, please.”’182 We should not, however, take such 
swordplay too seriously. There is a high degree of banter and showmanship in James’s 
sardonic reproof. Nevertheless, as Wedd noted, it did seem to be the case that ‘“thought” 
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in this sense really did disturb Monty throughout his life’.183 It was not that James could not 
manage it, but that ‘the eager pursuit of truth along many paths, regardless of where the 
path would lead and what obstacles would be thrust aside or destroyed in blazing the trail 
[…] the hall-mark of a living college, was not to Monty’s taste’.184 Michael Cox, his 
biographer, writes that James ‘tended to distrust intellectual inquiry that was not rooted in 
a sensitive respect for tradition and orthodoxy’.185 Furthermore, Cox believes that much of 
this – what amounted to a ‘lifelong disinclination to pass much beyond what his upbringing 
and education had taught him to believe’ – ‘must be attributable to his father’s 
condemnation and avoidance of “ill-regulated speculation”’.186 
 
Herbert James, James’s father, was a Church of England clergyman ‘closely associated with 
the evangelical wing’.187 ‘Dogma’, explains Cox, ‘was central’ to his ‘religious thinking. He 
traced what he called the “anarchy of belief” to an antagonism towards dogma and claimed 
that people were hampered by misbeliefs “because they are not taught fully what to 
believe”.’188 This parallels Chesterton’s own view that ‘the first effect of not believing in 
God, is that you lose your common sense’.189 As Herbert James wrote, there existed ‘a 
symmetry as well as a substance about God’s truth which cannot be dispensed with. Its 
lines are defined for our guidance.’190 Such lines ‘repress ill-regulated speculation’.191 
 
Badly will that teacher fare who thinks it possible to be free from their 
environment and wholesome restraint. He would be like a kite cut loose 
from its string. He might have a certain liberty, and soar to a certain 
height. But he soars only to fall, and the higher the height, the more 
damaging the descent.192 
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The importance of dogma, then, in combating what Belloc, too, labelled ‘a chaos of ideas’, 
was vital to Herbert James’s identification of an ‘anarchy of belief’ present in his own day.193 
And as Cox has written, ‘this emphatic trust in doctrine and precept must have had an effect 
on Monty’.194 This is what likely led Benson to reflect that James appeared to possess ‘the 
mind of a nice child – he hates and fears all problems, all speculation, all originality or 
novelty of view. His spirit is both timid and unadventurous.’195 It was for this reason, too, 
that Benson grimaced at the thought of James as Provost of King’s College:  
 
He will simply be a Head on the old lines – reactionary, against novelty 
and progress. He will initiate nothing, move nothing. Monty has no 
intellectual, religious, or philosophical interests really. He just has some 
aesthetic perceptions, antiquarian tastes, and a wonderful memory.196  
 
Of course, it might also be said that what James exhibited to a high degree was intellectual 
humility. Certainly, it seems that James inherited, or at the very least shared, his father’s 
suspicion of ‘ill-regulated speculation’ insofar as it had apparently brought into being an 
‘anarchy of belief’. Indeed, this almost profound aversion to hubris and intellectual inquiry 
would work its way into his own works of supernatural fiction.   
 
What is very apparent in James’s spectral and demonic tales is the pleasure he seemingly 
takes in visiting doom upon the members of his own profession. So many of his victims are 
themselves academics: Dennistoun, in James’s first ever tale, ‘Canon Alberic’s Scrap-book’, 
is ‘a Cambridge man’, we are told;197 the narrator’s cousin in ‘Number 13’ is a scholar 
‘engaged upon some researches into the Church history of Denmark’;198 Mr. Wraxall in 
‘Count Magnus’ is said to be ‘an intelligent and cultivated man […] near being a Fellow of 
his college at Oxford’;199 the unfortunate Parkin in ‘Oh, Whistle, and I’ll Come to You, My 
Lad’ is a professor; while Fanshawe in ‘A View from a Hill’ is described as being ‘a man of 
academic pursuits’.200 Crucially, all discount, or are indifferent to, the supernatural. 
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Professor Parkins states explicitly, for instance, that he is ‘a convinced disbeliever in what 
is called the “supernatural”’.201 Often in James’s stories there is a character, not always the 
protagonist, who reproves any inclination toward a belief in ghosts or uncanny beings and 
occurrences. In ‘An Episode of Cathedral History’ there is the dean, in the fictional 
Southminster Cathedral, who only permits an altar tomb to be opened in order to dispel 
the ‘arrant nonsense’ that some nefarious being lies within: ‘another time perhaps you’ll 
take the advice of an educated man’, he complains.202 The landlord, too, in ‘Number 13’, 
proclaims that ‘an educated man […] has no business with these superstitious notions’.203 
An intelligent, cultured man ought not to believe in the supernatural; and James’s 
characters generally do not. And for this, they often pay severely; at the very least suffering 
a grave fright as a result of a confrontation with the supernatural. Wraxall and Parkin do 
not survive their respective encounters. James evidently delighted in gently manoeuvring 
his fellows into the path of some terrible malevolence. Their crime, a lack of humility, which 
causes them to discount the supernatural, rebounds on them. Essentially, what James does, 
then, in such stories as ‘Count Magnus’, is to hold the Wraxalls, Paxtons and Dennistouns 
of this world to account for the ‘anarchy of belief’ that they have brought into being as a 
result of their ‘over-inquisitiveness’. As James’s himself wrote, Mr. Wraxall’s ‘besetting 
fault’, in ‘Count Magnus’, is ‘pretty clearly that of over-inquisitiveness’.204 It is a fault that 
ultimately proves fatal to Wraxall when he awakens Count Magnus and the strange 
creature that has bound itself to him. He had thought the engraving of ‘strange form […] 
pursuing a haunted soul’ on the Count’s tomb ‘an allegorical representation’.205 Magnus is 
merely ‘picturesque’, he believes.206 It is only when the final padlock, keeping the tomb 
secure, falls and the lid starts to open that Wraxall exclaims in horror, ‘“What is this that I 
have done?”’207 What he thought was an allegory now becomes his pursuer: ‘what can he 
do but lock his door and cry to God?’208 Later, he is found dead, having paid the ultimate 
price.  
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Thomas Sowell, of the Hoover Institution, laments the sad truth that in the real world 
‘intellectuals pay no price for being wrong’.209 The step ‘from unaccountability to 
irresponsibility can be a very short step’.210 What James does in his stories, however, 
through such creations as Count Magnus, is to hold such men to account for their 
intellectual sins. And as Ralph Harrington writes, for example, ‘Parkins’s sin’, in ‘A Warning 
to the Curious’, ‘is ultimately one of hubris; he believed that his rationalistic understanding 
of the world provided a total and all-encompassing explanation of the workings of the 
universe. In this sense, the point of the story is more than just a foolish individual being 
taught a lesson.’211 This is some disagreement here, however. Simon MacCulloch, 
contributing to Warnings to the Curious: A Sheaf of Criticism on M. R. James (2007), figures 
that James’s ‘protagonists’ are ‘intelligent, cultivated representatives of an ordered, fatally 
limited world view. Against them are pitted barbarous antagonists who represent the 
chaos, irrationality, and inhumanity that an unreserved embrace of the inhuman cosmos 
produces.’212 I think that MacCulloch misses the point here. He is right in surmising that 
James intended them to represent a ‘fatally limited world view’. However, it is they, not 
the ‘barbarous antagonists’, who, as a result of their ‘limited world view’, are the ultimate 
agents of ‘chaos’. It is a mistake to say, as MacCulloch does, that ‘“Count Magnus” is 
James’s clearest expression of his own proclivity for the strange and the danger he saw in 
it for his faith in conventional Christianity’.213 It is, I think, the ‘strange’ that leaps to the 
defence of Christian orthodoxy. Harrington, however, comes much closer to the truth when 
he writes that ‘the supernatural world as depicted by M. R. James is not capricious and 
arbitrary but reflects its creator’s conviction that human beings have a duty to act morally, 
and that they will ultimately be held to account for their failings’.214 
 
Nevertheless, James’s universe is, we have to recognise, savage. As Michael A. Mason 
notes, though a protagonist has, admittedly, so often ‘awakened trouble for himself by his 
temerity or even by his criminal actions’, the ‘retribution’ that is brought down on him, 
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though ‘just’, is nevertheless ‘unmerciful’.215 John Alfred Taylor also writes that ‘judging 
from some of James’s stories, a person must be careful to the point of near-paralysis’ to 
avoid an unfortunate end.216 It is possible, of course, that James was articulating two 
concepts at the same time in his stories: that his fellows should be held to account for their 
ideas, especially those that discounted the supernatural, as well as restrain themselves 
from forwarding such a view; but also that the real world in which they lived was, indeed, 
perilous, and would become even more so if the supernatural and religious conception of 
the universe was cast aside. The world itself was not merciful, but to preserve what was 
worth preserving required some manner of supernatural intervention which was itself 
ruthless and suffused with fury. In this sense, MacCulloch is correct when he affirms that 
‘the central deity of James’s fictional cosmos, although never explicitly stated, can be 
discerned as something […] [resembling] an Old Testament-styled god of patriarchal anger 
and vengeance’.217 So, too, is Tolkien’s God, ‘Eru’, who drowns Númenor for its sin of 
‘pride’, it might be added. James’s universe is a dark, hard and sobering one, as is Tolkien’s 
to a certain extent. 
 
Despite this harsh environment, Darryl Jones has written that ‘what James’s stories do, it 
seems, is to give articulation to a particularly English longing for the past’.218 In this sense, 
Jones concurs with Julia Briggs, the author of Night Visitors: The Rise and Fall of the English 
Ghost Story (1977), that the ‘Monty Jamesian’ ghost story was really ‘a vehicle for 
nostalgia’.219 ‘The temptation to retreat into an idealized Etonian youth’, Jones writes, 
‘must have been overwhelming’ for James.220 Jones seems to suggest that James gave in to 
it; that his stories were essentially nostalgic. What is implied here is that the author 
perceived the past through a rose-tinted lens. Moreover, it leaves James open to the 
accusation that in doing so he lacked the courage to view history as it really was. However, 
it can be reasonably argued that James’s stories have very little to do with ‘an idealized 
Etonian youth’. The universe that James desired was one filled with considerable terrors. 
Insofar as he looked back to the Middle Ages, as part of a second medieval revival, it was 
not ‘Merrie England’ that he longed for. James’s vision is not one of village feats, damsels 
in distress and court jesters, but an Old Testament tableau suffused with fire and 
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brimstone: a very fiery ‘More-Than-World’ within the world. Perhaps this also explains why 
Catholicism features so heavily in his work. For buried deep within the pages of James’s 
stories is the implication that his gentle Anglicanism was exactly what he was attempting 
to escape. George Orwell’s vision of ‘old maids biking to Holy Communion through mists of 
the autumn mornings’ was very likely what it appeared to be: a charming vista, but one 
bereft of any supernatural content. This chimes with a complaint Waugh made in 1947, to 
John Betjeman, that the various Anglican chaplains that he had come to know during his 
time in the army ‘seemed to have no sense of the supernatural at all’.221 This was an 
observation that found its way into Sword of Honour, where, early on in the story, the main 
protagonist Guy Crouchback asks a chaplain whether he agrees ‘“that the Supernatural 
Order is not something added to the Natural Order, like music or painting, to make 
everyday life more tolerable”’, but something that ‘“is everyday life”’.222 ‘“The supernatural 
is real”’, Crouchback asserts, and ‘“what we call ‘real’ is a mere shadow, a passing fancy. 
Don’t you agree, Padre?”’223 The chaplain’s reply is telling: ‘“up to a point.”’224 Catholicism 
was more able than Protestantism, perhaps, to acknowledge, as well as associate itself 
with, the supernatural; a common association, as we have seen. 
 
Harrington has observed that James’s stories display ‘a knowledgeable and sympathetic 
respect for Catholicism on the part of their firmly Protestant author’.225 Peter Ackroyd has 
also noted this tendency in James, writing that, though he evidently possessed ‘a 
thoroughly English mind’, he was nevertheless ‘not untouched by intimations of the 
Catholic past’.226 It certainly seems that James, an Anglican, displayed more often than not 
in his stories a curious deference toward Catholicism. This is not to say that James did not 
at times display a somewhat chauvinistic attitude toward Catholicism. In 1909, as Provost 
of King’s College, Cambridge, he would not permit a performance of Edward Elgar’s The 
Dream of Gerontius, remarking that the piece was ‘too papistical’.227 Previously, in 1901, 
after an alleged discovery of some relics in Toulouse, he complained ‘about the bones of St 
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Edmund which the Papists are foisting upon us’.228 However, James was not, it should be 
noted, entirely taken in by the so-called ‘Whig interpretation of history’ regarding the 
Reformation. In his work Abbeys (1925), a Great Western Railway guide book, he wrote 
that ‘whatever the venal commissioners of Henry VIII may have said, the monasteries were 
not hotbeds of crime and luxury’.229 
 
Your mental picture of the monk should not be that of the fat man 
holding his stomach and bursting with laughter at a good story, or 
brandishing his goblet in the conventional attitude of the stage carouser. 
Nor need you fly to the other extreme and figure them all as pallid 
ascetics passing their lives on their knees. There were monks of both 
sorts, no doubt: but the bulk of them were steady prosaic men, perhaps 
more like the Fellows of Colleges in the eighteenth century than anything 
else.230  
 
Many monks ‘were somnolent, many were insolvent’, but ‘few were evil’.231 There was 
really no need to feel ‘shocked’ upon sight at ‘the opening of a subterranean passage’ that 
led ‘to a nunnery five miles off’.232 ‘You may rest assured’, wrote James, that it ‘really [was] 
the main drain of the establishment.’233 If James did not necessarily associate the Catholic 
Church with avarice, sloth and irrepressibly randy monks, he certainly appears to have 
associated Catholicism, particularly around the time of the Reformation, with the 
supernatural: Torevell’s ontologically pre-modern cosmos, ‘a thing of symbolic and spiritual 
potency, a sacred arena for discovering knowledge and truth’.234 For example, ‘Number 13’ 
relates to a room in Vigorg, in Denmark, inside a house once owned by ‘Bishop Jörgen Friis, 
the last Roman Catholic who held the see’.235 James’s protagonist, who is examining papers 
‘relating to the last days of Roman Catholicism in the country’,236 discovers that one of the 
Bishop’s tenants was Nicolas Francken, ‘a scandal and a stumbling-block to the reforming 
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party’.237 He was, it was written, ‘a disgrace’, practising ‘secret and wicked arts’, having 
‘sold his soul to the enemy [the Devil]’.238 ‘It was’, indeed, ‘of a piece with the gross 
corruption and superstition of the Babylonish Church that such a viper and blood-sucking 
Troldmand should be patronized and harboured by the Bishop’.239 ‘Abbott Thomas’, too, in 
James’s tale of the same name, is evidently one of the last Catholic abbots in England, dying, 
it is revealed, in 1529, the same year the Reformation Parliament was inaugurated. While 
the magic field-glasses in ‘A View from a Hill’ afford Fanshawe a glimpse of the now 
demolished tower of ‘Fulnaker Abbey’, presumably demolished as a result of Henry VIII’s 
dissolution of the monasteries in the sixteenth century. Moreover, the whistle discovered 
by Parkin in ‘Oh, Whistle, and I’ll Come to You, My Lad’ is found on the site of a reputed 
Templars’ preceptory. Indeed, as in ‘An Episode of Cathedral History’, the artefact is 
recovered from an area that Parkin believes was the base of the altar. It is also surely 
significant that the tomb that the demon in ‘An Episode of Cathedral History’ escapes from 
is reputed to be of the pre-modern ‘fifteenth century’. We may reasonably assume that the 
demonic form in this tale last saw the light of day toward the latter end of the Middle Ages, 
when England was still a Catholic country. It is also telling, perhaps, that the sceptic in this 
story is the Anglican dean, who thinks it ‘arrant nonsense’ that some demonic force is 
afflicting the locals. 
  
‘An Episode of Cathedral History’ is particularly interesting since the ghostly presence is not 
a ghost at all, but ‘a thing like a man, all over hair, and two great eyes to it’.240 The 
inscription, from the Vulgate of Isaiah 34:14, affixed to the altar tomb at the conclusion the 
story – ‘IBI CUBAVIT LAMIA’ (there too Lilith shall repose, and find a place to rest) 241 – is a 
reference to the Lamia, the child-eating demon of Greek legend.242 It is a demon, not a 
ghost. In ‘Count Magnus’, too, we are presented with another ‘strange form’, presumably 
a demon, brought back from what James referred to as ‘the Black Pilgrimage’ to Chorazin, 
a city in Galilee. This monstrous figure, as examined by Wraxall when he studied its effigy 
on Magnus’s tomb, ‘was unduly short, and was for the most part muffled in a hooded 
garment which swept the ground. The only part of the form which projected from that 
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shelter was not shaped like any hand or arm.’243 Wraxall thought it most akin ‘to the 
tentacle of a devil-fish’.244 Both of these demons are essentially survivors, the supernatural 
equivalent of the Loch Ness monster. Such beings should not have survived the 
Reformation. What James did, however, was to bring these pre-modern demons out of 
retirement after they had been mothballed at the end of the Middle Ages. Indeed, James 
had apparently invented ‘a new type of ghost’, noted the prominent horror author Howard 
Philips Lovecraft, in his work Supernatural Horror in Literature (1945).245 In doing so, wrote 
Lovecraft, who was a great admirer of James, he ‘departed considerably from the 
conventional Gothic tradition; for where the older stock ghosts were pale and stately, and 
apprehended chiefly through the sense of sight, the average James ghost […] [was] lean, 
dwarfish, and hairy – a sluggish, hellish night-abomination midway betwixt beast and man 
– and usually touched before it is seen’.246 
 
What Lovecraft probably had in mind when he wrote this especially perceptive passage was 
‘Canon Alberic’s Scrap-book’, first published in 1895 in The National Review. Written 
between 1892 and 1893, it was James’s first ghost story. Strictly speaking, it is not a ghost 
story at all, however. Rather, it is typically ‘Jamesian’: an educated cynic is brought face to 
face with an avenging, supernatural remnant of a pre-modern past; not a ghost as such, 
but identifiably material and demonic. The story is centred around a man named 
Dennistoun who journeys to Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminge in France, near the border with 
Spain. After encountering a nervous sacristan in the cathedral there, Dennistoun purchases 
a manuscript that once belonged to ‘the unprincipled Canon Alberic, who had doubtless 
plundered the Chapter library of St. Bertrand to form this priceless scrap-book’.247 One of 
the items that the scrap-book contains is an antique sepia image of an especially horrific-
looking creature; the scene itself depicting King Solomon and five soldiers, one of whom is 
dead, ‘his neck distorted, and his eyeballs starting from his head’, evidently a result of an 
unfortunate encounter with what James intended to forward to the reader as a demon 
plucked straight out of the pages of the Old Testament. Indeed, Helen Grant believes that 
the demon was actually ‘intended to be an actual, possibly even a specific Solomonic 
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demon’.248 Grant argues convincingly that James’s demon is actually Ornias, who was 
forced by King Solomon to cut the stone for his famous Temple.249 James’s description of 
what might possibly be Ornias is particularly vivid: 
 
At first you saw only a mass of coarse, matted black hair; presently it was 
seen that this covered a body of fearful thinness, almost a skeleton, but 
with muscles standing out like wires. The hands were of a dusky pallor, 
covered, like the body, with long, coarse hairs, and hideously taloned. 
The eyes, touched in with a burning yellow, had intensely black pupils […] 
Imagine one of the awful bird-catching spiders of South America 
translated into human form, and endowed with intelligence just less than 
human, and you will have some faint conception of the terror inspired by 
this appalling effigy.250 
 
The narrator is clear about its effect on the reader:  
 
I recollect once showing the photograph of the drawing to a lecturer on 
morphology – a person of, I was going to say, abnormally sane and 
unimaginative habits of mind. He absolutely refused to be alone for the 
rest of that evening, and he told me afterwards that for many nights he 
had not dared to put out his light before going to sleep.251  
 
After purchasing the valuable scrap-book, including the sepia image of the demon, for a 
mere two hundred and fifty franks, Dennistoun returns to his lodgings, where James’s story 
reaches its inevitable, horrifying climax. Examining Canon Alberic’s collection of pieces 
poached from the cathedral library, the demon finally manifests itself, placing a hand on 
Dennistouns’s desk:  
 
His attention was caught by an object lying on the red cloth just by his 
left elbow […] “A rat? No too black. A large spider? I trust to goodness not 
– no. Good God! a hand like the hand in that picture! 
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     In another infinitesimal flash he had taken it in. Pale, dusky skin, 
covering nothing but bones and tendons of appalling strength; coarse 
black hairs, longer than ever grew on a human hand; nails raising from 
the ends of the fingers and curving sharply down and forward, grey, 
horny and wrinkled.    
     He [Dennistoun] flew out of his chair with deadly, inconceivable terror 
clutching at his heart. The shape, whose left hand rested on the table, 
was rising to a standing posture behind his seat, its right hand crooked 
above his scalp.252 
 
When considered as part of a second revival of interest in the Middle Ages, James’s very 
physical demons are significant because they underline the theology implicit at its core, 
which is a sense of spirit manifest in the world of time and space, as laid out at the beginning 
of this chapter. James’s beings are not ghosts, or pure spirits, they are palpable, gruesome 
and lethal. In this way, they may be viewed as a prime expression of the Old Western ethic 
that this thesis seeks to forward as a significant cultural shift in Britain that set itself against 
secular modernity in the twentieth century. 
 
 
Chapter Two Conclusion 
 
Having rediscovered through literature, art and music a semblance of the supernatural, 
such authors, artists and composers as Belloc, Tolkien, Nash, Ireland, and of course James, 
reoccupied the ‘Perilous Realm’ in the twentieth century. It was a territory that had been 
given up, it appeared, sometime around the Reformation. This is implied, and sometimes 
stated explicitly, for instance, in the writings of Kipling and James. As well as this, the 
modern world itself – the suburbs in particular, and indeed the electric light – had 
conspired, it appeared, to prevent any such attempt to return to a pre-modern cosmos; 
unless one was willing to remove oneself to Spain, as Lee did, to gain, almost by accident, 
a faint impression of the supernatural world apparently familiar to his ancestors. The 
firelight, relayed so compellingly by Lee, as well as other such prerequisites available to a 
primarily rural, and one might also say Roman Catholic, community were lost to the modern 
world. It was no longer possible to enter into the world of the supernatural through the 
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front entrance. Another route was required. It was Faërie, or what is more familiarly known 
to us as fantasy, that managed to reproduce the same effect as the dancing flames that Lee 
experienced in the barn in Spain. And it should not surprise us that so many turned to 
fantasy in the twentieth century – because really Faërie was the only way back for those 
unable to escape entirely the materialistic platitudes of modernity. If one could not go 
through modernity, one could at least circumvent it through a leap of the imagination. 
What moderns required, however, was a gentle push. Those such as Tolkien did just that – 
just as he forced Frodo and his friends to journey out beyond the safe space of the Shire 
(modernity) into the Wild (Blunden’s fairy wildness). But what ultimately makes this 
significant – and what, as Chesterton would say, is the true purpose of the fairy story, as he 
saw it at least – is that the route back to the ‘Perilous Realm’ also provided a path back 
toward religious faith: the ‘Perilous Realm’ and his Catholicism were, for him, one and the 
same. What marks out those such as the ‘Chesterbelloc’, Tolkien and James, rather than 
Nash and Ireland, is that such fantasy is also a matter of ‘religious faith’, meaning that it 
incorporates ‘the supernatural order in all its ramifications’, as Waugh describes it. For to 
believe in such an order is also to subject yourself to its prohibitions, as we see expressed 
most clearly in Tolkien’s and James’s work. Nevertheless, the work of Nash and Ireland does 
emphasis an incarnational view of the universe too. What is also vital here is that this 
conception is presented as part of the living order of things, as part of the material world, 
manifesting itself in enchanted trees, haunted landscapes and even demons. Each is 
ultimately a very ‘Old Western’ affirmation of the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world.
Chapter Three 
Cultivating the Eternal Perspective 
 
 
Divine Indifference 
 
These were the conditions of life, always vexatious, often utterly 
disastrous, of the people to whom the Jesuits were being sent, people 
drawn from the most responsible and honourable class, guilty of no crime 
except adherence to the traditional faith of their country. They were the 
conditions which, in the natural course, could only produce despair, and 
it depended upon their individual temperaments whether, in 
desperation, they had recourse to apostasy or conspiracy. It was the work 
of the missionaries, and most particularly of [Edmund] Campion, to 
present by their own example a third, supernatural solution. They came 
with gaiety among a people where hope was dead. The past held only 
regret, and the future apprehension; they brought with them, beside 
their priestly dignity and the ancient and indestructible creed, an entirely 
new spirit of which Campion is the type; the chivalry of Lepanto and the 
poetry of La Mancha, light, tender, generous and ardent […] not the fine 
flower only, but the root and stem of English Catholicism […] [those who] 
surrender themselves to their destiny without calculation or reserve; for 
whom the honourable pleasures and occupations of an earlier age were 
forbidden; whose choice lay between the ordered, respectable life of 
their ancestors and the faith which had sanctified it; who followed 
holiness, though it led them through bitter ways to poverty, disgrace, 
exile, imprisonment and death; who followed it gaily.1 
 
The Jesuit Edmund Campion’s great achievement, wrote Evelyn Waugh in 1935, in his 
biography of the prominent Catholic martyr, was prompted ‘by the supernatural grace that 
was in him’.2 And it was that grace that allowed men such as Campion to ‘surrender 
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themselves to their destiny […] gaily’, even though it would likely end in personal 
catastrophe on the scaffold at Tyburn in London. Campion’s achievement, which was no 
less than a triumph, Edmund Campion: Jesuit and Martyr proclaimed, was to carry that 
‘grace’ in an age of ‘despair’; an age, we might posit here, as perhaps we are supposed to, 
which paralleled Waugh’s own, of civilization on the brink, where ‘the past held only regret, 
and the future apprehension’. What Campion did, then, Waugh wanted his readers to 
believe, was not only to endure the modernity of his own age – in which the old certainties 
were no longer so certain – but to combat it ‘by their own example […] with gaiety’. Vitally, 
however, this very peculiar ‘spirit’, comparable to ‘the chivalry of Lepanto’ – a telling choice 
of words – was only achievable in Campion’s day through a vital feat of ‘supernatural grace’. 
What Waugh was essentially driving at here was that the foundation of Campion’s courage 
was his ‘gaiety’, which was synonymous with his ability to ‘surrender’ himself entirely to 
the ‘supernatural’ – meaning the reality of the eternal – which was so vital to Waugh 
himself, since it was a ‘solution’ to the ills of his own day; engendering ‘hope’, albeit a hope 
in the eternal, but one that might very well rouse a ‘spirit’ of resistance to modern despair 
that was characterised by what might be best described as a divine indifference. Having 
focused in the previous chapter on the expression of the ‘More-Than-World’ within the 
world, then, which can be said to be more Thomist, thus material, in emphasis, by now 
turning our attention to Waugh, amongst others, this chapter will concentrate its attention 
on the rather more ‘Augustinian’ element that complements, and in so doing completes, 
an Old Western via media.  
 
Explaining what it means to think ‘christianly’, Harry Blamires tell us that it is ‘a prime mark 
of the Christian mind is that it cultivates the eternal perspective. That is to say, it looks 
beyond this life to another one.’3 As we shall see, this assertion shall underscore this 
chapter: that when Waugh composed his work on Campion, as well as other works, this 
was very much his perspective; that, as Blamires writes, to constantly ‘think within a frame 
of reference bounded by the limits of our life on earth’ is ‘to think secularly’, but ‘to think 
christianly is to accept all things with the mind as related, directly or indirectly, to man’s 
eternal destiny as the redeemed and chosen child of God’.4 It is a central theme of Waugh 
– a theme that is itself a key Old Western conviction – that it is only by keeping an eye 
trained on the eternal that we cultivate divine indifference to worldly circumstance. It is 
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only through studying this Augustinian conception, of surrendering oneself to eternity, and 
in doing so inviting God’s grace, as Waugh reveals above, that the Old Western Men, taken 
in conjunction with their Thomist impulse, achieve a true via media. Having set aside the 
‘More-Than-World’ within the world, we shall now turn to the ‘More-Than-World’.  
 
 
Christopher Dawson and Augustine of Hippo 
 
In terms of forwarding a common theme here, it is worth examining the thought of 
Christopher Dawson, since it is the thought of this historian that is most consciously 
Augustinian; in other words, ‘Christian Platonism’, which centuries before had come ‘to 
permeate virtually all of medieval Christian thought in the West’.5 As Diarmaid MacCulloch 
writes, Augustine, who ‘was faced with the problem of explaining the Roman world’s 
catastrophe […] was heir to the world-denying impulses of Platonists and Stoics’.6 With 
regards to this, it was Dawson’s view, too, that the age that St. Augustine of Hippo inhabited 
was ‘one of the most vital moments in the history of the world’ since it marked ‘the failure 
of the greatest experiment in secular civilization that the world had ever seen, and the 
return of society to spiritual principles’.7 For what the fall of Rome in the fifth century had 
brought about was both ‘an age of material loss and of spiritual recovery’, he wrote, ‘when 
amidst the ruins of a bankrupt order men strove slowly and painfully to rebuild the house 
of life on eternal foundations’.8 Indeed, in ‘this age of universal ruin and destruction’9 – a 
time of ‘horror and suffering’ that had seen the ‘sack of cities, the massacre and 
enslavement of the population and the devastation of the open country’10 – what was so 
remarkable was the divine disregard, rooted in eternity, that countered the mounting 
despair of the time; by which Dawson meant the ‘indifference to temporal results’ on the 
part of such Catholic churchmen as Augustine and St. Gregory of Tours.11 As James J. 
O’Donnell has written, ‘Augustine devoted the full measure of his rhetorical skill to 
demonstrating that the misfortunes of life here below are insignificant by comparison with 
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the rewards beyond, and the injustices suffered here irrelevant to the final accounting in 
heaven.’12 And for Dawson this heroic indifference to the ‘temporal’ was also founded on 
a fundamentally ‘spiritual’ principle:  
 
To the materialist, nothing could be more futile than the spectacle of 
Augustine busying himself with the reunion of the African Church and the 
refutation of the Pelagians, while civilisation was falling to pieces about 
his ears. It would seem like the activity of an ant which works on while its 
nest is being destroyed. But St. Augustine saw things otherwise. To him 
the ruin of civilisation and the destruction of the Empire were not very 
important things. He looked beyond the aimless and bloody chaos of 
history to the world of eternal realities from which the world of sense 
derives all the significance which it possesses. His thoughts were fixed, 
not on the fate of the city of Rome or the city of Hippo, nor on the struggle 
of Roman and barbarian, but on those other cities which have their 
foundations in heaven and in hell.13 
 
Augustine was ultimately ‘justified in his faith’, Dawson concluded, and his indifference to 
worldly things, which ‘were not very important’, would continue ‘to live and bear fruit long 
after Christian Africa had ceased to exist’.14 In fact, this drive toward the ‘eternal’, which 
characterised Augustine’s work The City of God (426), Dawson believed to be still ‘an 
inalienable part of our spiritual heritage’.15 This tradition might be called upon once more, 
then, in Dawson’s own century. In this sense, Bradley J. Birzer is correct in emphasising 
Dawson’s ‘Augustinian Mind’, at least in this one aspect. 
 
That ‘the sense of despair and unlimited impotence and abandonment that the disasters of 
the time [of the barbarian invasions] provoked […] [were] not inconsistent with a spirit of 
courage and self-devotion which inspired men to heroic effort and superhuman activity’ 
was vital, Dawson believed.16 After all, he wrote in 1932, ‘the foundations of Europe were 
laid in fear and weakness and suffering – in such suffering as we can hardly conceive today, 
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even after the disasters of the last eighteen-years’.17 What made the difference in the fifth 
century, he asserted, was that for Augustine it was not Rome that mattered in the long run, 
but the City of God, meaning the eternal. Dawson was not alone in thinking this. G. K. 
Chesterton, for example, had written in 1917 that it was ‘the paradox of this time that only 
the unworldly things had any worldly success’.18 In fact, this was one of the key mantras of 
the Old Western ethic. Dawson would have agreed wholeheartedly with his intellectual 
progenitor’s statement that ‘we are never really on solid ground except on consecrated 
ground’.19 Waugh, in his work Campion, had touched on this too, as we have seen. What 
fortified the fifth century, as well as Campion’s own strength centuries later, against the 
despair of their own time, we are told, was a sense of the supernatural, of supernatural 
grace, which had, in turn, engendered such ‘superhuman activity’. In this sense, the ‘More-
Than-World’ informs ‘the world’ through the application of the Augustinian mind.  
 
Dawson’s point throughout his career was that twentieth century society had given up the 
City of God (the More-Than-World) in favour of Rome (the world), which was a wholly 
materialistic and essentially atheistic conception of the universe. The inevitable result of 
this, Dawson contended, was that in his own day, with the barbarians once more at the 
gates, society was now prone to despair and defeatism – a sort of moral deficit that a 
religious, and particularly a Christian, outlook had once guarded against, since it taught that 
material disaster was ‘not very important’. Dawson believed that if his own century was to 
salvage itself from the depths of its own despair it must rediscover the City of God – ‘the 
world of eternal realities from which the world of sense derives all the significance which it 
possesses’ – and, in particular, its corollary, an accompanying philosophy of history, which 
could provide man with the intellectual grounds for hope. This was Dawson’s solution, 
much like Waugh’s. The first step, then, in recovering Campion’s gaiety, his essential 
courage, was to recover this sense, this faith in final victory. This was essentially 
Augustinian; as Henry Chadwick has pointed out, the City of God was ‘also an important 
attempt to establish a vantage-point from which a panoramic view of the history of the 
world becomes possible’.20 
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Dawson’s ‘Theology of History’ 
 
In his own day, Dawson believed that there was a philosophy of history, the ‘Religion of 
Progress’, which threatened to supersede Christianity.21 The modern ‘idea of Progress’, 
which he deemed in 1938 a ‘rationalized theology’, constituted a new and ‘even more 
complete’ reformation than the Reformation in the sixteenth century, he argued, 
essentially ‘emptying Christianity of all supernatural elements and interpreting history as 
the progressive development of an immanent principle’.22 In other words, while Progress 
‘had no place for the supernaturalism of Christian eschatology’, or ‘divine judgement and 
divine grace’, the ‘very essence of the Christian attitude to history’, it nevertheless clung 
on to the ‘Christian teleological conception of life’.23 So it happened that the ‘belief in the 
moral perfectibility and the indefinite progress of the human race took the place of the 
Christian faith in the life of the world to come, as the final goal of human effort’.24 Although 
‘Christianity’ and ‘Progress’ are both ‘historical faiths’, then, Dawson tells us – ‘that is to 
say beliefs founded on history and implying a definite theory of history’25 – Christian 
‘progress’ is a fundamentally ‘invisible one and its results can only be fully seen at the end 
of time’.26 In this sense, for Dawson, ‘to think christianly’ means, in part, to accept that 
history only attains a right proportion when viewed, as a matter of faith, from an eternal 
perspective. ‘The essential meaning of history is to be found in the growth of the seed of 
eternity in the womb of time’, he wrote in 1951.27 
 
Dawson’s argument, which he held consistently, was that Christianity’s ‘theology of history’ 
differed very much with the modern doctrine of ‘Progress’, which was altogether ‘bound 
up with […] [the] rapid improvement in the material conditions of existence’.28 Dawson 
defined it simply enough in Progress and Religion, in 1929, as ‘the belief that every day and 
in every way the world grows better and better’.29 ‘To the average European, and still more 
to the average American’, this was a form of progress that entailed ‘more cinemas, motor-
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cars for all, wireless installations, more elaborate methods of killing people, purchases on 
the hire system, preserved foods and picture papers’.30 Then there were ‘the political 
theorists’, in whose minds ‘the belief in Progress found its chief support’.31 These were the 
prophets of progress, Dawson posited, who rejected eternity in favour of ‘the immediate 
future’, as well as the ‘almost apocalyptic belief in the possibility of a complete 
transformation of human society’.32 This was in direct contrast to Augustine, whose 
attention was directed toward the society of the world to come: the City of God. 
Modernity’s understanding of the workings of history, however – what Dawson deemed 
‘the working faith of our civilization’ for the last ‘two centuries’ – was now so much ‘a part 
of the modern mind that any attempt to criticize it’ seemed, or rather had until recently 
seemed, ‘almost an act of impiety’.33  
 
Dawson was working within the Old Western perspective that sought to criticise 
modernity’s vision of progress. Certainly, Dawson had observed a shift in paradigm, noting 
in 1935, in Religion and the Modern State, the ‘series of shocks’ which ‘during the last 
twenty years […] almost destroyed the old complacency and self-confidence that marked 
the pre-war world’: 
 
In those days it seemed as though nothing could shake the stability of our 
civilization, and the average man was content to take it for granted and 
to concentrate his attention on securing a good place for himself in it, 
and appropriating as many as possible of the advantages that it had to 
offer.34 
 
Now, however, in 1935, it was Dawson’s view that ‘[we] can no longer help realizing that 
something very serious is the matter, and that unless something is done about it, and done 
quickly, we shall all find ourselves in a desperate plight’.35 Here Dawson was referring to 
the First World War, of course, but also its aftermath, the political upheavals in Europe, 
currently ongoing, in Germany and elsewhere. Significantly, Dawson forwarded the notion 
of a spirit of despair as a corollary of this shift in paradigm. Indeed, it was clear to Dawson, 
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at least, that a ‘spirit of pessimism and moral defeatism’ – which ‘was especially strong in 
Italy owing to the disillusionment of the peace’, as well as in Germany, ‘owing to the 
bitterness of defeat’ – had come to pervade ‘the post-war period’ as a whole.36  
 
It was a central part of Dawson’s thesis that a modern conception of progress had brought 
about an epoch of moral defeatism as a result of its ‘emptying’ out of Christianity’s 
‘supernatural elements’, the eternal perspective in particular. The twentieth century had 
lost sight of any real ‘theology of history’ that alone was capable, Dawson believed, of 
affording ‘full weight to the unknown and unpredictable element in history’, that of the 
Christian theology of ‘divine judgement and divine grace’.37 Modernity, it seemed, could 
not countenance any recognition of ‘the world of eternal realities’. It was Dawson’s view 
that as a result it had given up a vital bulwark against despair. Consequently, wherever this 
modern despair was particularly pronounced, in Germany and Italy, for instance, the 
population had turned to political solutions, such a fascism, as a way out of this despair. 
Fascism, Dawson posited, had essentially taken advantage of the broken promise of 
progress on the similarly doubtful premise of ‘banishing pessimism and defeatism’ in the 
wake of the First World War.38 What modernity, meaning a world bereft of the eternal 
perspective, had brought about, therefore, was a self-perpetuating drive toward despair 
engendered by utopianism tendering worldly triumph. In this sense, then, Nazism might be 
said to be a reaction itself against the very principle that it had subsequently made its own: 
‘[the] determination to build Jerusalem, at once and on the spot.’39 
 
There is more than one Jerusalem, Dawson tells us, writing in 1935 that ‘there is the 
Muscovite Jerusalem which has no Temple, there is Herr Hitler’s Jerusalem which has no 
Jews, and there is the Jerusalem of the social reformers which is all suburbs’.40 What united 
all of these respective Jerusalems was that they were ‘exclusively this-worldly’.41 ‘Social 
reform, social credit, or socialism pure and simple’, for example, though they had a root in 
Christianity, were no longer considered ‘the indispensable preparation for the Kingdom of 
God’, but ‘the Kingdom of God itself’.42 This was a criticism that Dawson applied just as 
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much to ‘the self-satisfied optimism’ of the nineteenth century as he did the twentieth 
century.43 The error in all of this, particularly ‘from the Catholic point of view’, he saw, was 
that it ignored the concept ‘of Original Sin and its consequences’.44 Dawson’s point of view, 
as both a historian and a Catholic, was that society was not ultimately perfectible and that 
the attempt to do so, ‘by political or economic measures’, was ‘the very force which is 
responsible for the intolerance and violence of the new political order’.45 The benefit, then, 
of possessing a theology of history that was accustomed to defeat was that it prepared its 
adherents for coming disappointments, while at the same time promising victory at the end 
of Time. J. R. R. Tolkien, a fellow Catholic, neatly summed up what was essentially Dawson’s 
own theology of history, writing in 1956:  
 
Actually I am a Christian, and indeed a Roman Catholic, so that I do not 
expect “history” to be anything but a “long defeat” – though it contains 
(and in a legend may contain more clearly and movingly) some samples 
or glimpses of final victory.46 
 
The Christian should not demand, nor expect, victory in Time. Rather, victory lies beyond 
the precincts of history in eternity. This was Tolkien’s, as well as Dawson’s, essential 
premise. For them, this was what it meant to think ‘christianly’. 
 
 
The ‘Long Defeat’ 
 
In 1942, in The Judgement of the Nations, Dawson pondered that ‘in these dark times there 
must be many who feel tempted to despair when they see the ruin of the hopes of peace 
and progress that inspired the Liberal idealism of the last century’.47 However, he also 
believed that, for Christians, ‘the shock and the disillusionment should be less severe than 
to those who have put their faith in the nineteenth-century gospel of secular progress’, 
since ‘the Christian faith never minimized the reality of the forces of evil in history and 
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society’.48 As Chadwick writes, the perspective of Augustine makes it especially clear that 
‘no earthly state is free from overthrow either from without or, more commonly, by 
corrosion from within’.49 One of Christianity’s virtues, Dawson also argued, was that it 
‘prepared men’s minds to face the extreme consequences of the external triumph of evil, 
and the apparent defeat of good’.50 Nevertheless, this was ‘no defeatist philosophy’, but ‘a 
triumphant affirmation of life – of eternal life victorious over death, of the kingdom of God 
prevailing over the rulers of this world of darkness’.51 This was Dawson’s philosophy of 
history; one that, as a Catholic, he shared with Chesterton and Waugh, as well as Tolkien, 
who referred to this theology as the philosophy of the ‘long defeat’.  
 
In the concluding chapter of Beyond Politics (1939), Dawson posed a number of questions 
that he believed he must answer in order to forward Christianity as a serious response to 
modern despair:  
 
Have we any reason to believe that a Christian social order could be 
immediately realized here and now? Have we any reason to suppose that 
the right side necessarily wins? Or if we believe that it must win 
necessarily, must it win this time, in this particular age and these 
particular circumstances? And finally, have we any right to suppose that 
history will proceed according to plan, that it will realize the hopes and 
ideals of men? In other words, is history a reasonable process or is it 
essentially incalculable and irrational?52 
 
Certainly, Dawson noted, ‘nothing could be more discouraging to the man or woman who 
believes in the need for applying Christian principles to social and political life than the 
present state of the world and the present political outlook’.53 However, it was his view 
that it was ultimately a mistake to expect the triumph of the Christian ideal in Time:  
 
We have no right to expect that Christian principles will work in practice 
in the simple way that a political system may work. The Christian order is 
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a supernatural order. It has its own principles and its own laws which are 
not those of the visible world and which may often seem to contradict 
them.54 
 
This was no reason to despair, however, Dawson reasoned, asserting that Christianity’s 
‘victories may be found in apparent defeat and its defeats in material success’.55 It was not 
always obvious what direction history was heading. This, he argued, was the true nature of 
history. In this sense, too, ‘the life of Christ’ was ‘profoundly historical’ and a useful 
analogy.56 After all, Christ’s story was ‘the fulfilment of a historical purpose, towards which 
priests and prophets and even politicians had worked’.57 But ‘from the worldly point of 
view, from the standpoint of a contemporary secular historian, it was not only unimportant, 
but actually invisible’.58 We should take note, is Dawson’s point here; Christ’s life did not 
appear to ‘lead to any kind of historical achievement but moved swiftly and irresistibly 
towards its catastrophic end’.59 No one at the time could have supposed that ‘out of the 
heart of this catastrophe there arose something completely new’: Christianity.60 This was a 
prime example of the ‘unpredictable element in history’ that Dawson believed ought to 
forestall any temptation toward despair and defeatism. As Chesterton himself had written 
in 1909, in The Ball and Cross, ‘the cross cannot be defeated [...] for it is Defeat’.61 Dawson’s 
own work is peppered with similar remarks, which are essentially variations on a theme: 
that ‘apparent success often means spiritual failure, and the way of failure and suffering is 
the royal road of Christian progress’, for example.62 Dawson’s point was that ‘the Christian 
ought to be the last person in the world to lose hope in the presence of the failure of the 
right and the apparent triumph of evil. For all this forms part of the Christian view of life, 
and the Christian discipline is expressly designed to prepare us to face such a situation.’63 
As he had noted earlier, in 1935, ‘Christianity began with a startling failure, and the sign in 
which it conquered was the Cross on which its Founder was executed.’64 So though the 
Christian was obviously ‘bound to believe that there is a spiritual purpose in history – that 
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it is subject to the designs of Providence and that somehow or other God’s will is done’, 
Dawson stressed that this was a ‘very different thing from saying that history is rational in 
the ordinary sense of the word’.65 Enduring history – or the ‘long defeat’, as Tolkien termed 
it – was predicated on recognising the ‘unpredictable element in history’. At the moment 
when Europe appeared to be sliding toward catastrophe, Dawson wrote in 1939 that Christ 
in fact employed such a ‘forecast of calamity as a motive for hope. ‘“When you see these 
things,” He said, “look up and lift up your heads for your redemption is at hand.”’66 Although 
this might ‘seem a strange philosophy of history’, wrote Dawson, it was ‘the philosophy of 
Christ, and if the prospect of these things causes us to hang down our heads instead of 
lifting them up, it shows that there is something wrong with our point of view’.67 
Christianity made a speciality out of defeat. It was for this reason that it appealed so much 
to Dawson.  
 
 
Enduring the ‘Long Defeat’ 
 
Writing at a pronounced low-point for Britain during the Second World War, Waugh 
reproved the socialite Diana Cooper for suggesting that he was ‘unchristian to expect evil’, 
and also that he was essentially a ‘pessimist’ for thinking so.68 Waugh responded that it was 
true that for the past six years he had ‘seen everything moving to disaster’.69 However, he 
also added that it was a mistake to suggest that this should ultimately lead to a despair so 
profound that he should take his own life. This was Cooper’s great error, Waugh asserted, 
‘saying that because one expects disaster one should despair’.70 Waugh’s attitude to defeat 
is essentially the same as Dawson’s philosophy, as is evident in his letter to Cooper:  
 
Despair is a sin and has nothing to do with intellectual conclusions 
resulting from observation [...] I live in a world which seems to me to 
deteriorate daily before my eyes and I am not tempted to suicide. And 
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when things get very much worse indeed I shall not commit suicide; why 
should I at the expectation of them?71 
 
In actual fact, he argued, what Cooper’s view really amounted to was ‘the worst pessimism 
and ingratitude to God, saying that you find life tolerable only on the assumption that it will 
get a great deal better’.72 Here Waugh was asserting the classical Christian perspective that 
Dawson had articulated so well in his own work. It was also expressed in Tolkien’s own 
philosophy of the ‘long defeat’, which found perfect expression in his work The Lord of the 
Rings, where a vital philosophy of history served to uphold the entire quest. Essentially, 
Tolkien would express in literary form what Dawson had explained as a historian and a 
theologian, how a person, availing themselves of the Christian philosophy of history, might 
endure immediate or prospective disaster and yet, as Waugh termed it in his work on 
Campion, ‘surrender themselves to their destiny without calculation or reserve […] though 
it led them through bitter ways to poverty, disgrace, exile, imprisonment and death’. What 
is more, they would follow it ‘gaily’. 
 
Tom Shippey has observed ‘that most of the characters in The Lord of the Rings are staring 
“universal final defeat” in the face’.73 Indeed, characters such as Frodo and Treebeard 
‘seem to be on the edge of a situation of existential despair’.74 Another is Denethor, the 
despondent Steward of Gondor, introduced to us toward the latter end of Tolkien’s epic. A 
model of modern fatalism, he is, in a sense, what Cooper envisaged in Waugh. Employing 
one of the Palantíri seeing stones to gain knowledge of the enemy, Denethor is driven to 
despair by the prospect of his kingdom’s prospective annihilation by Mordor’s vast armies. 
Minas Tirith, his capital, seems certain to fall: ‘“soon all shall be burned. The West has 
failed. It shall all go up in a great fire, and all shall be ended. Ash! Ash and smoke blown 
away on the wind!”’75 As Tom Shippey notes, ‘despair […] is Sauron’s chief weapon’, a 
despair which is itself, he argues, a representation of ‘post-war and post-faith 
disillusionment’ in Tolkien’s Britain.76 Denethor, overwhelmed by a spirit of defeatism, 
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knowing what forces are arrayed against him, informs Gandalf the wizard that Gondor 
cannot hope to win against such huge odds:  
 
“For a little space you may triumph on the field, for a day. But against the 
Power that now arises there is no victory. To this City only the first finger 
of its hand has yet been stretched […] The West has failed.”77  
 
Denethor, in his despair, kills himself, reasoning that ‘“battle is vain. Why should we wish 
to live longer?”’78 Here we see what Waugh perceived in Cooper’s logic, that life is only 
bearable if the prospect of victory is favourable. Gandalf’s rebuke of Denethor is much the 
same as Waugh’s, that despair is essentially a sin: 
  
“Authority is not given to you, Steward of Gondor, to order the hour of 
your death,” answered Gandalf. “And only the heathen kings, under the 
domination of the Dark Power, did thus, slaying themselves in pride and 
despair.”79 
 
Joseph Pearce has suggested that Tolkien intentionally set up the link between ‘pagan 
despair’ and the Steward of Gondor, and that this is evident in the very name Denethor; 
Thor being the Norse god of thunder, while Théoden, the king of Rohan, another character 
who conversely overcomes his despair, fights on. Théoden, Pearce notes, ‘connects to true 
religion via Theos, the Greek word for God’.80 Certainly, the notion of fighting against 
terrible odds is seen by Tolkien to be not antithetical to Christianity. Moreover, there is a 
vital philosophy of history at work in The Lord of the Rings that, like Christianity, makes a 
specialty out of defeat, which is evident throughout Tolkien’s created history. As well as 
this, Tolkien would also touch upon the idea that Waugh forwarded earlier, of virtue being 
rewarded through supernatural grace. The individual through his sanctity is himself capable 
of influencing events through the reciprocal nature of grace, which was Waugh’s estimation 
of Campion the Jesuit, Denethor’s opposite. To find Campion’s equal on Middle-earth we 
must turn to Frodo.  
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Middle-earth’s Theology of History: Providence and Free Will  
 
‘Providence’ is a significant aspect of Tolkien’s created universe. It is not a godless universe; 
there is a philosophy of history that is implicit in his work, particularly in Frodo’s story, 
though it is only hinted at, for example when Gandalf explains to Frodo early on in The Lord 
of the Rings why the Ring is now in his possession:  
 
“There was something else at work, beyond any design of the Ring-
maker. I can put it no plainer than by saying that Bilbo was meant to find 
the Ring, and not by its maker. In which case you also were meant to have 
it. And that may be an encouraging thought.”81 
 
As Pearce has pointed out, it is these words spoken by Gandalf to Frodo ‘which are among 
the most important in the whole story’: 
 
The “something else” is obviously God and that which is meant by God to 
happen is clearly providence. It is this scarcely concealed presence of 
God, made manifest in His providence, which makes The Lord of the Rings 
a “fundamentally religious” work.82 
 
We should note that Gandalf finds this thought ‘encouraging’. He views the coming of the 
Ring to Frodo, via Bilbo, optimistically, exactly because it suggests that a greater power is 
on their side. And it continues to be a source of hope. Later, providence appears to interfere 
again when Frodo wonders at the ‘marvel’ of his escape from the black riders during his 
flight to Rivendell:  
 
“Yes, fortune or fate have helped you,” said Gandalf, “not to mention 
courage. For your heart was not touched, and only your shoulder was 
pierced; and that was because you resisted to the last. But it was a 
terribly narrow shave.”83 
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It is Gandalf’s use of the word ‘fate’ that is most telling here. It appears to be one of the 
functions of Gandalf to remind Frodo, as well as the reader, that history is not merely a 
meaningless chaos. At the very least, he suggests that it is somehow being guided. Indeed, 
in this sense, there is something of Dawson in Gandalf, insofar as there is one character in 
the work who is the story’s historian and theologian. 
 
Tolkien’s works are suffused with providence. Indeed, collectively it is a profound 
expression of a philosophy of history that finds a parallel in Christianity, in terms of God’s 
interference in Time, his rewarding and punishing of the actions of those who are part of 
his universe. Nowhere is this more evident, in terms of its nod to religion and the Bible, 
than in the story of the destruction of Númenor by Ilúvatar (God) in The Silmarillion (1977), 
a pre-history that takes place many centuries before The Lord of the Rings. Númenor is the 
island home of the Númenóreans, a race of prosperous mariners. To the west of the island 
lies the Undying Lands, where men are forbidden to tread. However, resenting this ban, 
the Númenóreans break this vital prohibition and sail westwards in an attempt to gain the 
great gift of everlasting life. This decision turns out to be catastrophic:  
 
Ilúvatar showed forth his power, and he changed the fashion of the 
world; and a great chasm opened in the sea between Númenor and the 
Deathless Lands, and the waters flowed down into it, and the noise and 
smoke of the cataracts went up to heaven, and the world was shaken. 
And all the fleets of the Númenóreans were drawn down into the abyss.84 
 
The destruction of Númenor obviously has a peer in the story of the fall of Man in the 
Garden of Eden. We can see here that Tolkien has constructed an entire framework for his 
philosophy of history, where Ilúvatar rules Middle-earth as well as all the lands and seas 
beyond its precincts. Within this universe, then, we have the vital interplay between what 
is essentially the Christian concept of the relationship between providence and free will, 
which we see at work in such stories as The Lord of the Rings.  This, Pearce writes, is really 
what ‘makes it a specifically Catholic work’, underlining the ‘relationship between 
providence and free will’, which provides us ‘with the opportunity to make good moral 
choices that will, in turn, have good moral consequences’.85 The small group of 
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Númenóreans who resist the temptation to sail west is spared the fate of those who broke 
the ban. Instead, they are rewarded and carried to the shores of the Middle-earth. We see 
this repeated once more when Frodo makes just choices, which prompts providence to 
intervene on his behalf in recompense for his right action, even when at the end of his quest 
he cannot bring himself to drop the One Ring into Mount Doom, which is the objective of 
his mission.  
 
When it was pointed out that Frodo had actually failed in his task to destroy the One Ring 
himself, Tolkien replied that he had ‘indeed “failed” as a hero’, but only ‘as conceived by 
simple minds’ who neglect ‘that strange element in the World that we call Pity or Mercy, 
which is also an absolute requirement in moral judgement (since it is present in the Divine 
nature). In its highest exercise it belongs to God.’86 Frodo’s defeat was not a moral failure, 
since he ‘had done what he could and spent himself completely (as an instrument of 
Providence) and had produced a situation in which the object of his quest could be 
achieved’: 
 
His humility (with which he began) and his sufferings were justly 
rewarded by the highest honour; and his exercise of patience and mercy 
towards Gollum gained him Mercy: his failure was redressed.87 
 
In 1956 Tolkien wrote in a letter that Frodo’s ‘quest was bound to fail as a piece of world-
plan, and also was bound to end in disaster as the story of Frodo’s development to the 
“noble”, his sanctification’.88 
 
Fail it would and did as far as Frodo considered alone was concerned […] 
But at this point the “salvation” of the world and Frodo’s own “salvation” 
is achieved by his previous pity and forgiveness of injury. At any point any 
prudent person would have told Frodo that Gollum would certainly 
betray him, and could rob him in the end. To “pity” him, to forbear to kill 
him, was a piece of folly, or a mystical belief in the ultimate value-in-itself 
of pity and generosity even if disastrous in the world of time. He did rob 
him and injure him in the end – but by a “grace”, that last betrayal was at 
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a precise juncture when the final evil deed was the most beneficial thing 
any one cd. [sic] have done for Frodo! By a situation created by his 
“forgiveness”, he was saved himself, and relieved of his burden.’89 
 
The moral of the story, then, is that Frodo and the ‘Cause’ are saved ‘by Mercy […] by the 
supreme value and efficacy of Pity and forgiveness of injury’.90 ‘Grace’ rewards Frodo for 
his sanctity. This is vital, since, as Tolkien writes, ‘one must face the fact: the power of Evil 
in the world in not finally resistible by incarnate creatures, however “good”’.91 Another 
agency, a supernatural force, is required: ‘I think rather of the mysterious last petitions of 
the Lord’s Prayer: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.’92 Referring to this, 
in 1947, Tolkien wrote that once this was accepted there was ‘no horror conceivable that 
such creatures [as Frodo] cannot surmount, by grace (here [in The Lord of the Rings] 
appearing in mythological forms)’.93 This raises another vital aspect contained within this 
particular philosophy of history, which takes us back to Campion: that, as Tolkien wrote, 
‘salvation from ruin will depend on something apparently unconnected: the general 
sanctity (and humility and mercy) of the sacrificial person’.94 Salvation is ultimately reliant 
on sacrifice and ‘“sacrificial” situations’, situations, Tolkien tells us, when ‘the “good” of the 
world depends on the behaviour of an individual in circumstances which demand of him 
suffering and endurance far beyond the normal’, even though it might ‘demand a strength 
of body and mind which he does not possess’.95 
 
He is in a sense doomed to failure, doomed to fall to temptation or be 
broken by pressure against his “will”: that is against any choice he could 
make or would make unfettered, not under the duress [...] Frodo was in 
such a position.96 
 
So, too, was Campion. Indeed, in both Waugh’s and Tolkien’s individual expressions of a 
benevolent philosophy of history, they both emphasised the vital requirement of suffering 
and sacrifice, which would ultimately bring about victory. This was Frodo’s achievement, 
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and it was important that he should invite grace into himself, since he was not capable of 
resisting Evil entirely. Waugh made much the same point. Campion, he wrote, was of ‘an 
age replete with examples of astounding physical courage’.97 Yet compared to the glut of 
Elizabethan ‘sea-dogs and explorers […] tough men, ruthlessly hardened by upbringing, 
gross in their recreations’, Campion stood out amongst ‘even his most gallant and 
chivalrous contemporaries […] Philip Sidney and Don John of Austria’.98 What was so 
impressive about Campion, then, was that this ‘the gentle scholar’, who had ‘trained all his 
life for the pulpit and the lecture room, was able at the word of command to step straight 
into a world of violence, and acquit himself nobly’.99 This could be said of Frodo too. ‘I do 
not think people of that sort and stage of life and development can be both peaceable and 
very brave and tough “at a pinch”’, Tolkien wrote.100 Certainly, this was the apparent 
‘mystery’, Waugh asserted, which set ‘Campion’s triumph apart from the ordinary 
achievements of human strength’.101 At the root of that mystery was supernatural grace.  
 
Waugh’s work on Campion has been described as ‘a polemic’ for the Catholic Church, as 
well as a ‘personal affirmation of his new-found faith’.102 While this is true, it was also an 
attempt to offer a ‘solution’ to the ‘mystery’ of Campion’s strength, which Waugh 
attributed to his ‘piety’, a self-sanctification that might armour modern society against the 
trials of the present.103 Waugh’s examination of his subject in 1935 was not simply an 
expression of his ‘romantic enthusiasm for […] the spirit of the Counter-Reformation’, as 
Douglas Lane Patey has suggested.104 What Waugh did was link Campion’s ‘physical 
courage’ to his ‘gaiety’, which Waugh stated was a manifestation of ‘the supernatural grace 
that was in him’. His triumph, then, was a result of his ‘faith’, which was ‘concrete and 
indestructible’, and ‘of such transcendent value that, once it was held, all other possessions 
became a mere encumbrance’ – including, by implication, his own life.105 All of this had 
resulted from his willingness to sacrifice himself and suffer the material consequences that 
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were implied in that sacrifice.106 This was underscored and emboldened by the promise of 
final victory that was at the heart of the Christian philosophy of history. What history 
essentially required, then, was an army of saints. But because of the vital collaboration 
between providence and free will, it called for self-sanctification rather than an elite of pre-
ordained saints. Sinners trying to be saints is now seen as a vital currency in history.  
 
 
Self-Sanctification  
 
Ian Ker recently referred to ‘that favourite Chestertonian subject of free will’.107 This was a 
major part of Chesterton’s clear inclination toward the Middle Ages. ‘The medieval mind 
turned centrally upon the pivot of Free Will’, Chesterton wrote in 1912.108 ‘In their moral 
philosophy they always thought of man as standing free and doubtful at the cross-roads in 
a forest [...] They had a much stronger sense than we have of the freedom of the soul.’109 
Chesterton believed that this ‘sense’, of ‘a man that may turn either way’, had subsequently 
been ‘weakened’, in part, by ‘the Calvinism of the seventeenth [century]’, which had 
‘darkened this liberty with a sense of doom’.110   
 
Of the idea of Predestination there are broadly two views; the Calvinist 
and the Catholic; and it would make a most uncommon difference to my 
comfort, if I held the former instead of the latter. It is the difference 
between believing that God knows, as a fact, that I choose to go to the 
devil; and believing that God has given me to the devil, without my having 
any choice at all.111 
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Dawson also believed that Calvin’s ‘doctrines of predestination and election’ were ‘inimical 
to that spirit of hope which inspired the Christian culture of the past’.112 The idea, however, 
that a ‘man has the power to choose his own good; either to find his peace in subordinating 
his will to the divine order, or to refer all things to the satisfaction of his own desires and 
to make himself the centre of his universe’ was an identifiably Catholic concept.113 In this 
sense, Catholicism, both Dawson and Chesterton agreed, was exclusively inclusive, unlike 
Calvin’s doctrine of a spiritual elite, since admission to God’s Kingdom was open to both 
saints and sinners. The reason why this was such a relevant subject was that this essentially 
opened the way for a personal quest of self-sanctification, one that intersected with history 
itself. Any individual could co-operate with the Divine.  
 
In 1951, Dawson wrote that ‘Christians not only believe in the existence of a divine plan in 
history, they believe in the existence of a human society which is in some measure aware 
of this plan and capable of co-operating with it’.114 ‘The Christian’, he believed, not only 
‘had to keep his eyes fixed on the future like a servant who waits for the return of his 
master’, he also had to ‘prepare himself for the coming of the Kingdom’ that Providence 
was working toward.115 The individual had his own role to play in history, therefore. Here 
Dawson consciously identified himself with the Augustinian tradition of the vital interplay 
between free will and history. This, he explained in Progress and Religion (1929), was 
Augustine’s revolutionary philosophy of history that ‘the present world’ was essentially ‘the 
birth process of a spiritual creation’, God’s Kingdom, which would be brought about 
through man’s collaboration with ‘the Divine Spirit’, the ‘actuating principle […] which 
manifests itself in the world, outwardly through the sacramental order of the Church, and 
inwardly in the soul by the operation of the spiritual will’.116 Having thus established the 
Divine objective, the City of God, it was the role of the individual, contained within the 
precincts of history, to work toward it in a state of preparation, therefore, availing himself 
of the grace afforded to him by God. The ‘human will’, in this sense, wrote Dawson, was 
‘the engine that God employs for the creation of a new world’.117 And really the individual 
had only two choices before him, or rather a choice between to ‘two loves […] The love of 
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Self [that] builds up Babylon to the contempt of God, and the love of God [that] builds up 
Jerusalem to the contempt of Self’.118 As Augustine had written in The City of God: 
 
If the soul and reason do not serve God as God himself has commanded 
that he should be served, then they do not in any way exercise the right 
kind of rule over the body and the vicious propensities [...] [being instead] 
prostituted to the corrupting influence of vicious demons.119  
 
It was the Christian’s mission, Augustine posited, to reject the love of Self and bring himself 
‘into relation with God’.120  
 
The theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar observed that ‘since the great period of 
Scholasticism’ there had ‘been few theologians who were saints’; meaning one whose 
‘vocation’ was ‘to expound revelation in its fullness’ and whose own life ‘reproduced the 
fullness of the Church’s teaching, and their teaching the fullness of the Church’s life’.121 This 
chapter has essentially been arguing that this attempt to be saintly was also a vital part of 
the Old Western ethic itself: bringing oneself into relation with the ‘More-Than-World’. 
Miles Hollingworth, in his 2013 biography of Augustine, explains that the City of God was 
underscored by its author’s central ‘obsession […] the idea that the writing out, and 
speaking out, of reality – Confession – was the only way that we could grasp something’.122 
Contained within this was Augustine’s chief reflection: ‘how men and women must carry 
themselves between heaven and earth.’123 Hollingworth elucidates this point further, that 
in Augustine’s view we are ‘congenital materialists’ inhabiting ‘a spiritual universe’, and 
therefore ‘doomed to be going about things the wrong way’.124 In this sense, ‘the human 
heart’ is ‘a needle in a compass’ that ‘quivers between its poles […] what Augustine would 
call his “two cities”’.125 Having come to fully admit the supernatural as a reality, accepting 
an accompanying theology of history, one that very much chimes with Hollingworth’s own 
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account of Augustine’s theology – of an individual being able to choose between two poles 
– the Old Western Men would themselves attempt to practice what they preached. It was 
for this reason, perhaps, that so many of these men, those such as Dawson and Chesterton, 
converted to ‘the sacramental order of the Catholic Church’, which, as Dawson noted, was 
the outward manifestation of the ‘actuating principle’ itself. Arguably, it was Catholicism, 
in the twentieth century, which conformed most of all to the Augustinian tradition that 
accepted Providence, yet which did not diminish the role of the individual in that history. A 
person’s role within history was to bring himself into a closer relation with the Divine and 
sanctify himself. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings expresses this line of thought particularly 
well. 
 
 
Aspiring to Sanctity: Faramir 
 
Tolkien had written that he was in actual fact a hobbit.126 However, in 1956, in a letter to a 
fan, Tolkien claimed that ‘as far as any character is “like me” it is Faramir – except that I 
lack what all my characters possess (let the psychoanalysts note!) Courage’.127 Although 
there is some correlation between hobbits and Faramir – an appreciation of gardens, most 
notably128 – there is an apparent contradiction here, in that Faramir himself is hardly a 
hobbit. Rather, he is a warrior invested ‘with an air of high nobility such as Aragorn […] a 
captain that men would follow’.129 This is not to say there are not facets to Faramir’s 
character that speak of Tolkien himself: he was ‘gentle in bearing […] [and] a lover of lore’, 
for example.130 Nevertheless, it is problematic to reconcile Tolkien’s two statements here 
– that he was at once a hobbit and Faramir – unless we understand that Faramir was not 
necessarily who Tolkien was, but who he wanted to be; that Faramir was the standard that 
Tolkien set himself as a Christian on his own quest toward self-sanctification.  
 
Faramir has already been likened to a ‘saint’, by Pearce.131 Birzer, too, has recently 
identified Faramir as one of a number of ‘sanctified heroes’ in The Lord of the Rings; the 
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others being Frodo, Sam, Gandalf, and Aragorn, each representing and fulfilling ‘not only 
St. Augustine’s post-Roman vision of heroism – a synthesis of Stoic realism and Christian 
hope – but particularly St. Paul’s notion that each individual was a member of the larger 
and eternal Body of Christ’.132 In Faramir’s case, a large part of his quality is his humility, 
which is a reflection of that ‘eternal Body’. This is the essence of his saintliness. For 
example, Faramir is particularly notable since he is one of the few characters in Tolkien’s 
work to resist the temptation to take the Ring for himself, chancing upon Frodo and Sam in 
The Two Towers. At the root of this resistance is his humility:   
 
“I would not take this thing, if it lay by the highway. Not were Minas 
Tirith falling in ruin and I alone could save her, so, using the weapon of 
the Dark Lord for her good and my glory. No, I do not wish for such 
triumphs, Frodo son of Drogo.”133 
 
Faramir allows Frodo and Sam to go on their way, letting them complete their mission. This 
is in stark contrast to Boromir, his brother, who had attempted to take the Ring from Frodo 
previously. While Faramir is a ‘saint’, then, Boromir, Pearce has written, is really Tolkien’s 
idea of ‘the sinner who is trying to be a saint’.134 What prevents him from achieving this 
goal is his own pride; a thirst for personal glory, which Faramir himself succeeds in 
repudiating. Following Hollingworth’s line, what we might say is that Boromir is a prime 
example of man ‘going about things the wrong way’. 
 
Tolkien, it seems, intended Faramir to be a direct counterpoint to Boromir. Faramir, we are 
told, is very much like Boromir in that he, too, is ‘personally courageous’.135 The great 
difference between them, however, is that Faramir is ‘also modest, fair-minded […] and 
very merciful’.136 Unlike Boromir, Faramir ‘did not seek glory in danger without a purpose’, 
even though it meant that ‘his courage was judged less than his brother’s’.137 This may be 
Faramir’s true glory. It is what makes him a saint. In this sense, as Tolkien himself noted, 
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one of Faramir’s uses is that he expresses ‘some very sound reflections no doubt on martial 
glory and true glory’.138  
 
True heroism, Tolkien argues, must include humility. He would touch on this notion again 
when writing a commentary on the poem The Battle of Maldon, a piece of Old English verse 
that recounted the events of a battle between the Anglo-Saxons and a Viking army in 991. 
Here Tolkien criticised the heroic Anglo-Saxon ethic epitomised by the actions of Byrhtnoth, 
the leader of a band of Anglo-Saxon warriors, who permitted a Viking army to cross the 
causeway from Northey Island to the mainland, allowing them to utilise their full martial 
strength. That Byrhtnoth actually acquiesced to this entreaty was ‘magnificent perhaps’, 
Tolkien admitted, ‘but certainly wrong’.139 The Anglo-Saxons, including Byrhtnoth were 
annihilated, all because of an ‘act of pride and misplaced chivalry’.140  
 
Tolkien employed the example of the poem The Battle of Maldon to illustrate his own 
distinction between ‘bleak heroic necessity’ and heroism carried ‘to excess’ by the ‘element 
of pride, in the form of the desire for honour and glory’.141 Faramir is, of course, Byrhtnoth’s 
opposite, not allowing pride to blind himself to the right course of action. As Faramir 
himself relates, ‘“I do not love the bright sword for its sharpness, nor the arrow for its 
swiftness, nor the warrior for his glory. I love only that which they defend.”’142 Faramir’s 
attitude toward battle, Tolkien implies, is entirely of a piece with his moral capacity to resist 
the power of the Ring. His virtue as a solider is synonymous with his sanctity. 
 
Faramir represents sanctity. On the other hand, the drive toward self-sanctity is present in 
the quest itself, not Faramir. This introduces the notion of the sinner trying to be a saint, 
which from the Catholic perspective is the Christian’s mission in life, as Stratford Caldecott 
writes:  
 
God created us incomplete, because the kind of creature that can only be 
perfected by its own choices (and so through Quest and trial) is more 
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glorious than the kind that has only to be whatever it was made to be by 
another.143 
 
Here, then, free will and providence coalesce, affording the individual meaning and 
purpose since it grants them the autonomy to decide for themselves whether they will 
accept the quest of self-sanctification. Charles Moseley, referring to the presence of 
Christian metaphysics in Tolkien’s work, believes, too, that at ‘its root lies the Christian 
model of a world loved into being by a Creator, whose creatures have the free will to turn 
away from the harmony of that love to seek their own will and desires’.144 Sean McGrath 
agrees, writing that ‘The Lord of the Rings myth depicts the dynamics of this fundamental 
option to give up our lives for the sake of a higher good’.145 Such ‘“escapist” literature’ as 
The Lord of the Rings, McGrath continues, ‘presents in vivid dramatic pictures what is 
otherwise intangible and inexpressible: our battle for salvation, for overcoming the all-
pervasive, crippling legacy of sin’.146 In Tolkien’s story, it is Frodo’s quest to destroy the Ring 
that most obviously signifies this ‘battle for salvation’ or self-sanctification. Sam, Gandalf 
and Aragorn, too, as Birzer notes, fulfil their own individual quests or destinies. But there 
is Boromir too. Although this example is less obvious, Faramir’s brother’s story is perhaps 
the most human journey of all since his story is most evidently a tale of redemption, which 
comes through penitence as well as sacrifice. 
 
Boromir’s exoneration, having attempted to take the Ring from Frodo, is his act of sacrifice 
– a common theme and requisite, in this regard – being mortally wounded fighting to 
protect his friends, as well as his subsequent penitence when he confesses his sins to 
Aragorn as he lies dying: ‘Boromir opened his eyes and strove to speak. At last slow words 
came. “I tried to take the Ring from Frodo,” he said. “I am sorry. I have paid.”’147 Pearce 
notes that Boromir’s words mirror ‘precisely the actions required of the penitent according 
to the form of the Sacrament of Confession in the Catholic Church’, meaning ‘the three acts 
required by the penitent before the priest’: contrition (remorse); confession (of the sin); 
and satisfaction (achieved by the act of confession itself).148 Aragorn fulfils the role of the 
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priest in this instance. When Boromir says ‘“I have failed”’, it is Aragorn who insists that he 
has actually ‘“conquered. Few have gained such a victory.”’149 Boromir is dying, of course. 
In this sense, he has failed. What Aragorn is referring to, however, is a spiritual triumph, a 
very specific sort of victory that Boromir has won for himself, transcending the old heroic 
ideal, since it was achieved under the auspices of sacrifice and penitence rather than pride, 
thus transcending himself, which is the objective of self-sanctification. Above all, then, 
Boromir has conquered himself in a way that Byrhtnoth, at Maldon, had not. Aragorn kisses 
his brow and tells him to ‘“be at peace”’.150 
 
 
The Song of Roland 
 
Boromir’s redemption has a parallel in literature that has so far gone unmentioned, which 
is the eleventh century epic poem The Song of Roland, a fictionalised account of the death 
of a real-life Roland at the Battle of Roncevaux Pass in 788. In the poem, Roland and the 
soldiers under his command are ambushed by Saracens. Out of pride, he refuses to sound 
his horn to call for reinforcements, a decision that seals his fate. Only when his force has 
been all but destroyed does he sound his horn. Whether Tolkien was purposely setting up 
a link between these two characters or not, Boromir, too, blows his horn for assistance as 
he fights for his life, prior to his death. Their respective death scenes are also similar, in that 
Roland confesses his sins:  
 
Roland feels that his time has come; 
He is on a steep hill facing Spain. 
With one hand he beat his breast: 
“O God, the Almighty, I confess 
My sins, both great and small, 
Which I have committed since the time I was born, 
Until this day on which I have been overtaken.” 
He held out his right glove to God; 
Angels come down to him from Heaven.151 
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Roland’s exoneration, then, like Boromir’s, is his humility at the last in an act of Christian 
penitence. Although Tolkien himself never compared and contrasted, explicitly at least, The 
Song of Roland with the actions of Byrhtnoth in The Battle of Maldon, Dawson did.  
 
Writing in 1932, Dawson explained that ‘in The Song of Roland we find the same motives 
that inspired the old heathen epic – the loyalty of a warrior to his lord, the delight in war 
for its own sake, above all the glorification of honourable defeat’.152 Dawson compared this 
facet of the poem to The Battle of Maldon, ‘with its great lines: “Though shall be harder, 
heart the keener, courage the greater, as our might lessens.”’153 This, he wrote, was a clear 
expression of the northern ‘heroic ideal’.154 This philosophy was still apparent in The Song 
of Roland. The hero’s ‘obstinate refusal to sound his horn is entirely in the tradition of the 
old poetry’, Dawson notes.155 What made The Song of Roland revolutionary, however, in 
terms of the ethical ideal that it espoused, as revealed in Roland’s death scene, was that 
the northern ideal was ‘now subordinated to the service of Christendom and brought into 
relation with Christian ideas’.156 Now ‘the defiant fatalism of the Nordic heroes’, as 
exhibited in The Battle of Maldon, is ‘replaced by the Christian attitude of submission and 
repentance’.157 We see these themes expressed in Tolkien’s own work. 
 
For Dawson, The Song of Roland was the prime ‘symbol of the fusion of Nordic and Christian 
traditions in the medieval unity’ that he made his central subject of study in the 1930s.158 
This ‘synthesis […] between the Germanic North and the spiritual order of the Church and 
the traditions of the Latin culture’ was what he termed ‘Nordic Catholicism’, he 
explained.159 Dawson believed that the Dark Ages had been characterised by an essential 
dualism, in which ‘there was one ideal for the warrior and another for the Christian, and 
the former still belonged in spirit to the barbaric world of northern paganism’.160 Then in 
the eleventh century the ‘crusading ideal’ arose, when this ‘military society was 
incorporated into the spiritual polity of Western Christendom’.161 This entailed a 
                                                          
152 Dawson, The Making of Europe, 252. 
153 Ibid., 253. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid., 252. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., 253. 
159 Ibid., 252, 253. 
160 Ibid., 253. 
161 Ibid. 
167 
 
‘translation into Christian forms of the old heroic ideal of the Nordic warrior culture’ in ‘the 
institution of knighthood’.162 ‘The medieval knight was the barbarian warrior with a veneer 
of Christian chivalry’, he emphasised.163 The medieval knight no doubt appealed to Dawson 
for the same reason that the notion of self-sanctification appealed to Tolkien. They were 
essentially identical concepts that remained relevant even in their own day. The knight was 
no saint, Dawson made sure to stress, but he was at least an improvement. Chesterton, 
too, shared the same view as Dawson, that The Song of Roland was a piece of ‘semi-barbaric 
poetry’.164 Nevertheless, it contrived ‘to express the idea that Christianity imposes upon its 
heroes a paradox: a paradox of great humility in the matter of their sins combined with 
great ferocity in the matter of their ideas. Of course the Song of Roland could not say this; 
but it conveys this.’165  
 
Dawson agreed with Chesterton’s view. ‘Nordic Catholicism’ was a compromise. The knight 
was a sinner attempting to be a saint, much like Boromir. But what mattered more, of 
course, to Tolkien, Dawson and Chesterton, in terms of this compromise, was that it 
constituted a very Christian attempt at self-sanctification, which was the fundamental glory 
of the saint. What is more, because such works as The Lord of the Rings expressed a vital 
Christian truth – that of the interplay of free will and providence, of action and 
consequence – it was applicable to themselves in the real world. This was the reality that 
so much impressed the poet W. H. Auden when he reviewed Tolkien’s work. John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost was ‘hard to stomach because of the conjunction of two incompatible notions 
of Deity, of a God of Love who creates free beings who can reject his love and of a God of 
absolute Power whom none can withstand’.166 In this sense, though Tolkien was ‘not as 
great a writer as Milton’, he had ‘in this matter […] succeeded where Milton failed’.167 
Tolkien had established a compelling universe that clarified the individual’s mission within 
the Christian and Catholic philosophy of history. Indeed, he was attempting, just like 
Dawson, to re-establish this notion of the quest for self-sanctity. There was no doubt in 
Dawson’s mind, certainly, that this was essentially a vanishing ethic, ever since 1524, when 
its ‘last representative [Chevalier de] Bayard, “the good knight”, died like Roland with his 
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face to the Spaniards at the passage of Sesia, in the age of Luther and Machiavelli’.168 What 
Tolkien’s vision in The Lord of the Rings left unanswered, however, was whether this ethic 
could be resurrected in reality, and particularly in their own century. And if it could, what 
form would it take? Moreover, if sanctity was reliant upon what Tolkien termed 
‘“sacrificial” situations’, what opportunities were there for sacrifice in the twentieth 
century? Ought they to be sought out? The South African poet Roy Campbell, in particular, 
would struggle with these questions, more so than Tolkien and Dawson perhaps, because 
he sought to emulate Roland as a soldier. 
 
 
Roy Campbell 
 
On 6 October 1944, Tolkien wrote a letter to his son Christopher recounting a meeting of 
note in his local pub ‘The Eagle and Child’ in Oxford:   
 
I noticed a strange tall gaunt man half in khaki half in mufti with a large 
wide-awake hat, bright eyes and a hooked nose sitting in the corner. The 
others had their backs to him, but I could see in his eye that he was taking 
an interest in the conversation […] It was rather like Trotter at the 
Prancing Pony, in fact v. [sic] like. All of a sudden he butted in, in a strange 
unplaceable accent, taking up some point about Wordsworth. In a few 
seconds he was revealed as Roy Campbell.169 
 
Tolkien would later change the name of ‘Trotter’ to ‘Strider’, otherwise known as Aragorn, 
one of the central characters in his work The Lord of the Rings. Tolkien’s meeting with 
Campbell was reminiscent, he thought, of the introduction of Aragorn into the story at the 
Prancing Pony in Bree. Indeed, Tolkien referred to Campbell as a sort of ‘old-looking war-
scarred Trotter’ himself; a ‘powerful poet and soldier […] limping from recent wounds’.170 
Campbell had, it seems, regaled him with tales of adventures and personal glory. Tolkien 
was evidently very much impressed. Campbell, he found out, was not only a poet, but a 
bullfighter too, who had fought, supposedly, for Franco in the Spanish Civil War. Campbell 
was certainly a man of action. The story that Tolkien ‘most enjoyed’, however, ‘was the tale 
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of greasy [Jacob] Epstein (the sculptor)’, who Campbell had fought and allegedly put ‘in 
hospital for a week’.171 What Campbell amounted to, Tolkien concluded, was a poet very 
much ‘unlike the Left – the “corduroy panzers”’, those such as Auden, ‘who fled to America’ 
at the outbreak of war in 1939.172 Campbell, it appeared, was exactly the opposite. And it 
is, indeed, telling that what so much impressed Tolkien was not Campbell’s poetry, but his 
apparent physical courage.  
 
Certainly, Campbell cultivated an image of hardiness, fortitude and chivalry. He wrote in 
his autobiography that when ‘in an unfamiliar predicament’ he would ‘invariably take one 
of the paladins of Chivalry for […] [his] Model – the Cid Campeador, Roland, Oliver, or some 
other worthy of that sort’.173 This was a telling sort of bravado. It was not so much Campbell 
‘the poet’ that counted as it was Campbell the ‘warrior’ who really mattered in his own 
mind. This much is clear from his meeting with Tolkien in 1944. Moreover, it was an idea of 
himself that he sought to demonstrate at every opportunity, but not only in passing 
conversation. It was not simply a matter of bluster. What drove Campbell, it might be 
argued, was a sort of pugilistic piety, a piety that not only underscored his poetry but 
informed his actions as part of the Old Western ethic.  
 
It was vital to Campbell’s own sense of himself that he should actually realise what he 
purported. He shared his contemporary Catholics’ philosophy of history; of the importance 
of sacrifice and its corollary, sanctity, through which final victory might be gained. His own 
drive toward sanctity, however, would be characterised by an ostensible fierceness that 
really entailed what Dawson identified as a ‘fearlessness of consequences’, which was a 
sanctity in its own right. Both Dawson and Campbell were, in effect, in search of a 
battleground, although they differed in terms of what the battle itself might look like.  What 
they were seeking, essentially, was a type of combat that suited their own capabilities.     
 
 
Dawson and the Oxford Movement 
 
In his 1933 work The Spirit of the Oxford Movement, Dawson emphasised the peculiar 
‘fierceness of spirit’ that marked the movement’s founding members: Richard Hurrell 
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Froude, John Keble and John Henry Newman.174 It was Froude, in particular, ‘the hero and 
champion of the movement’, Dawson wrote, who embodied the characteristic Tractarian 
combativeness most of all; a ‘supernaturalized chivalry’, which was ‘a vindication of the 
supernatural order’ itself, realised ‘in the spiritual life of the individual Christian’.175 Writing 
in 1933, Dawson was relaying the Augustinian notion that Newman had himself sought to 
establish, that Froude was really a saint. This is a common conception. Piers Brendon, for 
example, wrote in 1974 that Froude represented his movement’s ‘heroic, chivalric, self-
sacrificing aspect’.176 The Tractarians were ‘dominated by the ideal of personal holiness’. 
177 This entailed ‘a quest for holiness’, as revealed, for instance, in the posthumous 
publication of Froude’s diary in Remains (1838).178 Brendon explains that the leadership of 
the Oxford Movement ‘won support for their ideology through the quality of their lives 
rather than through the strength of their arguments’.179 ‘Froude’s heroic attempts at self-
sanctification’ were particularly impressive. 180 That he died from tuberculosis at the 
comparatively early age of thirty-three also served to confer on Froude an irresistible 
mystique, the personification of ‘the heroic qualities to which nineteenth-century Anglo-
Catholics aspired’.181 Dawson, too, made a point of stressing Froude’s ‘intense thirst for 
personal holiness’.182 It is interesting to note that the qualities that Dawson explained were 
of a piece with Froude’s personal piety were fundamentally combative pieties. ‘He was a 
natural leader of men and a born fighter.’183 What Dawson meant by this was that Froude 
represented the best of the Tractarians in terms of his ‘fearlessness of consequences’, 
manifest in a ‘fierceness […] that led them to despise compromise and to defy the 
prejudices of the majority’.184 In this sense, Froude’s virtue, his essential piety, was his 
extremism. He was a pugilist who ‘never had any sympathy with a policy of moderation and 
compromise’, wrote Dawson.185 And it was this ‘Froudian extremism’ that was 
‘characteristic of the original spirit of the Oxford Movement’, he argues.186 Froude led by 
example, and it was his example – that licensed that ‘extremism’ for others, such as 
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Newman – that ‘saved the movement from becoming prematurely respectable, while at 
the same time giving it a fresh impulse towards the Catholic ideal’.187  
 
Dawson and Brendon agree that Froude’s great influence and effect on the Oxford 
Movement stemmed from his own drive toward a personal holiness, meaning, in Dawson’s 
own words, a recognition of ‘the supernatural life of the Christian’ and its ‘necessary 
corollary’, the ‘supernatural authority of the Church’.188 In other words, Froude’s apparent 
‘extremism’ was synonymous with the Roman Catholic conception of an apostolic 
succession of saints; what Dawson terms ‘those rare, hidden souls who are the heirs of the 
world to come’.189 Dawson evidently believed that Froude was such a soul and that what 
made the Oxford Movement ‘Catholic’ was not simply its focus upon ‘the hierarchical 
principle of episcopal succession’, but something altogether ‘more mystical’. 190 What made 
Froude the character that he was, Dawson suggests, was that he was one of a number of 
successors to the holiness of the Apostles, who, in Newman’s words, were ‘enough to carry 
on God’s noiseless work’.191 Dawson admired Froude, clearly. Indeed, it would not be so 
far-fetched to suggest that Froude’s ‘fierceness’, which was in effect an expression of his 
sanctity, Dawson argued, was the standard that he set himself as an intellectual; just as 
much as Faramir was Tolkien’s ideal. What is more, it was a realistic gauging of his own 
proficiencies. Campbell, too, would make a similar assessment, but one that came to a very 
different conclusion. His personality was very different to the shy scholar; as his friend 
David Wright would later write: ‘Campbell was a man of action.’192 
 
 
Campbell’s Fierceness  
 
Wright cautions us that ‘some idea has to be given of Campbell’s background and 
upbringing if the cast of his mind is to be understood’.193 Essentially, it was Campbell’s 
‘South African birth and half-pastoral upbringing’, he believed, which gave his ‘work its 
unique bias’.194 This bias, the poet’s peculiar violence in verse – which, in Wright’s words, 
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‘burst like a bomb in the middle of the faded prettiness of the “Georgian” poetry’ – had its 
origins in the sun-baked bush of Campbell’s native Natal.195 Campbell evidently thought so 
too. Light on the Dark Horse (1951), his autobiography, accentuated the severe 
environment that he believed had served to infuse a corresponding asperity in himself. ‘As 
children’, he wrote, ‘we used to amuse ourselves with scorpions much in the same way as 
English boys do with chestnuts or “conkers”’, for example.196 He also described the killing 
of a stag with his bare hands. It was ‘one of the happiest days of my life’.197 Campbell 
revelled in the ferocious physicality of the action:  
 
I was knocked over with a flesh wound on the hip, recovered, and 
throwing myself on the animal, went for it with my bare hands. After 
much tossing and tussling, I got a leverage on its horns, wrestled it down, 
and gradually drowned it, in less than eighteen inches of water.198  
 
That the stag had also drawn blood on this occasion was vital to the image Campbell had 
of himself. The nature of his upbringing had exposed him to danger at an early age. And it 
is perhaps telling that he would continue to place himself in such situations throughout his 
life, as one of his daughters, Anna, later recalled:  
 
Roy would take the opportunity to take part in all sorts of sports which, 
after […] writing, were essential to his well-being. It was important also 
that the sport should […] involve a certain amount of risk which, for some 
paradoxical reason, restored his nervous equanimity.199  
 
This may also explain Campbell’s passion for bullfighting.  
 
Writing in a small book titled Taurine Provence: The Philosophy and Religion of the 
Bullfighter (1931), a work that was later consulted by Ernest Hemingway in the writing of a 
similar work, Death in the Afternoon (1939), Campbell expressed his view that ‘bull-fighting 
is the only sport which is at the same time a great art and in which the man opposes a 
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terrific adversary with inferior weapons’.200 This chimes with Hemmingway’s own claim, in 
1939, that ‘bullfighting is the only art in which the artist is in danger of death and in which 
the degree of brilliance in the performance is left to the fighter’s honor’.201 Bullfighting was 
the only art in which the aptitude of the artist was almost entirely dependent upon his 
‘ability temporarily to ignore possible consequences’.202 ‘The usual bullfighter is a very 
brave man’, Hemmingway tells us.203 But what marks the truly great bullfighter, however, 
is ‘a more pronounced degree of bravery’, which is ‘the ability not to give a damn for 
possible consequences’ – in fact, he must actively ‘despise them’.204 Campbell would have 
agreed with Hemmingway. An exquisite pass, or the perfect kill, required a high degree of 
physical courage on the part of both the bull and the torero. A contempt of consequence 
was what Dawson so much admired in Froude as well, we should note.      
 
By seeking out combat – for Campbell took part himself, on occasions, in bullfighting – he 
was, in his own mind, attempting to transcend himself since, in the words of Hemmingway, 
it obliged him ‘not to give a damn for possible consequences’. This chimes with Dawson’s 
own identification of Froude’s fierceness, attempting to conform to a conception of the 
‘More-Than-World’, we might say. But while Froude’s particular ‘extremism’, in this regard, 
was entirely intellectual, Campbell’s was tipped with a very physical edge. In this sense, 
Campbell’s arena was really that of the bullring itself; and sometimes he would pick fights, 
with Epstein, for instance. Brutality was not, however, part of Campbell’s nature, it seems. 
Anna wrote that what ‘irritated’ her ‘most was that this very gentle man should spend so 
much time and energy trying to prove that he was tough’.205 ‘He always made light of his 
gifts as a poet, but exaggerated his prowess in the fields of action.’206 Furthermore, 
Campbell’s friend Wright also perceived ‘a great and fundamental gentleness beneath a 
superficial truculence’.207 ‘Campbell’s ruggedness’, Wright believed, ‘was theatrical; a thing 
put on; the vainglory and braggadocio, with which he embroidered his exploits’.208  
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Birzer writes that ‘Tolkien believed that as a part of one’s preparation for heaven, or one’s 
sanctification, one should perform acts of Christian heroism. For Tolkien, that meant doing 
God’s will and being a part of Christ’s army.’209  Campbell, we might say, took this injunction 
far more literally than any of his Old Western contemporaries. This was, perhaps, 
Campbell’s flaw. He set himself up for disappointment. Anna has written of her father’s 
‘lifelong ambition to become a soldier’.210 It was an ambition that was thwarted time and 
time again. This had much to do with Campbell’s age. Born in 1901, he was too young to 
fight in the early stages of the First World War, though he attempted to volunteer twice. 
When he was finally accepted and sent to Europe the war was over. By 1939, however, 
Campbell was too old for active service in the armed forces. He was also suffering from a 
bad hip, which limited his mobility. Before this, too, he ‘longed to fight the communists 
physically’ in Spain, Anna remembers; while later he ‘could get no peace until he actually 
enlisted to fight Hitler’.211 Although he was eventually accepted into the British army, he 
was posted to Africa, far away from the fighting. In actual fact, Campbell never experienced 
battle. Tolkien’s impression of Campbell was founded on a lie. His only experience on the 
frontline in Spain, during the civil war, was a tour by car of a battlefront in 1937. Anna later 
attempted to defend her father:  
 
 I know that Roy was very disappointed not to be allowed to join up […] 
He has been criticised for saying that he actually fought in the Spanish 
Army, but I find nothing wrong with this. It was Poetic Justice. He did his 
best to get in and that was equivalent, for him, with having done so. The 
courage needed was the same. He really longed to fight the communists 
physically, but since he was unable to do so he fought for Christianity and 
against Communism with his pen.212 
 
However, there is another sense in which Campbell was justified in saying that he had 
fought Communism, in terms of his philosophy of history and his conversion to Catholicism 
in 1936.  
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Toledo, 1936 
 
The ancient city of Toledo in Spain stood for Campbell’s newfound philosophy of history. 
The fortress, in particular, which bore the brunt of a Republican attack in 1936, during the 
civil war, had been at the cynosure of what was, in his mind, a very Christian victory. For it 
was his view that this victory was achieved not through strength of arms, but through the 
strength of faith, as he advertised in his short verse ‘The Alcazar Mined’: ‘This Rock of Faith, 
the thunder-blasted – / Eternity will hear it rise.’213 Campbell eulogised the ‘Miracle […] / 
How fiercer tortures than their own / By living faith were overthrown; / How mortals, 
thinned to ghastly pallor, / Gangrened and rotting to the bone / With winged souls of 
Christian valour’ withstood the siege.214 Campbell’s implication here was that ‘living faith’ 
was integral to ‘Christian valour’. Here we see the root of the significance that he attached 
to the Nationalist success in Toledo in 1936. It was, he believed, a ‘miracle’, one that had 
been gained through suffering and willingness to sacrifice all, including his own life. 
 
Campbell’s daughter Teresa summed up her father’s attitude toward ‘the victory at 
Toledo’: it ‘was one of the examples of the supernatural working during the Spanish war’.215 
Anna also believed that ‘supernatural tactics’ were the only way ‘to explain the resistance 
of the Alcázar to the overwhelming attacks of every kind by superior forces that it 
sustained’.216 For two months, Toledo had held out against large numbers of Republican 
forces. Eventually, it was relieved, on the arrival of Franco’s Army of Africa. Subsequently, 
as Michael Seidman states, ‘the Alcázar became a mythical example of Nationalist 
resistance’.217 Judith Keene explains, too, that ‘the event encapsulated archetypal interwar 
anxieties, which is probably why the narrative of the Toledo siege was retold in many 
languages’.218 In particular, it ‘captured the imagination of people outside Spain who were 
backing Franco’s victory’, even though, ‘strategically, this side campaign made little 
sense’.219 Hugh Thomas, in his seminal work  The Spanish Civil War (1961), wrote similarly, 
that though ‘Franco knew the importance attached to symbols in Spain […] the “epic” of 
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the Alcázar in subsequent propaganda’ was also designed to justify Franco’s decision ‘to 
divert to Toledo, even though it gave the republic time to organise resistance in Madrid’.220 
Although the Nationalist victory at Toledo had much to do with the ‘incompetence’ of the 
Republican armed forces,221 Campbell himself believed that the defence of the Alcázar was 
essentially, in his own words, ‘a victory of the spirit over […] materialists’.222 Yet it was not 
simply that ‘spiritual people’ were ‘better’ than ‘materialists […] and 50 times braver’, as 
Campbell argued they were.223 In such poems as ‘The Alcazar Mined’, there was also the 
notion that their suffering and sacrifice had actually served to rouse the supernatural and 
press it into action on their behalf. In this sense, physical courage had a role to play in the 
philosophy of history that Campbell held to as a Catholic convert. It explains why the poet 
placed such a stress on physicality and risk taking, insisting that they were not only soldierly 
virtues, but saintly prerequisites.  
 
 
Eusebio 
 
A friar named Eusebio del Niño Jesús, Campbell’s confessor in Toledo, takes on a special 
significance here. On their arrival in Toledo, in 1935, Campbell and his family became 
conversant with the Carmelite friars at the local convent. At this time, both Roy and Mary, 
his wife, were well on their way to total immersion in the Catholic church. It was Eusebio, 
however, the leading friar, who became Campbell’s ‘spiritual director’.224 Although their 
time together was ultimately cut short, his influence was significant and protracted. For 
what he essentially provided Campbell with was an example. Campbell was a sinner in 
search of a saint. Eusebio was that saint. It was not so much his spiritual example that so 
much impressed Campbell as it was his example as solider of Christ, although the two might 
be held to be synonymous As Campbell’s wife later related, Eusebio ‘was perhaps the only 
saint we have ever known’.225 
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It could be claimed that Campbell already had a saint in his life: his wife. The writer Laurie 
Lee, who stayed with the Campbells in Toledo for a week, later wrote that ‘soft-voiced’ 
Mary exuded ‘the banked-up voluptuousness of a young and beautiful convert’.226 Lee also 
attested to Campbell’s own self-professed adoration of his wife: ‘marvellous girl, that Mary 
[…] She’s got more genuine saintliness in her little finger than the whole of this god-damn 
town.’227 However, Mary was the type of saint that Campbell could not possibly imitate. 
Piety demanded sacrifice, which no doubt appealed to Campbell. However, what he was 
seeking around this time was a piety that complemented his own idea of himself, one that 
was very different to his wife. And while Mary found satisfaction in joining the Order of 
Carmelite Tertiaries, which necessitated a high level of strictness and spiritual devotion, 
including fasting, daily prayers, as well as abstinence during Advent and Lent, Roy’s idea of 
piety, essentially that of high stamina, high spirits and physical courage, found a perfect 
match in Eusebio – an example Campbell could actually follow. 
 
‘Eusebio’s saintliness was noticed by everyone’, Anna wrote later.228 In him, it seemed that 
‘sacrifice took on a new dimension. His feet, bare except for sandals in the icy Castilian 
winter, seemed to float rather than walk across the freezing flagstones.’229 Eusebio’s 
sanctified hardiness surely appealed to Campbell. However, it was the Spanish Civil War 
that underscored Eusebio particular saintliness, contrasted against the background of anti-
clericalism that was soon to turn murderous. Indeed, the clergy would come to be seen by 
many Spaniards as a legitimate target, since, as Thomas explained, Catholicism had become 
‘the critical question of politics since 1931, because of the supposed subordination of 
priests to the upper classes, and because of the provocative wealth of many churches, and 
of the old suspicion about the secretiveness of orders’.230 What resulted, he writes. was a 
‘colossal onslaught on the lives of members of the church’.231 Tensions were already high 
in Toledo in early 1936, following the elections in February that had brought Spain to the 
brink of conflagration. There were riots in March. The Campbells housed a number of 
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Carmelites in their house. Then the Nationalist uprising occurred. On 22 July, as Toledo was 
attacked, Eusebio and sixteen other monks of the Carmelite Order where lined up against 
a wall in Toledo and shot by Republican militiamen. Campbell later discovered Eusebio’s 
body under a tarpaulin; above him was scrawled ‘thus strikes the Cheka’, written in the 
blood of the murdered friars. In total, 12 bishops, 4,184 priests, 2,365 monks, as well as a 
few hundred nuns, were murdered by Republicans during the course of the war.232 Eusebio 
was no mere statistic, however. For Campbell, Eusebio’s martyrdom had transformed him 
into a very personal symbol of the philosophy of history that would come to characterise 
his subsequent war poetry.233 In his mind, in particular, the Spanish Civil War was really an 
exercise in the Christian philosophy of history in microcosm, in which, as Dawson wrote, 
‘victories may be found in apparent defeat’. 
 
What impressed the Campbells most of all about their friend Eusebio was the manner in 
which he met his death, as Anna recounts: ‘it was he who kept up the spirits of his fellow 
monks when they were all dragged out to be shot. They died heroically – a friend of ours 
who was with them to the end said that Fr. Eusebio was smiling when he fell, and shouting, 
“Long live Christ the King! Long live Spain!”’234 It was his gaiety that seemed so telling, as if 
he was aware of the future victory to come. We see this idea played out in Campbell’s 1939 
poem the Flowering Rifle: A Poem from the Battlefield of Spain, for example, which set up 
a comparison between the Nationalist victory in Toledo and the Resurrection of Christ, 
victories founded on two ostensible defeats, both of them executions: the death of Eusebio 
in a street in Toledo, and the Crucifixion of Christ in Palestine. In this sense, Campbell 
portrayed his friend’s death as a turning point in the Spanish Civil War, when ‘The 
Carmelites rose up to show the way: / For martyrdom their eagle spirits burned / As fierce 
as angry captains for the fight – / In these charred cells where Victory was learned / As 
others study medicine or law’.235 Eusebio and his friars served as an example, then, that 
faith was the ultimate weapon in the arsenal of the army of Christ:  
 
In this, Eusebio prayed whom I last saw –  
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His flesh already flame, his blood its light –  
Questing the fire as fire would seek the straw. 
On that dark night, too dark to say “goodnight,” 
When what was gentlest in the shaken hand 
Cut like a sword – how could I understand 
My friends in their true mastery and height?  
Or guess at half the fury of delight 
That armed these Titans to belittle Death 
And made my life, so dear to me that night, 
Seem suddenly not worth the waste of breath?236 
 
This was the lesson that Campbell took from the events of July 1936. Eusebio’s gaiety was 
a manifestation of his faith in an eternal reality. Accepting martyrdom was a natural 
progression. In return, the cause was won. Campbell went so far as to suggest that the 
murderers were in some way aware of this too: 
 
They knew the eternal Presence of their Prey 
And that it was themselves they’d come to slay; 
Then from the place they slunk in guilt away; 
For These were first to catch the sacred fire 
That winged the Phoenix city from her pyre 
And made the might of Resurrected Spain 
More terrible for every martyr slain.237 
 
Campbell’s poem ‘Toledo, July 1936’ had seen him make use of the theme of resurrection 
before: ‘Toledo, when I saw you die / And heard the roof of Carmel crash, / A spread-winged 
phoenix from its ash / The Cross remained against the sky!’238 The Cross in Campbell’s work 
is synonymous with immediate defeat, but victory in the long term. ‘The Carmelites of 
Toledo’, on the other hand, a poem that evidently anticipated Campbell’s larger work ‘The 
Flowering Rifle’, emphasised how through their faith Eusebio and the other friars, unlike 
the ‘faith-starved multitudes’, had ultimately contributed to that victory: 
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And well might Hell feel sick and sorry 
To see the brown monks lying dead, 
Where, as with coarse tarpaulins spread, 
Each seemed a fifty-horsepower lorry 
That to the troops had brought the Bread! 
 
Their wounds were swords – how bravely worth 
The care the angels took to smith them! 
We thought they took their victory with them 
But they had brought it down to earth, 
For it was from their neighbouring spire 
The proud Alcazar caught the fire 
Which gave that splendour phoenix-birth.239 
 
 
Enlistment into the Catholic Church 
 
In June 1936, Eusebio had visited the Campbell residence in Toledo, informing Roy and 
Mary that Cardinal Goma, knowing what risks they had taken in sheltering local monks, had 
decided that they should be confirmed immediately, ‘just in case’, even though their 
instruction in the Catholic Church was incomplete.240 Anti-clerical violence meant that the 
Campbells might not have much longer to live. Certainly, Campbell noted, ‘it was no longer 
safe to be seen in religious habit’.241 Accompanying Eusebio was another friar, ‘the diehard 
Evaristo, a roaring lion of man whose laugh could shake the rafters’, who deliberately 
flaunted his habit in broad daylight’.242 Evaristo was yet another example for Campbell to 
emulate. Campbell later remembered that it made him ‘feel six inches taller to stride beside 
him’.243 In the early hours of the morning, Campbell and his wife went with the two friars, 
‘in their “full-regimentals” as Carmelites’, to the cardinal’s palace and were received into 
the Church.244 That Campbell later chose to conclude his autobiography with this scene is 
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significant: ‘on that day, before dawn, began an entirely new chapter in our lives, which 
had hitherto been somewhat drab and dull compared with the new splendours of 
experience for which we were lucky enough to be preserved.’245 What this moment 
essentially signified for Campbell was the moment of his passing out parade in the crack 
unit of the army of Christ, the Catholic Church. In much the same way that Froude’s 
extremism, as described by Dawson, was his Tractarian fierceness, Campbell’s own 
fierceness ultimately found a home in the Catholic Church. Indeed, this was typical of a 
poet who had at one point referred to ‘Protestantism’ as ‘a cowardly sort of Atheism, 
especially in the anglo-Oxfordish-Henry VIII sense’.246 The Church of England simply would 
not do for Campbell in 1936. ‘Up to then’, he wrote, ‘we had been vaguely and vacillatingly 
Anglo-Catholic: but now was the time to decide whether, by staying in the territorials, to 
remain half-apathetic to the great fight which was obviously approaching – or whether we 
should step into the front ranks of the Regular Army of Christ’.247 There was, indeed, a 
recognition, at least amongst other Catholics, that the Church constituted not only an army, 
but the Household Division itself, as the Catholic writer Graham Greene observed of its 
priesthood:  
  
I think that for many people, especially the young, the priesthood must 
have the attraction of a crack unit. It’s an organisation which has to train 
for combat, one which demands self-sacrifice […] I’m convinced that the 
drop in vocations has to do with the fact that we don’t put across clearly 
enough the attraction to be found in a difficult and dangerous calling.248 
 
Chesterton, another convert, shared much the same view as Greene and Campbell. In a 
carefully considered passage, Chesterton explained to his mother why he had chosen to 
convert to Catholicism, the ‘one fighting form Christianity’:  
 
I have thought about you, and all that I owe to you and my father, not 
only in the way of affection, but of the ideals of honour and freedom and 
charity and all other good things you always taught me: and I am not 
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conscious of the smallest break or difference in those ideals; but only of 
a new and necessary way of fighting for them.249 
 
Both Campbell’s and Chesterton’s conversion – and we might say Dawson’s and Waugh’s 
too – were rooted in this fundamental notion, that only Catholicism’s philosophy of history, 
which incorporated both the doctrines of providence and free will, was capable of facing 
down their century and allowing willing converts, such as themselves, to participate in that 
battle through their own faithfulness as part of what Chesterton termed that ‘insatiably 
fighting thing, the Catholic Church’.250 In this sense, Campbell really did fight. By following 
the example of Eusebio, he found a way to reconcile his natural spirit of resistance with a 
world that offered very little opportunity for actual combat. As it happened, Waugh would 
undergo a similar process of resolution.  
 
 
Guy Crouchback: il Santo Inglese 
 
Waugh’s Sword of Honour trilogy – Men at Arms (1952), Officers and Gentlemen (1955) and 
Unconditional Surrender (1961) – is centred around a similar quest for self-sanctification, 
that of Guy Crouchback, a Catholic English aristocrat, who, like Campbell, takes the notion 
of a crusade quite literally, desperate to transcend himself through the opportunity of war. 
At the beginning of the trilogy, we find discontented Crouchback in exile in Italy. Europe is 
on the cusp of the Second World War. Having determined himself to return home to 
England, Crouchback says goodbye to an old friend, who also happens to be something of 
a saint: Roger of Waybroke, an English knight entombed in the local church, who had died 
on his way to the Holy Land during the Second Crusade. Crouchback ‘felt an especial kinship 
with “il Santo Inglese”’.251 Townspeople came to Sir Roger with ‘their troubles and touched 
his sword for luck’.252 On his last day there, Guy ‘made straight for the tomb and ran his 
finger, as the fishermen did, along the knight’s sword. “Sir Roger, pray for me,” he said, 
“and for our endangered kingdom.”’253 This scene sets up the universe that Crouchback, as 
a Catholic, believes he inhabits, the same universe that the locals, ‘to whom the 
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supernatural order in all its ramifications was ever present’, held to as well; the same 
townspeople who had canonized Sir Roger.254 This universe is fundamentally the same 
universe that Frodo in The Lord of the Rings occupies, where supernatural grace is a very 
real force in history. Crouchback must find his place in that history. He yearns to follow Sir 
Roger’s path and live up to the example of the grace that was in him. Guy’s story – or rather 
Waugh’s, for Crouchback’s war will very consciously mirror the author’s own experience – 
is essentially the attempt to live up to the title ‘il Santo Inglese’. Noting Hollingworth’s 
exploration of Augustine’s theology once more, Crouchback has been ‘going about things 
the wrong way’. The novel will chart his attempt to conform to one of Augustine’s two 
poles: the City of God.  
 
Guy’s crusade in Waugh’s novel is really a crusade directed against his universe’s direct 
opposite, the atheistic modern world and all its material ramifications, which, at the 
beginning of the novel, announces itself blatantly in the alliance between the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany: ‘now, splendidly, everything had become clear. The enemy at last was 
plain in view, huge and hateful, all disguise cast off. It was the Modern Age in arms. 
Whatever the outcome there was a place for him in that battle.’255 Guy’s war, however, 
turns out to be very different to the one he imagined in Italy. After finding a position in the 
fictional regiment the Halberdiers, Guy is sent home after having taken part in an 
unauthorized reconnaissance mission, during the Dakar Expedition, under the orders of his 
commanding officer, the ferocious Ben Ritchie-Hook. Guy’s experience paralleled Waugh’s 
own war experience insofar as his participation, with the Royal Marines, in the real-life 
‘Dakar fiasco’256 – the aborted attempt in September 1940 to wrest the key port in French 
West Africa from the grips of Vichy – had begun to undermine his enthusiasm for the war. 
‘Bloodshed has been avoided at the cost of honour’, he wrote to his wife afterwards.257 The 
debacle at Bardia, by which time Waugh had been transferred to the commandos, also 
dented his confidence in the overall competency of the British war effort, when an entire 
company of men was left behind by accident during a coastal raid in April 1941.258 However, 
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it was his experience on Crete that served to dispel forever the vision of the war that he 
had entertained at its commencement.  
 
In May 1941, Waugh accompanied a formation of commandoes, named ‘Layforce’, under 
the command of Robert Laycock, to Crete. They were to assist in the defence of the island, 
which had been invaded by German parachutists on 20 May. By the time they had arrived 
there, however, the defence of the island had turned into an evacuation. Although both 
Waugh and Laycock escaped, many of the commandoes were left behind. When Waugh 
wrote home to his wife he revealed something of his consequent mood: ‘I have been in a 
serious battle and have decided I abominate military life. It was tedious & futile & fatiguing. 
I found I was not at all frightened; only very bored & very weary.’259 However, it seems that 
Waugh was concealing his true feelings about the battle, as one of his fellow soldiers, 
Christopher Sykes, recollected:  
 
[Waugh] said that he had never seen anything so degrading as the 
cowardice that infected the spirit of the army. He declared that Crete had 
been surrendered without need; that both the officers and men were 
hypnotized into defeatism by the continuous dive-bombing which with a 
little courage one could stand up to; that the fighting spirit of the British 
armed services was so meagre that we had not the slightest hope of 
defeating the Germans; that he had taken part in a military disgrace, a 
fact that he would remember with shame for the rest of his life.260 
 
I think that Waugh’s extreme reaction here may be said to be rooted in his wish to emulate 
the ‘spirit of which Campion is the type’, the spirit of those who ‘surrender themselves to 
their destiny without calculation or reserve’. This was the spirit that he believed was absent 
in the botched defence of Crete.261 The army was, in this sense, far from saintly in its 
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conduct. It had retreated. What is more, Waugh had been carried away by it too, into 
ignominy. Then there was the question of his own escape from Crete. Laycock later recalled 
that ‘by the look on his face at the time I gathered that Evelyn believed this to be a 
dishonourable thing to do though it made sense to me for, at least, we lived to fight another 
day’.262 For Waugh, however, it seems that it was the principle that counted. He had been 
evacuated, the majority of the commandoes had not. This is underscored in Sword of 
Honour in the desertion of Ivor Claire. Waugh had not abandoned his post. However, 
perhaps he believed he had personally failed to live up to the spirit of Campion. If so, he 
had set himself a high standard.263 Although he had not been captured, he had, in a sense, 
made himself a prisoner of his own expectations – all too keen to step into a ‘world of 
violence’ and prove himself, much like Campbell. As he writes of Crouchback’s own ethic: 
he ‘was perfectly ready, should need arise, to sacrifice himself for them [his men] – throw 
himself on a grenade, give away the last drop of water – anything like that’.264 Sacrifice, as 
we have seen, was a vital aspect of the Old Western ethic, through which history itself 
might be determined. Crouchback’s view of the war conflates the Second World War with 
the philosophy of history itself. He is therefore willing to sacrifice himself for the cause. The 
only snag is that the defeatist spirit of the army robs him of that chance.  
 
Then came Operation Barbarossa, which Waugh saw as another defining moment in the 
war; as we see when Crouchback finds his country allied with one of the forces that he had 
initially set out to fight: 
 
Now that hallucination was dissolved, like the whales and turtles on the 
voyage from Crete, and he was back after less than two years’ pilgrimage 
in a Holy Land of illusion in the old ambiguous world, where priests were 
spies and gallant friends proved traitors and his country was led 
blundering into dishonour.265 
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‘It doesn’t seem to matter now who wins’, Crouchback relates to his father, after he has 
concluded that the war is not so much a war against modernity, but modernity itself. From 
this moment Crouchback’s march toward self-sanctification, as il Santo Inglese, realigns 
itself, as it must if he is to continue to pursue that end. Therefore, he looks to a new 
example, the saint that is standing in plain view: his father.  
 
 
Gervase Crouchback 
 
Diarmaid MacCulloch states that because ‘God in Platonic mode was transcendent, other, 
remote’, the notion of the saint was conceived as ‘a logical outcome of the Platonic cast of 
Augustine’s theology’ itself, which, in the Middle Ages, required ‘a myriad of courtiers who 
could intercede with their imperial Saviour for ordinary humans seeking salvation or help 
in their everyday lives’.266 In the Sword of Honour trilogy, it is Guy’s father Gervase 
Crouchback who fulfils this role of the saint. He is, we are informed, ‘an innocent, affable 
old man who had somehow preserved his good humour – much more than that, a 
mysterious and tranquil joy – throughout a life which to all outward observation had been 
overloaded with misfortune’.267 He had ‘been born in full sunlight and lived to see night 
fall’.268 Despite life’s disappointments, Guy’s father had not lost his essential gaiety. A very 
Chesterstonian virtue – as we shall see. Indeed, Waugh’s character very much resembles 
Chesterton in this sense. Both were Catholics too. Of course, in Waugh’s work, Gervase’s 
staunch Catholicism is fundamental to his character. ‘Mr Crouchback acknowledged no 
monarch since James II’, Waugh writes.269 ‘It was not an entirely sane conspectus but it 
engendered in his gentle breast two rare qualities, tolerance and humility.’270 Humility, as 
we have seen, is a vital currency in a Christian universe. This is at the root of Gervase’s 
saintliness, just as much as it is the foundation of Faramir’s quality. In Sword of Honour, 
Guy concludes that ‘his father was the best man, the only entirely good man, he had ever 
known’.271 
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His father had been a “just man”; not particularly judicious, not at all 
judicial, but “just” in the full sense of the psalmist […] Few people, Guy 
thought, had ever spoken ill of his father […] His father had suffered as 
much as most men – more perhaps – from bad news of one kind or 
another; never fearfully.272 
 
Peter Hitchens has suggested ‘that Guy’s father is what Waugh himself would have wished 
to be, but knew perfectly well he could not be’.273 I think that this is likely the case. As 
Waugh wrote to Anthony Powell to 1955: ‘“[Guy] Crouchback” (junior: not so his admirable 
father) is a prig. But he is a virtuous, brave prig.’274 Gervase is at a different level to his son. 
Waugh is Guy, though Gervase was the standard that he set himself, an impossible 
standard, but one that he might have felt was necessary, if only because it provided him 
with an example to live up to. Waugh was reaching for self-sanctification, like Tolkien was 
in his view of Faramir. Gervase, at least, is the epitome of the saint. ‘“Not long for 
purgatory,” his confessor had said of Mr. Crouchback.’275 Waugh signalled Gervase’s 
sanctification in the aftermath of the character’s death, writing that ‘Guy’s prayers were 
directed to, rather than for, his father’.276 This, too, proves to be an important moment in 
the story. 
 
Crouchback continues to take part in the war, but ultimately his soldierly ambitions, as well 
as his hopes for the war itself, are thwarted. However, the moment when he prays to his 
father at his funeral is a key moment in his own transformation. Sacrifice is still on his mind, 
but so, too, a lesson that his saintly father had relayed to him shortly before his death: that 
‘quantitative judgments don’t apply. If only one soul was saved that is full compensation for 
any amount of loss of “face”.’277 Guy is still searching for his opportunity, but he no longer 
believes that the war will afford him that opportunity. ‘“I don’t ask anything […] I am here 
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if you want me”’, he had prayed to God previously.278 Then at his father’s funeral Guy is 
overcome by a defining realisation:  
 
That was the deadly core of his apathy […] That emptiness had been with 
him for years now even in his days of enthusiasm and activity in the 
Halberdiers. Enthusiasm and activity were not enough. God required 
more than that. He had commanded all men to ask.279 
 
So Crouchback asks: ‘“show me what to do and help me to do it,” he prayed.’280 This is the 
moment when Guy invites into himself the ‘supernatural grace’ that Waugh had claimed 
was in Campion too, which allowed the modest, unsoldierly Jesuit the chance to co-operate 
with God’s ‘divine plan’:  
 
In the recesses of Guy’s conscience there lay the belief that somewhere, 
somehow, something would be required of him; that he must be 
attentive to the summons when it came. They also served who only stood 
and waited […] One day he would get the chance to do some small service 
which only he could perform, for which he had been created. Even he 
must have his function in the divine plan. He did not expect a heroic 
destiny. Quantitative judgements did not apply. All that mattered was to 
recognize the chance when it offered. Perhaps his father was at that 
moment clearing the way for him.281 
 
Soon after Gervase’s funeral, Crouchback’s chance presents itself. Guy’s ex-wife Virginia 
turns up at his door pregnant by another man. Her first instinct had been to procure an 
abortion. Having obtained the address of a doctor on Brook Street, she had made the 
journey to the abortionist, only to find rubble and a bomb crater. Whether or not Waugh 
intended to imply divine intervention here is unclear, though it does appear to be 
suggestive: ‘there’s a special providence in the fall of a bomb.’282 Certainly, the end result 
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is that Virginia must turn to Guy, who agrees to marry her. Having been presented with the 
opportunity to save a ‘soul’, Guy recognises it as such, as the chance that he has prayed for, 
and duly takes that chance: ‘“I don’t think I’ve ever in my life done a single, positively 
unselfish action. I certainly haven’t gone out of my way to find opportunities. Here was 
something most unwelcome, put into my hands; something which I believe the Americans 
describe as “beyond the call of duty.”’283 Guy has achieved a measure of satisfaction. 
 
The Sword of Honour trilogy was essentially Waugh’s attempt to infuse the concept of 
supernatural grace, and its corollary philosophy of history, with a sense of realism in the 
twentieth century, having come to realise that the Second World War had compromised 
any sense of an actual crusade; the sword itself, that gave its name to the trilogy, being the 
sword dedicated by the British government to Stalin’s atheistic Soviet Union. The moral, 
then, is that in terms of self-sanctity ‘quantitative judgements’ do not apply. In this sense, 
Waugh’s achievement was to look beyond the pageantry of Chesterton’s Lepanto, as well 
as the epic sweep of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, and even the sheer heroism of 
Campion, and instead root supernatural grace, or rather Dawson’s ‘supernaturalized 
chivalry’, in everyday life and ‘in one frustrated act of mercy’.284 Crouchback’s faith is 
rewarded. The supernatural is confirmed as real, though not in the manner that he foresaw 
at the beginning of his quest when he prayed to Sir Roger. 
 
 
A Flame Burning Anew 
 
In Waugh’s seminal, and most obviously Catholic, novel Brideshead Revisited (1945), the 
central character Charles Ryder goes from having ‘no religion’ to having ‘come to accept 
the supernatural as the real’.285 What represents that belief in the supernatural, most of 
all, in the story is the sanctuary lamp in the chapel at Brideshead – the lamp that, in 
Catholicism, is traditionally kept alight wherever the Blessed Sacrament is reserved, 
signifying the actual presence of God in the tabernacle. This was the same ‘Great Presence’ 
that John Henry Newman, in his novel Loss and Gain (1848), noted, which made ‘a Catholic 
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Church different from every other place in the world; which makes it, as no other place can 
be, holy’.286 
 
A priest, or at least an assistant, had mounted for a moment above the 
altar, and removed a chalice or vessel which stood there; he could not 
see distinctly. A cloud of incense rose on high; the people suddenly all 
bowed low; what could it mean? the truth flashed on him, fearfully yet 
sweetly; it was the Blessed Sacrament - it was the Lord Incarnate, who 
was on the altar, who had come to visit and to bless His people.287 
 
In Brideshead Revisited – which, as Ann Pasternak Slater identifies, ‘is steeped in theology’ 
– Waugh makes a point of registering, just as Newman did in 1848, the ‘Lord Incarnate’.288 
Without his supernatural presence, the chapel at Brideshead is merely an ‘oddly decorated 
room’, which is made clear to us when the chapel is itself deconsecrated following the 
death of Lady Marchmain:   
 
They’ve closed the chapel at Brideshead, Bridey and the Bishop; 
mummy’s Requiem was the last mass said there. After she was buried the 
priest came in – I was there alone. I don’t think he saw me – and took out 
the alter stone and put it in his bag; then he burned the wads of wool 
with the holy oil on them and threw the ash outside; he emptied the holy-
water stoop and blew out the lamp in the sanctuary, and left the 
tabernacle open and empty, as though from now on it was always to be 
Good Friday. I suppose none of this makes any sense to you, Charles, poor 
agnostic. I stayed there till he was gone, and then, suddenly, there wasn’t 
any chapel there any more, just an oddly decorated room. I can’t tell you 
what it felt like.289 
 
The absence of the supernatural force of the ‘Great Presence’, in the form of the Blessed 
Sacrament, was keenly felt by Waugh. Indeed, for him, it ‘was always to be Good Friday’ in 
Anglican churches. As Waugh wrote in Edmund Campion: Jesuit and Martyr, as a result of 
                                                          
286 John Henry Newman, Loss and Gain (London: James Burns, 1848), 382. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Slater, Waugh, 99. 
289 Waugh, Brideshead Revisited, 206. 
191 
 
‘the Tudor revolution’ English ‘village churches’ were merely ‘empty shells, their altars torn 
out and their ornaments defaced’.290 Yet the actual recognition of the supernatural was so 
vital for Waugh, as it was for Tolkien and others. It is for this reason that Ryder is moved, 
and indeed overjoyed, when he returns to Brideshead during the war and finds that the 
sanctuary lamp is alight once more:   
 
A small red flame – a beaten-cooper lamp of deplorable design relit 
before the beaten-cooper doors of a tabernacle; the flame which the old 
knights saw from their tombs, which they saw put out; that flame burns 
again for other soldiers, far from home, farther, in heart, than Acre or 
Jerusalem. It could not have been lit but for the builders and the 
tragedians, and there I found it this morning, burning anew among the 
old stones.291 
 
Although we might take this flame to mean the flame which was extinguished a number of 
years before, upon the death of Lady Marchmain, it also might also very aptly stand for 
Catholic England itself, as well as Ryder’s own conversion to the old faith, which, above all, 
provides him with hope. And this brings us back to Waugh’s own estimation of Campion. 
The supernatural is real, it is recognised as real; through this admission – of supernatural 
grace and its accompanying theology of history – modern despair dissipates and man 
regains his sense of mission, his quest for sanctity. The manner of Waugh’s proposed 
‘supernatural solution’ is hope. As one of Ryder’s fellow soldiers observes, in the final line 
of Brideshead Revisited: ‘you’re looking unusually cheerful today.’292  Like Campion, Ryder 
is now able to face the doom of the world with a smile on his face. That is the true nature 
of his sanctity. Ryder essentially symbolised Waugh’s realisation of the significance of the 
supernatural. Part of the purpose of Brideshead Revisited, then, was show that it was 
indeed discoverable, and its implication profound, in terms of the optimism that its 
‘ramifications’ were capable of engendering.  
  
Roy Hattersley has observed that ‘the novels of Evelyn Waugh’ have ‘a preoccupation with 
despair’.293 This is certainly true, though this aspect of Waugh’s work has not always been 
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understood correctly. For example, the writer Conor Cruise O'Brien commented in 1946 
that Waugh’s ‘Catholicism’ was ‘dark and defeatist’.294 Gore Vidal, too, reviewing the 
concluding book in the Sword of Honour trilogy, noted ‘a new pessimism in Waugh’.295 
Although Waugh’s novels might seem essentially bleak and foreboding, once we place 
them in their right context, however, a context rooted in the realisation of an eternal 
reality, or the ‘Great Presence’, we see that Waugh’s apparent pessimism is fundamentally 
superficial. 
 
 
Saint Chesterton  
 
Dawson mourned the notion that ‘Chesterton’s Christian optimism is out of fashion today, 
when the external perils of Western civilization are reflected in the moral discouragement 
and spiritual anxiety of Western man’.296 Dawson believed that society would do well to 
follow his example. And in that sense, Chesterton was particularly important, since he was 
an example. As we have seen, examples were a vital aspect of the Old Western ethic, as a 
standard to live up to, in terms of sanctity. And there was a general consensus amongst 
those such as Dawson, Tolkien, Campbell, and Waugh, that optimism and gaiety were 
indicators of saintliness. Certainly, Chesterton was himself particularly sensitive to the 
subject jollity. Indeed, it was Christianity’s natural inclination, he believed: ‘Christianity is 
itself so jolly a thing that it fills the possessor of it with a certain silly exuberance.’297 
Chesterton was part of that very consensus, then. For example, he could not help but 
contrast ‘cold Pagan architecture’ with ‘the grinning gargoyles of Christendom’.298 
‘Nowhere in history has there ever been any popular brightness and gaiety without 
religion’, he wrote.299 It was for this reason, too, that he took issue with the ‘Pre-
Raphaelites’, amongst others, who in reality, he argued, ‘had in their subtlety and sadness 
the spirit of the present day’.300  
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However, the relevance of Chesterton in his own day, we may conclude, was not that he 
preached jollity. He also led by example and embodied that very jollity. In this sense, it was 
his example, most of all, it seems, which served as a motivation for others to reach for such 
salvation. There was, it appears, a genuine recognition that he had actually attained a level 
of sanctity that might very well serve as a beacon for others to follow in the darkness. 
Indeed, Chesterton’s colleague, the Catholic convert William Richard Titterton, writing 
shortly after Chesterton’s death in 1936, expressed his hope that one day it would be 
acknowledged that his friend ‘died a saint’.301 In particular, it was ‘his heroic jollity’ that 
Titterton admired.302 For in reality, ‘he was a very ill man’.303 ‘It is entirely untrue that 
Gilbert Chesterton suffered little throughout his life.’304 Though ‘it would have left many 
peevish, irritable, [and] unable to take any interest in anything but their own insides’, 
Titterton was sure that ‘the only part of his inside that occupied the attention of G. K. C. 
was his immortal soul’.305 And it is telling, perhaps, that Titterton couched his praise of his 
friend in terms of Chesterton the ‘fighter’, who ‘would die fighting’.306 ‘He died working. I 
am rather inclined to call that heroic.’307 
 
Chesterton can be said to have epitomised the Campion-like figure, who, as Waugh wrote, 
‘came with gaiety among a people where hope was dead’, presenting by his ‘own example 
a third, supernatural solution’. Insofar far as any figure was generally considered by his 
fellow Catholics to be an actual saint, it was Chesterton. As Titterton attests, it was 
essentially Chesterton’s jollity that raised him up. Indeed, the Belgian author Émile 
Cammaerts referred to Chesterton as the ‘Laughing Prophet’. His joviality was obvious. 
What is perhaps less clear to us is what the essence of that jollity was. Cammaerts, 
however, was the most perceptive of Chesterton’s biographers when he noted that 
Chesterton’s ‘hope seemed to grow stronger as the issue of the long conflict in which he 
had been engaged became more remote’.308 Even though ‘political events at home and 
abroad caused him some disappointments’, and ‘confirmed his apprehensions’, 
Chesterton, Cammaerts tells us, ‘learned to consider them with a new sense of proportion’, 
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coming to the conclusion ‘that that a man cannot expect to witness the triumph of his ideals 
during his lifetime’.309 What Cammaerts was relating here was essentially Chesterton’s 
philosophy of history; what we now might recognise as that of Tolkien’s ‘long defeat’.310 
Although ‘he was still in the front line’, he ‘considered the battle from a new angle’.311 ‘His 
resolution did not waver’, but Chesterton came to be ‘unimpressed by success or defeat. 
His ultimate goal was elsewhere.’312 This, Cammaerts determined, was the essence of 
Chesterton’s hope: ‘he walked in the shadow of eternity.’313 
 
 
Chapter Three Conclusion  
 
The Old Western Men placed a very great emphasise on the idea that their own century 
was defined by a pronounced narrowness in terms of a closing of the modern mind to the 
reality of the supernatural, as well as eternity. Their prognosis was bleak; if moderns did 
not return to the concept of eternity, civilization itself might crumble, or at least lose that 
essential quality that had characterised civilization up to that point. The result was clear, 
the apparent crisis in Europe; fascism and communism. Despair was seen to be a significant 
root of this. And it was self-perpetuating. We have seen that it was an important Old 
Western objective to find some way of fathoming a way out of those despairing shallows 
into safer waters, not only proffering a solution, but attempting to embody it too. Campion, 
Faramir and Gervase are our saintly standards, in this instance. Therefore, as a response to 
the modern, this supernatural solution to despair constituted a broad Old Western 
awakening. In terms of understanding to what extent an Augustinian consideration of the 
‘More-Than-World’ informed that response, the output of the Old Western Men on the 
subject of the philosophy of history, was, as this chapter has shown, undeniably couched 
in the language of a theology of eternity and ultimate victory that was itself an answer to 
modern despair.
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Chapter Four 
The Redemptive Discourse of Christendom 
 
 
The subject of England, and the pilgrimage into the national past that animated its 
intellectuals, particularly between the wars, has received much attention in recent years. 
For example, The Geographies of Englishness: Landscape and the National Past, 1880-1940 
(2002) observed how ‘the sixty years up to the Second World War were marked by repeated 
attempts to imagine a way out of modernity through national identity’.1 Alexandra Harris, 
in Romantic Moderns: English Writers, Artists and the Imagination from Virginia Woolf to 
John Piper (2010), also revealed how a broad spread of writers and artists in Britain 
abandoned modernism’s ‘international language of form’ in favour of a rather more 
national language of ‘eccentricity’ and ‘locality’.2 Peter Lowe, as well, has described the 
same turn toward nativism in his work English Journeys: National Cultural Identity in 1930s 
and 1940s England (2012). There is, indeed, a considerable consensus surrounding the 
notion of what Jed Etsy termed, in A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in 
England (2003), the rise of ‘the redemptive discourse of Anglocentrism’ in the twentieth 
century.3 This, he continues, was openly manifest in the attempt, on the part of high 
modernists, such as Virginia Woolf and T. S. Eliot, to ‘reinscribe universalism into the 
language of English particularism’.4 Etsy cites Woolf’s novel Between the Acts (1941), as 
well as Eliot’s poem the Four Quartets (1943), as key examples of this shift toward 
Anglocentrism, in which ‘aging high modernists participated in the process of 
anthropological introversion by modifying some of their most distinctive stylistic and 
generic choices’.5 
 
Certainly, it appears that there was a curious intersection between high, or rather aesthetic, 
modernism and nativism, especially evident in the 1930s and 1940s, which attempted to 
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resolve the antagonism between the universal and the particular. There was, however, 
another approach that Etsy also touched on in his 2003 analysis, albeit briefly, which related 
to religion rather than high modernism. Eliot, he writes, was part of ‘a transitional 
generation’ that ‘cut their Anglocentricism with international ideas’.6 Nevertheless, Eliot’s 
sense of a broader community was also located in his ‘investment in the unity of European 
Christendom’7 – which in the case of the Four Quartets achieved ‘a kind of epic revaluation 
of time and space’, Etsy notes.8 This was very much unlike the atheist Woolf, whose own 
approach precluded any such adoption of the concept of Christendom. Etsy has recognised 
this difference.9 However, it may be that Etsy mischaracterises an essential aspect of Eliot 
here, in the sense that Eliot, an Anglo-Catholic, is portrayed as a high modernist, like Woolf, 
first. For this reason, too, the emphasis that has been placed on the theme of 
Anglocentricism seems to have excluded what this thesis forwards as the rather more 
significant theme of religion. In this sense, then, though there was certainly a turn toward 
nativism in twentieth century Britain, as Etsy notes, the accentuation of this particular 
discourse has, in Eliot’s case especially, served to obscure another vital, specifically Old 
Western, mode of response that was explicitly spiritual and Christian: what we might term 
the redemptive discourse of Christendom. As Edwin Jones has stated in The English Nation: 
The Great Myth (1998):  
 
A truth, an “essential commonplace” of the medieval world, which 
historians often fail to discern – that before the Reformation Christianity 
in the West meant a unified body or community of people rather than a 
body of differing “isms”.10 
 
‘Out of the violence of the Great War it seemed that a new international order had 
emerged’, Adam Tooze has written in The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of 
Global Order, 1916-1931 (2014).11 This notion constituted a ‘politicization of international 
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affairs’.12 In this sense, too, he writes, ‘although sovereignty was multiplied, its context was 
hollowed out’.13 As Mark Mazower explains, in Governing the World: The History of an Idea 
(2012), in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, this politicization found chief in 
expression in the League of Nations: ‘a vehicle for world leadership based on moral 
principles and the formal principles and formal equality of sovereign states.’14 Similarly, 
Casper Sylvest asserts, in British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress? 
(2009), that the twentieth century represented a ‘coming of age’ of ‘internationalist 
ideology’, in terms of a ‘shift towards more institutional modes of argument’, in part 
because ‘British liberal internationalism’, an ideology espousing the thought of such 
nineteenth century theorists as Richard Cobden and John Stuart Mill, ‘was markedly 
accelerated during the Great War’.15 This, it may argued, was the context in which the 
redemptive discourse of Christendom was conceived.  
 
At a time when, as Mazower has noted, ‘competing visions of world order’ – the League of 
Nations and Communism, as well as ‘the fascist element’, Nazi Germany – appeared to be 
in the ascendancy, the Old Western ethic forwarded another form of ‘world order’, but one 
that was essentially non-political.16 This alternative may be considered as part of what 
Sylvest has recently termed the ‘historically minded language of internationalism’, manifest 
in the work of the historian James Bryce and his disciple George Peabody Gooch.17 As 
Sylvest writes, both were absorbed in ‘the continuing attractions of the medieval ideal [of 
Christendom] in a conflict-ridden modern world. In fact, it became a mainstay of Gooch’s 
internationalist writings to attempt a very Brycean resurrection of the medieval ideal.’18 
However, an important distinction should be made here, which is that the Old Western 
alternative considered in this chapter will not conform to Gooch’s vision, in the sense that 
‘Gooch tied his enthusiasm for the respublica Christiana firmly to the mast of institutional 
internationalism, the League of Nations’.19 Rather, what this chapter is focusing its 
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attention on here is an ideal that Bryce, tellingly known as ‘the Holy Roman’, had first 
espoused in his own output as a historian; an ideal that was not tied to an institutional 
mode of response to the problem of European conflagration. Importantly, too, it was a type 
of cultural internationalism that did not seek to supersede the nation.   
 
 
T. S. Eliot 
 
Barry Spurr’s recent contribution to the scholarly literature on Eliot, in ‘Anglo-Catholic in 
Religion’: T. S. Eliot and Christianity (2010), argued the case that it was ‘Eliot’s fidelity not 
only to Christianity but to a particular variety of it, over a period of nearly forty years until 
his death in 1965’, which was ‘the dominant element in his life and work’.20 Spurr’s 
conclusion here reveals Eliot to possess an especially ‘Old Western’ ethic, I think, which it 
is the purpose of this thesis to forward as one side of Malcolm Cowley’s stated divide 
amongst intellectuals. What stands out, in particular, in Spurr’s analysis is the importance 
Eliot placed on the value of the supernatural: 
 
Eliot was highly critical of a religious system which had jettisoned 
theology and prioritised morality, which could not survive (he believed) 
in a vacuum. He came to see this as the antithesis of the Anglo-Catholic 
understanding of moral issues and conduct.21 
 
For an authority that was not supernatural was, Eliot ultimately came to decide, no 
authority at all. As early as 1916, Eliot had admitted that he believed that ‘man requires an 
askesis, a formula to be imposed upon him from above’.22 It was for this reason, too, that 
Eliot thought it important to ‘question whether we could live without superstition’.23 He 
would conclude that civilization could not. Spurr has detailed this process in his own work. 
However, Eliot was not alone in his conclusion here. The supposed ‘vacuum’ that had been 
created when society abandoned its belief in the supernatural was a conception that was 
by no means unique to Eliot, as we have seen. This was an essential Old Western 
                                                          
20 Barry Spurr, ‘Anglo-Catholic in Religion’: T. S. Eliot and Christianity (Cambridge: The Lutterworth 
Press, 2010), ix. 
21 Ibid., ix, 2. 
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conception. What concerned Eliot most of all – and what arguably gave Old Western Men 
their impetus in the twentieth century – were the perceived corollaries of that ‘vacuum’, 
including the present condition of Europe. One such concern was the rise of nationalism. 
As Keith Lowe writes, the Second World War itself, which for many writers came to define 
the century, would not only be a ‘traditional conflict for territory’: it would also 
‘simultaneously [be] a war of race, and a war of ideology […] interlaced with half a dozen 
civil wars fought for purely local reasons.’24 
 
Enzo Traverso has written that the intellectuals able to ‘resist’ the ‘nationalist wave’ that 
appeared to overcome Europe in the first half of the twentieth century ‘were extremely 
few’.25 Ian Kershaw has noted, too, in To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949 (2015), that ‘the 
belief in spiritual renewal through national rebirth accounts in good measure for fascism’s 
appeal to intellectuals’.26 Moreover, Kershaw also asserts that ‘belligerent nationalism, 
vicious antisemitism and other brands of racism were commonplace outside the minority 
drawn to the doctrines of international socialism’.27 Both Traverso and Kershaw have, I 
argue, neglected a significant discourse, particularly prominent between the two world 
wars, which, though seeking to combat nationalism and racism, did not subscribe to 
‘international socialism’ or what Tooze and Mazower identify as the post-1918 ‘world 
order’. No where do we see the Old Western ethic exhibited more plainly, and indeed 
broadly, as we do in the manner in which the professed ill-health of Europe – where all its 
ideologies, disunities and, most apparently, its great wars of recent years, were all seen to 
be a direct result of the spiritual vacuum identified by Eliot, but also by Christopher Dawson, 
G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc. Here, then, Eliot found himself on the side of what this 
thesis argues was a very real divide amongst the intellectuals of his day.  
 
 
Notes towards the Definition of Culture 
 
Writing in one of a number of articles that would later form Notes towards the Definition 
of Culture (1948), Eliot expressed his view that: 
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For the health of the culture of Europe two conditions are required: that 
the culture of each country should be unique, and that the different 
cultures should recognize their relationship to each other, so that each 
should be susceptible of influence from the others. And this is possible 
because there is a common element in European culture, an interrelated 
history of thought and feeling and behaviour, an interchange of arts and 
of ideas.28 
 
The sociologist Émile Durkheim wrote in his seminal work The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life (1912) that ‘the idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church [...] an 
eminently collective thing’.29 In a sense, then, Eliot also emphasised such ‘a moral 
community formed by all the believers in a single faith, laymen as well as priests’.30 
However, Eliot’s collective was just as much historical and cultural as it was religious, 
though he believed that ‘the dominant force in creating a common culture between 
peoples, each of which has its distinct culture, is religion’.31 Moreover, with regards to 
Europe, there was only one ‘common culture’ that could conceivably be called upon:  ‘I am 
talking about the common tradition of Christianity which has made Europe what it is, and 
about the common cultural elements which this common Christianity has brought with it.’32 
This tradition was vital, Eliot believed: 
 
It is in Christianity that our arts have developed; it is in Christianity that 
the laws of Europe have – until recently – been rooted. It is against a 
background of Christianity that all our thought has significance. An 
individual European may not believe that the Christian Faith is true, and 
yet what he says, and makes, and does, will all spring out of his heritage 
of Christian culture and depend upon that culture for its meaning.33 
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What is more, Eliot was certain ‘that the culture of Europe could [not] survive the complete 
disappearance of the Christian Faith […] not merely because I am a Christian myself’, he 
wrote, ‘but as a student of social biology. If Christianity goes, the whole of our culture 
goes.’34 Lucy McDiarmid has noted previously that Eliot was himself part of a ‘wishing away 
Luther, Machiavelli, Descartes, Cromwell, Hobbes, Newton, and Locke’, in favour of a 
‘unified Christendom, believing in one God, speaking one language’.35 And the reason why 
Eliot thought it essential that Europe – and particularly its intellectuals – preserve that 
‘culture’, a culture common to all Europeans, was that he thought it ‘wrong that the only 
duty of the individual should be held to be towards the State’.36  
 
 
Fear of the State 
 
It has become increasingly clear that the whole social structure of the 
modern world is undergoing a process of change which not only affects 
politics and economics but also raises fundamental moral and religious 
issues. It matters little whether we regard this development as tending 
towards State-socialism or State-capitalism, whether we describe it as 
collectivist or totalitarian; the vital point is that it invokes a new relation 
between society and the individual and a new conception of the nature 
and function of the State.37 
 
Writing in one of his most pressing works, Religion and the Modern State (1935), Dawson 
asserted his view that Europe was steadily being overtaken by a ‘universal […] movement 
towards State control in every department of life’, independent of the ‘political tenets of a 
party, whether Communist or Fascist’.38 Not only was the state ‘becoming more 
centralized’, but rather more tellingly, ‘society and culture’ as a whole were steadily 
‘becoming more politicized’.39 This was suggestive because Dawson believed that at the 
root of this politicization, which he posited was ‘responsible for the intolerance and 
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violence of the new political order’, was the ‘determination to build Jerusalem, at once and 
on the spot […] never ceasing from mental strife till they have built Jerusalem in England’s 
green and pleasant land’.40  
 
Dawson’s wielding of William Blake’s poem ‘Jerusalem’ is significant because what 
underpinned his entire thesis in 1935, and what to a certain extent defined his life’s work 
as a historian, was the proposition that ‘the rise of the new State’ should be ‘regarded as 
the culmination of the process of secularization in Western history’.41 And the theme of 
secularization – Eliot’s ‘vacuum’ – is a primary Old Western preoccupation, of course. And  
ultimately, the rise of the modern state, in Dawson’s view, was really ‘an attempt to find 
some substitute for the lost religious foundations of society’.42 Consequently, this 
endeavour to exchange religion for what was essentially a religion of politics had, in due 
course, found chief expression in a vital utopianism that had, in his own day, established 
itself in an apparent epidemic of worldly Jerusalems: ‘there is the Muscovite Jerusalem 
which has no Temple, there is Herr Hitler’s Jerusalem which has no Jews, and there is the 
Jerusalem of the social reformers which is all suburbs.’43 But none of these ‘earthly cities’ 
were ‘Blake’s Jerusalem’, which, in Dawson’s view, was exactly the problem:  
  
If we believe that the Kingdom of Heaven can be established by political 
or economic measures – that it can be an earthly state – then we can 
hardly object to the claims of such a State to embrace the whole of life 
and to demand the total submission of the individual will and 
conscience.44 
 
In this sense, Dawson found his views in alinement with the writer Paul Einzig, who claimed, 
in The Economic Foundations of Fascism (1933), that ‘to a very great extent Fascism is 
Socialism’.45 Dawson concurred, quoting Einzig, claiming himself that there existed ‘a 
parallel line of development’ between the two systems, since each in effect demanded ‘an 
equally whole-hearted spiritual allegiance’, which itself involved a ‘large a claim on the life 
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of the individual’.46 This was what Dawson found so worrying; that as a result of the 
politicization of society, in that it now sought to bring about the Kingdom of Heaven ‘at 
once and on the spot’, the state was ‘steadily annexing all the territory that was formerly 
the domain of individual freedom’, having ‘already taken more than anyone would have 
conceived possible a century ago. It has taken economics, it has taken science, it has taken 
ethics.’47 In his estimation, it was essentially totalitarian. 
 
Dawson noted a number of symptoms of this impulse toward authoritarianism: an 
emergent class of ‘professional politicians or demagogues’48; as well as the establishment 
of ‘a direct relation of personal loyalty between the leader and the man in the street’49; 
hoping ‘for the appearance of some political Messiah who will solve all our difficulties by 
the magic of his personality’50. Dawson’s language here is significant. Idolatry was itself a 
sign that the politician had supplanted God in the hearts and minds of the general populace, 
according to Dawson. The purpose of his work Religion and the Modern State was to assert 
that, in actual fact, a religious ‘society’ was ‘the only Kingdom of God on earth that we have 
any right to look for’, and that it was only this ‘membership’ that provided ‘an answer to 
the claims of the Totalitarian State’.51 If the state had, indeed, ‘become too totalitarian’, 
this was ‘because the average Christian’ had ‘not been totalitarian enough’, not in the sense 
of Christian abuses of power, but rather in terms of rejecting worldly power in favour of 
the ‘More-Than-World’.52  
 
Dawson was not alone in his thesis that totalitarianism was a natural consequence of a 
widespread securitisation of society. In 1935, as well, Eliot had expressed a similar view in 
his journal The Criterion: 
 
We are really, you see, up against the very difficult problem of the 
spiritual and the temporal, the problem of which the problem of Church 
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and State is a derivative. The danger, for those who start from the 
temporal end, is Utopianism.53  
 
It is worth reiterating the point here that Eliot’s and Dawson’s rejection of State power and 
organisation, which they classified as being totalitarian in instinct, was ultimately rooted in 
a religious reading of current events. Therefore, it is important that we recognise the true 
extent of this critique, one that was very much founded on a Christian reading of history, 
as we see, for example, in the work of Chesterton, who also asserted the importance of 
recognising the reality of the ‘More-Than-World’. 
 
Writing in Christendom in Dublin (1932), Chesterton declared that, ‘Once abolish the god, 
and the Government becomes the God.’54 Although Chesterton did not go into as much 
depth on the subject as Dawson and Eliot, he nevertheless argued the same point that 
‘wherever the people do not believe in something beyond the world, they will worship the 
world. But, above all, they will worship the strongest thing in the world […] the State.’55 
 
That fact is written all across human history; but it is written most plainly 
across that recent history of Russia; which was created by Lenin. There 
the Government is the God, and all the more the God, because it 
proclaims aloud in accents of thunder, like every other God worth 
worshipping, the one essential commandment: “Thou shalt have no 
other gods but Me.”56 
 
As early as the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Chesterton’s friend and ally 
Belloc had also claimed, in Europe and the Faith (1920), that it was above all the Catholic 
Church and the European ‘unity’, the unity of ‘Christendom’, which was ‘the guarantee of 
the plain man's healthy and moral existence against the threat of the wealthy, and the 
power of the State’.57 Unsurprisingly, this critique survived the Second World War too, in 
part because this war appeared to confirm what had already been posited by the likes of 
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Dawson and others; that, in words of the poet Roy Campbell, in 1951, there was a reason 
why ‘Demagogues always attack and destroy the traditional Faith or tribal beliefs of their 
fellow-countrymen’, because only then would they be ‘able to enslave them’.58 ‘Recent 
history’, he wrote, had ‘proved that wherever you get rid of your priest, you have to have 
a policeman, an S.S., or a Commissar, armed with a knout, to replace him’.59 At the root of 
this, again, was the notion that religion, by default, was the only effective bastion against 
the encroachment of state power: 
 
Faith can move mountains: but Credulity (its inevitable substitute) can 
move whole continents: and it requires the most blatant credulity to 
believe in the Utopian futurism of “classless societies”, “thousand-year 
Reichs”, “five-year plans” and other demagogic blarney current in Europe 
during the last two hundred years, amongst people who have had their 
faith destroyed.60 
 
The result of this move away from ‘faith’ toward ‘credulity’ had, in Campbell’s view, 
ultimately been catastrophic:  
 
Far more people have been imprisoned for Liberty, degraded and 
humiliated for the sake of Equality, and tortured and murdered in the 
name of Fraternity during the last thirty years than in the previous 
thousand under less hypocritical forms of despotism.61 
 
Campbell concluded, in his own mind, that ‘even for us’ religion was ‘the only alternative 
to the police State and slavery in the long run’.62 Again, it is worth pressing home the point 
that the Old Western Men may, in part, be defined by their wholesale rejection of state 
power.  
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J. R. R. Tolkien was also fundamentally opposed to what he termed the ‘State-God’,63 
affirming, in 1956, that he was ‘not a “socialist” in any sense – being averse to “planning” 
(as must be plain) most of all because the “planners”, when they acquire power, become 
so bad’.64 This opposition also found expression in his output as an author of fantasy. 
Indeed, his depiction of his central villain Sauron, especially in The Silmarillion (1977), as an 
expression of the general Old Western ethic. Tolkien explains that Men – the 
Númenóreans, in this case – in the Second Age ‘believed in the One, the true God, and held 
worship of any other person an abomination’.65 Sauron, on the other hand, who had 
developed a ‘lusting for Complete Power’,66 ‘desired to be a God-King, and was held to be 
this by his servants’.67 Sauron ‘strove ever for the dominion of Middle-earth, to become a 
king over all kings and as a god unto Men’.68 Ultimately, the root of Sauron’s villainy, we 
come to realise, is his desire to supersede God himself, since he can only achieve ‘dominion’ 
over Men by being ‘both king and god’, Tolkien argues later on in his letters.69 This, 
importantly, was not to suggest that Sauron was “evil” in origin’.70 Instead, he was ‘a “spirit” 
corrupted’.71 This is significant, since Tolkien drew a comparison, in 1954, between Sauron 
and the self-destructive desire on the part of the planners of his own time, who sought to 
refashion the world along the lines of some utopian vision, confirming that Sauron ‘was not 
indeed wholly evil, not unless all “reformers” who want to hurry up with “reconstruction” 
and “reorganization” are wholly evil, even before pride and the lust to exert their will eat 
them up’.72 Writing again in 1956, Tolkien reaffirmed the point that Sauron ‘had gone the 
way of all tyrants: beginning well, at least on the level that while desiring to order all things 
according to his own wisdom he still at first considered the (economic) well-being of other 
inhabitants of the Earth’.73 Had Sauron been ultimately ‘victorious he would have 
demanded divine honour from all rational creatures and absolute power over the whole 
world’.74 Tolkien would conclude retrospectively that the broader ‘conflict’ in his story The 
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Lord of the Rings was ‘not basically about “freedom”’, though was ‘naturally involved’, 
being instead ‘about God, and His sole right to divine honour’.75  
 
Tolkien’s fellow ‘Inkling’ Lewis concurred, claiming that ‘of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely 
exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive’.76 In this sense, he 
concluded, ‘it would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral 
busybodies’: 
 
The robber baron’s cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at 
some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will 
torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own 
conscience. They may be more likely to go to Heaven yet at the same time 
likelier to make a Hell of earth.77 
 
Lewis, therefore, thought it prudent to at least ‘face the possibility of bad rulers armed 
with’, what he termed, ‘a Humanitarian theory of punishment’, which would attempt to 
‘cure’ dissent rather than punish it.78 For what this novel ‘Humanitarian theory’ actually 
entailed, he explained, was treating ‘crime and disease […] as the same thing’, the result 
being ‘that any state of mind which our masters choose to call “disease” can be treated as 
crime; and compulsorily cured’.79 Moreover, this new ‘theory’ might be applied to 
Christianity itself, which ‘one school of phycology’ already regarded ‘as a neurosis’.80 The 
worry, then, in Lewis’s mind, was that should this ‘neurosis’ become inconvenient to 
government, what would ‘hinder government from proceeding to “cure” it?’.81 The danger 
of this theory lay, then, in its subtlety and its pronounced humanitarianism:  
 
Under the Humanitarian theory it will not be called by the shocking name 
of Persecution. No one will blame us for being Christians, no one will hate 
us, no one will revile us. The new Nero will approach us with the silky 
manners of a doctor, and though all will be in fact as compulsory as the 
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tunica molesta or Smithfield of Tyburn, all will go on within the 
unemotional therapeutic sphere where worlds like “right” and “wrong” 
or “freedom” and “slavery” are never heard.82 
 
Consequently, ‘the practical problem of Christian politics’ would ‘not [be] that of drawing 
up schemes for a Christian society, but that of living as innocently as we can with 
unbelieving fellow-subjects under unbelieving rulers who will never be perfectly wise and 
good and who will sometimes be very wicked and very foolish’.83 For it was an essential 
part of Lewis’s understanding of the modern tyrant that ‘they will usually be unbeliever. 
And since wisdom and virtue are not the only or the commonest qualifications for a place 
in the government, they will not often be even the best unbelievers.’84 Although Lewis’s 
identification of ‘a Humanitarian theory of punishment’ was ultimately left undeveloped, 
we may reasonably extract from it the critique that ‘moral busybodies’ were, in point of 
fact, ‘unbelieving’ Christians applying a dissociated Christian ethic, which, as a result of that 
dissociation, was political rather than spiritual. 
 
Lewis had, in fact, touched on this idea in his work Mere Christianity (1952). Here he 
claimed that ‘a Christian society would be what we now call Leftist’.85 Indeed, in ‘its 
economic life’ such a society would seem ‘very socialistic and, in that sense, “advanced”’.86 
Nevertheless, it was also a vital part of Christianity that ‘the New Testament hates what it 
calls “busybodies”’87 – the phrase Lewis had employed to describe the tyranny behind the 
‘Humanitarian theory of punishment’.88 The difference, Lewis explained in 1952, between 
the Christian and Leftist ‘busybodies’, was this, then: ‘[that] Christianity has not, and does 
not profess to have, a detailed political programme for applying “Do as you would be done 
by” to a particular society at a particular moment.’89 The Leftist, conversely, was in the 
business of attempting to bring about the Kingdom of Heaven in the here and now, rather 
than reaching it in the hereafter. Lewis concurs with Dawson. Meanwhile, the Christian 
‘clergy’, for example, were ‘those particular people within the whole Church who have been 
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specially trained and set aside to look after what concerns us as creatures who are going to 
live for ever’.90 We may, therefore, deduce – because Lewis stated it explicitly – that what 
was implicit in Lewis’s respective identifications in his unpublished essay, but in Mere 
Christianity too, was that at the root of the tyranny of ‘Leftist’ ‘busybodies’ was an absence 
of belief, not in the ethics of Christianity, but its supernatural claims. This puts Lewis in line 
with the Old Western ethic itself.  
 
As we have seen, Eliot’s own writing belonged to a tradition that rejected state power and, 
consequently, precluded any such solution to the issue of European cooperation that 
sought to apply the apparatus of the state trans-nationally. What was really required, he 
argued, was a union founded on an allegiance that was, to the contrary, cultural rather than 
political. This raised an issue of equal importance, which was the problem of spiritual 
loyalty. This would bring Eliot, as well as others, closer to the idea of the unity of culture, 
meaning ‘Christendom’. 
 
 
A Question of Loyalties 
    
The legacy of the Second World War looms large throughout Eliot’s Notes towards the 
Definition of Culture. Nazi Germany was a key case in point, he believed, of ‘a country which 
is too well united – whether by nature or by device, by honest purpose or by fraud and 
oppression’ – and which was, as a result, ‘a menace to others’.91 What Eliot hoped for, to 
the contrary, and indeed what he argued for, was ‘a variety of loyalties’.92 However, this 
‘variety’ could only be got at through what he termed ‘the unity of culture’.93 For ‘in 
contrast to the unity of political organisation’ – which Nazi Germany, as well as fascist Italy, 
had stood for94 – the ‘unity of culture’ would ‘not require us all to have only one loyalty’.95 
‘We need variety in unity: not the unity of organisation, but the unity of nature’, he 
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argued.96 In a sense, what Eliot was expressing was what he thought of as Christianity’s 
supreme practicality in the area of international relations. What really Europe required, he 
concluded – in the wake of what was a fundamentally nationalistic and racialist outbreak 
of disorder, particularly in Germany, he supposed – was ‘unity in culture’, a unity founded 
on the cultural, and indeed emotional, framework of Christendom that would the negate 
the need to impose a unity from above that was essentially political and superficial.  
 
Eliot was not alone in his forwarding of cultural unity as a solution to Europe’s recent self-
immolation. Dawson, it may be said, was part of what Daniel Laqua states was a ‘diversity 
of transnational thought and action between 1919 and 1939’, which he believes is 
‘frequently underestimated’.97 Dawson also argued for the unitary principle of a common 
culture rooted in Europe’s cultural inheritance, which was Christian, he posited. Writing in 
The Judgement of Nations (1942), in a chapter titled ‘Christendom, Europe and the New 
World’, Dawson broached the subject of a possible ‘union’ of European nations in answer 
to ‘the great tragedy of our time’.98 Dawson was, of course, referring to the ongoing 
conflagration on the continent that had yet again erupted into world conflict. Was ‘it 
possible’, he asked, ‘to conceive of a Western European federation’ that would ‘reconcile 
the rights of nations with the existence of Europe, on the one hand, and the need of world 
order, on the other’?99 The question that Dawson was really considering here, however, 
was what form ‘a European union’ should take. His own response, in 1942, was to argue 
that ‘any such attempt to organise Europe by military or economic power divorced from 
spiritual vision’ was ‘doomed to failure’.100 This caution was founded on the conviction that 
had informed much of Dawson’s output as a historian, that ‘the formal principle of 
European unity is not physical but spiritual’.101 As he would stress later, in Understanding 
Europe (1952), Europe was ‘a man-made continent, an historical creation’.102 Accordingly, 
spiritual allegiance, not geography, was central to the understanding of European society 
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as a whole. And one such ‘spiritual’ reality, which had to recognised, Dawson emphasised 
in 1942, was ‘the intensive development of national political traditions and national 
culture’, which had ‘made every people so conscious of its own individuality that any 
limitation of its political sovereignty’ was ‘felt as a threat to its spiritual being’.103 Later, in 
1952, Dawson would forward the example of  the German philosopher-politician 
Constantin Frantz, an opponent of Otto von Bismarck’s policy of German unification, who 
foresaw the danger of transforming Germany into a centralised state, a state that was 
ultimately ‘contrary to the deep-rooted political traditions of the German people’.104 
Similarly, Dawson argued that any such attempt to organise Europe artificially would not 
command the spiritual loyalties of the European peoples. As he had written in 1942, ‘the 
reconciliation of the nations can only be accomplished on a deeper plane than that of 
political power or economic interest’.105 The only solution, then, was some manner of 
organisation ‘based on community of culture […] organized as a society of nations or states 
with autonomous rights’.106 And just as Frantz invoked ‘the older tradition of the [Holy 
Roman] Empire, which was based, on the one hand, on the principle of regional or 
territorial autonomy, and on the other, on the conception of a universal Christian society 
of which the Empire was the historical representative’,107 Dawson also called upon the 
example of ‘Christendom’, a culture based on the ‘idea of spiritual universalism’; an idea 
‘which was more than an idea, because it was embodied in the superpolitical society of the 
Church’.108 He was, in this sense, as Michael Bentley has identified, one of the ‘heirs to a 
tradition of Roman Catholic historiography which provided a second challenge to the more 
comfortable assumptions of whigs about the Protestant state’.109 
 
 
Christendom: ‘the only league of nations that ever had a chance’ 
 
A vital aspect of the Old Western ethic is that it is, if not collaborative, then essentially 
corroborative. Regarding the revival of Christendom – arguably part of a broader revival of 
interest in the Middle Ages as a whole – it seems that Eliot was to some extent aware that 
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his own personal view was part of a broader response to the contemporary situation, 
observing in 1939 that ‘events during the last twenty-five years have led to an increasing 
recognition of the supra-national Christian society’.110 This identification likely 
encompassed Dawson’s own analysis, which in 1948 Eliot acknowledged personally in his 
preface to Notes towards the Definition of Culture. As we shall see, Eliot’s own work and 
opinion owed a great deal to the influence of Dawson, but also to a broader Old Western 
ethic that proceeded even Dawson. For it is important that we recognise that what Eliot 
was attempting to affirm in 1948 was a variant of Chesterton’s assertion, in 1917, that what 
‘Christendom’ really constituted was ‘variation without antagonism’.111 In this sense, then, 
though they were a generation apart, and moved in very different circles, both Eliot and 
Chesterton, including his ally Belloc too, made it their business to defend the concept 
Christendom. Chesterton and Belloc – the ‘Chesterbelloc’ – were the first Old Western 
generation in the twentieth century to elevate the conception of a Christian league of 
nations modelled on a conception of Christendom that was also related, unashamedly, to 
their own Roman Catholic faith and sympathies. In doing so, they would attempt to 
reconcile a corporate Catholic identity with English identity.112 Accordingly, the 
Chesterbelloc sought to remind the English of their European, or pre-modern, citizenship – 
an idea that, to a considerable degree, was alien to the tradition that Englishmen had for 
centuries been exposed; a tradition that has been dubbed a peculiarly ‘English’ narrative, 
in which ‘the struggles of the Protestant Reformation’ were ‘fought out over and over 
again’.113 In this sense, Chesterton and Belloc preceded Eliot, as well as Dawson, in 
combatting what they believed to be an ill-effect of the Reformation in the sixteenth 
century, which, amongst other evils, had, Chesterton was sure, ‘destroyed the only league 
of nations that ever had a chance’.114 In this sense, too, this recovery of the notion of 
Christendom constituted a key, though so far unacknowledged, component of Michael 
Alexander’s ‘Edwardian relaunch’ of the medieval revival. 
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Writing in 1919, for The New Witness, Chesterton could hardly have chosen stronger words 
to condemn what he believed to be the historically ruinous ramifications of the 
Reformation: 
 
I am firmly convinced that the Reformation of the sixteenth century was 
as near as any mortal thing can come to unmixed evil. Even the parts of 
it that might appear plausible and enlightened from a purely secular 
standpoint have turned out rotten and reactionary, also from a purely 
secular standpoint. By substituting the Bible for the sacrament, it created 
a pedantic caste of those who could read, superstitiously identified with 
those who could think. By destroying the monks, it took social work from 
the poor philanthropists who chose to deny themselves, and gave it to 
the rich philanthropists who chose to assert themselves. By preaching 
individualism while preserving inequality, it produced modern capitalism. 
It destroyed the only league of nations that ever had a chance. It 
produced the worst wars of nations that ever existed. It produced the 
most efficient form of Protestantism, which is Prussia. And it is producing 
the worst part of paganism, which is slavery.115 
 
Chesterton’s complaint here was not entirely novel. Previous critiques of the Reformation, 
such as Williams Cobbett’s A History of the Protestant Reformation (1824-26), had 
accentuated its deleterious social effect: that the Reformation had, in the words of Cobbett, 
impoverished and degraded the main body of the people in those countries.116 Around this 
narrative congregated what J. W. Burrow termed, in Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians 
and the English Past (1981), ‘the radically disaffected, overtly reactionary strand in the 
English approach to the past’, which, ‘in the middle years of the nineteenth century, from 
Southey and Cobbett, Pugin and Disraeli, to Ruskin and Morris, with a twentieth-century 
epilogue in Belloc and Chesterton’, ‘constantly called for […] the conception of a medieval 
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utopia’.117 This ‘radical critique of capitalism’, writes Burrow, which naturally entailed ‘a 
repudiation of Whiggish complacency about national history’, perceived ‘the Middle Ages 
as a lost paradise’, a paradise that had been wilfully destroyed during the course of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.118 However, though Belloc and Chesterton were, it is 
true, a ‘twentieth-century epilogue’, as Burrow says, insofar as they advanced a social 
critique of the effects of the Reformation, they were also, more originally, a prologue. They 
were a preamble, indeed, to Eliot’s own Notes towards the Definition of Culture. For what 
Chesterton and Belloc did – preparing the way not only for Eliot, but for Dawson as well, as 
we shall see – was to add to that critique of the Reformation the view, a view in response, 
perhaps, to the First World War, that, as Belloc remarked in How the Reformation 
Happened (1928), the Reformation was the ‘shipwreck of European unity’.119 
 
There undoubtedly existed a common consensus amongst the ‘Roman Catholic’ core of the 
Old Western ethic that the Reformation was, indeed, the ‘shipwreck’ of the old ‘European 
unity’. But what was that ‘European unity’? Chesterton summed up his own conception of 
Christendom particularly evocatively in 1917, as Europe was engaged in one of the most 
shattering conflicts in its history. Chesterton was certain that he knew what Christendom 
was, but he also believed he knew when it had died: 
 
Shakespeare died upon St. George’s Day, and much of what St. George 
had meant died with him. I do not mean that the patriotism of 
Shakespeare or of England died; that remained and even rose steadily, to 
be the noblest pride of the coming times. But much more than patriotism 
had been involved in that image of St. George to whom the Lion Heart 
had dedicated England long ago in the deserts of Palestine. The 
conception of a patron saint had carried from the Middle Ages one very 
unique and as yet unreplaced idea. It was the idea of variation without 
antagonism. The Seven Champions of Christendom were multiplied by 
seventy times seven in the patrons of towns, trades and social types; but 
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the very idea that they were all saints excluded the possibility of ultimate 
rivalry in the fact that they were all patrons. The Guild of the Shoemakers 
and the Guild of the Skinners, carrying the badges of St. Crispin and St. 
Bartholomew, might fight each other in the streets; but they did not 
believe that St. Crispin and St. Bartholomew were fighting each other in 
the skies. Similarly the English would cry in battle on St. George and the 
French on St. Denis; but they did not seriously believe that St. George 
hated St. Denis or even those who cried upon St. Denis.120 
 
In other words, neither the English nor the French were the chosen people; they were all 
God’s people. In this sense, Chesterton believed that what Christendom had, above all, 
afforded the peoples of the Middles Ages was ‘variation without antagonism’. St. George, 
whom an Englishman might conceivably invoke, finding himself imperilled upon the breach, 
embodied something far more comprehensive than the narrow confines of the nation 
itself. Christendom, in the manner of a ‘common culture’, which embraced peoples on a 
truly trans-national scale, ultimately transcended the nation, but, unlike political 
internationalism, which Chesterton equally disliked, did not seek to abolish the nation. This 
was Christendom’s great appeal to a number of not insignificant writers in the twentieth 
century. Lodged precariously between the insular rock of state nationalism and the vast 
cultural nothingness of internationalism, as they characterised it, was Christendom. Its 
tradition was that neat trick of ‘variation without antagonism’, Chesterton argued. 
Christendom, it seemed to him, might reconcile the irreconcilable. It was a via media, in a 
way. And for centuries, he maintained, that via media had existed. Christendom was no 
utopian fancy, but, as one of Chesterton’s protégés, Dawson, confirmed: ‘an objective 
historical reality.’121 It was exactly because it was not an abstraction that it might be 
revived. 
 
It is significant, it should be noted, that in eulogising Christendom – which, in the view of 
many Englishmen, in the wake of the Reformation, had an all too Catholic connotation, as 
Linda Colley has detailed122 – Chesterton, as we have seen, conscripted into his vision 
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perhaps two of the most recognisable Englishmen known to history: William Shakespeare 
and Richard the Lionheart.123 Indeed, it was indicative of what Chesterton, as well as Old 
Western Roman Catholics as a whole, were attempting in the twentieth century, to 
confront the deep-rooted idea, revealed to us by Colley, for example, that to be Catholic 
was to commit the crime of being ‘un-British’.124  
 
 
A Very English Catholicism 
 
Much of the history produced by the Chesterbelloc was conceived in order to correct the 
Protestant narrative that Catholicism and Englishness were fundamentally incompatible 
concepts. This was, of course, vital if Christendom – meaning ‘variation without 
antagonism’ – was to be accepted by Englishmen. Because Christendom was seen to be so 
much related to Catholicism, it was, therefore, of the utmost importance that Catholicism 
should be seen to be part of the ‘English’ tradition. This apparent antagonism, between 
Englishness and Catholicism, an ostensible contradiction in terms, is very much apparent in 
the history novel Robert Peckham (1930), for example, written by the Catholic convert 
Maurice Baring, a British diplomat who had spent much time on the continent. He was also 
a close friend of Chesterton and Belloc. Baring’s novel is certainly a work that recognised 
the English/Catholic antagonism, which finds a particularly poignant expression in the 
book’s central character, an Englishman who was real to history: an English Catholic buried, 
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tellingly, in the church of San Gregorio Magno al Celio in Rome. His epitaph, inscribed in 
the church, expressed exactly the dilemma that permeates Baring’s novel:  
 
Here lies Robert Peckham, Englishman and Catholic, who, after England’s 
break with the Church, left England because he could not live in his 
country without the Faith and, having come to Rome, died there because 
he could not live apart from his country.125 
 
Evidently moved by Peckham’s plight, and indeed by his apparent tragedy, Baring 
constructed his novel around this epitaph. Accordingly, in Baring’s novel, Peckham is ‘an 
ardent patriot […] his country dear to him, so much so that his eyes filled with tears 
whenever the word England was pronounced in his presence’.126 His father, Edmund 
Peckham, is also a loyal and trusted subject of King Henry VIII. England, Baring wrote, ‘was 
the flame of his life’.127 Its royal house, in particular, is beyond reproach. However, it is 
Robert’s father’s unhesitating loyalty that troubles him: ‘I knew my father would never 
question anything the King might do. He would lay down his life for any of the Tudors, at 
any moment.’128 ‘The first duty of an Englishman, in my father’s eyes, was loyalty to the 
King.’129 However, this is a sentiment that Robert increasingly comes to question in Baring’s 
novel. For like Baring, Edmund ‘professed to be a good Catholic’.130 However, this he comes 
to doubt. This is the question that comes to consume Robert Peckham. Ultimately, the issue 
that runs through the entire work is the Reformation. Robert is forced to choose between 
his loyalty to the English state and his loyalty to the Church.           
 
Ultimately, Baring’s Peckham thinks ‘the King’s assumption of the title “Head of the 
Church” a mistake, and perhaps a disaster’, one which ‘must at the end bring calamity to 
the Church’.131 In what other terms could his father’s acquisition of lands previously held 
by the Church be explained? It is no longer possible, it seems to Robert, to be at once a 
good Englishmen and a good Roman Catholic: ‘I felt that England was no longer a home for 
me […] It was well-nigh impossible, and becoming daily more difficult, to practice my 
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religion.’132 England had been truly ‘severed from the authority that once bound 
Christendom’.133 Unable to betray his Queen, for Elizabeth I is now on the thrown, but 
similarly incapable of giving up his religion, Robert’s only path, he decides, is to go into exile 
in Rome – where he dies in 1569. It is significant, however, that toward the end of the novel 
Baring’s Peckham is said to have ‘made a mistake’ in retreating to Rome.134 The implication 
here is that he should have stood his ground in England. Christendom – ‘the only league of 
nations that ever had a chance’ – was a cause worth fighting for, and even worth dying for. 
Moreover, Robert Peckham’s tragedy is that he had failed to reconcile two competing 
loyalties.  
 
In response to this problem, of competing loyalties, two of Baring’s fellow Roman Catholics, 
Dawson and Evelyn Waugh, attempted to create historic portraits rooted in an actual past 
that reconciled the Catholic faith with Englishness; and it does seem that the stress was, 
indeed, on Englishness rather than Henry VIII and the English state. Baring’s focus on the 
antagonism between the Church and England as political units set up a problem that was 
arguably insoluble. And for Peckham, it evidently was. The issue had changed, however. 
What Waugh and Dawson sought to reconcile was the cultural antipathy that had emerged 
as a result of the England’s split with Rome. This attempt at resolution was what Waugh’s 
work Edmund Campion: Jesuit and Martyr (1935), in part, endeavoured to achieve. Here, 
for instance, Waugh employed the example of the Jesuit martyr Campion to express his 
view that being both English and Catholic was not so much a contradiction as it was a 
historic reality. He raised this point at the moment when Campion is convicted by the 
English state: 
 
It was then that Campion’s voice rose in triumph. He was no longer 
haggling with perjurers; he spoke now, not merely for the handful of 
doomed men behind him, nor to that sordid court, but for the whole 
gallant company of the English counter-Reformation; to all his 
contemporaries and all the posterity of his race: “It was not our death 
that ever we feared. But we knew that we were not lords of our own lives, 
and therefore for want of answer would not be guilty of our deaths. The 
only thing that we have now to say is, that if our religion do make us 
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traitors, we are worthy to be condemned; but otherwise are, and have 
been, as good subjects as ever the Queen had. 
     In condemning us you condemn all your own ancestors – all the 
ancient priests, bishops and kings – all that was once the glory of England, 
the island of saints, and the most devoted child of the See of Peter.  
     For what have we taught, however you may qualify it with the odious 
name of treason, that they did not uniformly teach? To be condemned 
with these lights – not of England only, but of the world – by their 
degenerate descendants, is both gladness and glory to us.135 
 
What Waugh was attempting to confront in his work on Campion was the idea that to be 
Catholic was to be unpatriotic and un-English. Actually, he argued, to be Protestant was to 
betray ‘the glory of England’. Waugh’s short biography, which is really a historic novel, 
about Campion, had much the same objective as Chesterton’s A Short History of England: 
to argue that to be anti-Catholic, and to consider Catholics to be ‘un-English’, was to 
consider the majority of English history, as well as those, such as Shakespeare and Richard 
the Lionheart, who dwelt within that history, as ‘un-English’, since they were either Roman 
Catholic themselves or heavily influenced by that culture. 
 
Dawson also set out to remind Englishmen of their Roman Catholic heritage. This was the 
evident purpose of his analysis of the English medieval poet William Langland’s fourteenth 
century poem Piers Plowman. This study was his contribution to a collection of essays, first 
published in 1933, under the title The English Way: Studies in English Sanctity from Bede to 
Newman. Edited by Maisie Ward, of Sheed and Ward, and featuring essays by other 
Catholics such as Chesterton and Belloc, each author had ‘chosen characters who in their 
opinion’ were ‘very English and very Catholic’.136 In ‘The Vision of Piers Plowman’, Dawson 
set out to portray Langland as just this, and in doing so forwarded a vision that was capable 
of combating what he had touched upon earlier, in his work The Making of Europe (1932). 
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Writing in The Making of Europe, Dawson had lamented that nationalism had, since the 
nineteenth century, so much ‘permeated the popular consciousness and determined the 
ordinary man’s conception of history’: 
 
It has filtered down from the university to the elementary school, and 
from the scholar to the journalist and the novelist. And the result is that 
each nation claims for itself a cultural unity and self-sufficiency that it 
does not possess. Each regards its share in the European tradition as an 
original achievement that owes nothing to the rest, and takes no heed of 
the common foundation in which its own tradition is rooted.137 
 
‘This was no mere academic error’, Dawson stressed, but something that had ‘undermined 
and vitiated the whole international life of modern Europe’.138 He believed that this 
historical error had ultimately found ‘its nemesis in the European War, which represented 
a far deeper schism in European life than all the many wars of the past’.139 It was this 
‘academic error’ that Dawson sought to repair in 1933 by dubbing Langland ‘the Catholic 
Englishman par excellence’: 
 
[Langland is] at once the most English of Catholic poets and the most 
Catholic of English poets: a man in whom Catholic faith and national 
feeling are fused in a single flame. He saw Christ walking in English fields 
in the dress of an English labourer, and to understand his work is to know 
English religion in its most autochthonous and yet most Catholic form.140 
 
Langland’s ‘Piers Plowman’, an ‘English farmer, ploughing his half-acre by the wayside’, 
nevertheless turns his mind toward matters of a more spiritual nature.141 ‘Langland’s hope 
of salvation for society rests on his faith in the redemption of humanity in the 
Incarnation.’142 In this sense, Piers Plowman becomes ‘John Bull spiritualized’, writes 
Dawson.143 This one phrase summed up Dawson’s hopes for an English identity that might 
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itself be incorporated into a spiritual, rather political, unity: allowing for a variety of 
loyalties.  
 
Dawson was in the same line of work as Chesterton and Belloc in promoting a vision of 
Christendom. However, the Chesterbelloc, far more than Dawson, saw themselves as 
contesting, in particular, the ‘Teutonic’ school of English history; particularly Edward 
Augustus Freeman and John Richard Green, whose theories, promulgated in the nineteenth 
century, and which were no less anti-Catholic, expounded the idea that England and the 
English were, way beyond the Reformation, essentially German, rather than Roman, in 
origin. As Edwin Jones has written:  
 
The “official” view of the English past was to regard English institutions 
as of purely indigenous origin. The only variant, but minor theme was an 
emphasis on the Germanic origin and teutonic nature of English people, 
dismissing a millennium of cultural development as simply an alien 
intrusion associated with the “Dark Ages”.144 
 
Unlike Dawson, Chesterton’s and Belloc’s Christendom was especially anti-Teutonic in 
emphasis. In a sense, the Chesterbelloc’s redemptive discourse of Christendom was obliged 
to confront this legacy of the nineteenth century in a way that Dawson was not. 
  
 
Roman Britain vs. Teutonic Britain 
 
Chesterton’s A Short History of England, published in 1917, and Belloc’s A Shorter History 
of England, published in 1934, are kindred histories. As their titles suggest, these works 
were ‘popular’ works, abridging history for the common reader; in the case of Belloc, an 
abbreviated work of over six-hundred pages, condensed from his four (out of a planned six) 
volume History of England (1925-1931). In brief summary, both works set out to repudiate 
the Whig/Teutonic perspective of history; a Teutonic tale that, as Robert Speaight writes, 
seemed to Belloc not only to be ‘a legend’, but ‘what sometimes appeared to be a vested 
interest’.145 The history that both Chesterton and Belloc sought to challenge was that 
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England was chiefly Anglo-Saxon, or rather Germanic, in origin and tradition; the notion 
that the Anglo-Saxon race liberated itself from a nefarious and deleterious foreign influence 
in its breach with Rome in the sixteenth century; and that this deliverance from Papal 
tyranny enabled an inexorable ascension toward an apotheosis of social, democratic and 
scientific ‘progress’, which Victorian liberals believed England stood for. All of this was 
contrary to the Chesterbelloc assertion, very much revisionist, that England was, in fact, 
Roman in foundation, including its institutions and character, therefore part of what was 
once the living body of a Christian league of nations. History had, therefore, become a 
battleground where Chesterton and Belloc would storm the nineteenth century barricades 
of Freeman and Green. 
 
It was Belloc’s belief that, in the absence of any real historical record between 420 and 597 
in Britain, a ‘vast amount of empty assertion, most of it recent, and nearly all of it as 
demonstrably (as it is obviously) created by a religious bias’, had resulted in the creation of 
a national myth, asserting the Teutonic origins of the modern English.146 Belloc was not 
incorrect to assert that the ‘Teutonic’ school had come to dominate the writing of English 
history, as even Burrow conceded in 1981: ‘the idiom of English historiography was German 
[…] accented in the second half of the [nineteenth] century’.147 One such exponent of that 
history was the historian Freeman, who, writing in 1860, in the Edinburgh Review, had 
expressed the typical Teutonic school mantra: ‘the fact that we Englishmen live in an island, 
and have always moved in a sort of world of our own’, which, ‘combined with the 
exterminating character of the first Teutonic settlements, made England, in the days of its 
earliest independence, a more purely Teutonic country than even Germany itself’.148 As M. 
E. Bratchel writes, Freeman ‘may be seen as the most extreme expression of the convictions 
of nineteenth century Englishmen about their past’.149 ‘Freeman never tired of insisting that 
the English of the fifth century were the same as the English of the nineteenth century, and 
that it was to the Anglo-Saxons that we owe our present constitution.’150 And amongst ‘his 
prejudices’, which served ‘constantly to disfigure his writings’, were his ‘racialism’ and 
‘nationalism’.151 Green, too, another historian of Freeman’s type, producing his own Short 
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History of the English People (1874), made a similar claim: that the true history of the 
‘English people’ began in the 5th century A.D., with the arrival of the peoples of Schleswig, 
under Hengist and Horsa, from the Germanic territory of Angeln (Anglia), which Green 
thought to be the true ‘fatherland of the English race’.152 Chesterton’s own Short History of 
England was, more so than Belloc’s, a repudiation of Green’s thesis. A particular piece of 
text which attracted Chesterton’s censure ran accordingly: 
 
If by English history we mean the history of Englishmen in the land which 
from that time they made their own, it is with this landing of Hengest’s 
war-band that English history begins. They landed on the shores of the 
Isle of Thanet at a spot known since as Ebbsfleet. No spot can be so sacred 
to Englishmen as the spot which first felt the tread of English feet.153 
 
Chesterton responded:   
 
[It should  be] permissible to disagree with the historian Green when he 
says that no spot should be more sacred to modern Englishmen than the 
neighbourhood of Ramsgate, where the Schleswig people are supposed 
to have landed; or when he suggests that their appearance is the real 
beginning of our island history. It would be rather more true to say that 
it was nearly, though prematurely, the end of it.154  
 
It is possible, too, that Chesterton, always sensitive to any ‘blood’ narrative, disapproved 
of the notion that ‘Englishness’ was to be defined racially.  
 
Underpinning Chesterton’s, as well as Belloc’s, criticism of Green and Freeman was the 
complaint that ‘German history had simply annexed English history’, to such a great extent 
that ‘it was almost counted the duty of any patriotic Englishman to be proud of being a 
German’, wrote Chesterton.155 Ultimately, Chesterton believed that what he and Belloc 
were countering was the nineteenth century: an era ‘overshadowed by Germany’.156 The 
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fall of Paris – ‘the capital of civilization’ – to Germany in 1871 was, for Chesterton at least, 
very much symbolic; indeed, he went so far as to liken it to ‘the sacking of Rome by the 
Goths’.157 There was, indeed, a very severe anti-German strain running throughout 
Chesterton’s work, including Belloc’s too, whose family home near Paris had been 
ransacked by Prussian troops.158 This antagonism was also rooted, in part, in England’s 
‘social reform […] modelled upon Germany’, which Chesterton opposed; for example, the 
National Insurance Act of 1911, which Belloc criticised vigorously in his work The Servile 
State (1912).159 English education, too – its development in the nineteenth century through 
various Acts of Parliament – was ‘inspired largely by the example’ of Germany, in which its 
‘governments and great employers thought it well worth their while to apply the grandest 
scale of organization and the minutest inquisition of detail to the instruction of the whole 
German race’.160 This, along with the Great War, exacerbated Chesterton’s overt animosity 
toward Germany. 
 
Nevertheless, it was also the Chesterbelloc’s consideration of Christendom and its Roman 
root that drove them to repudiate the Teutonic school of history. As Belloc wrote: 
 
Nothing is commoner, for instance (in English schools), than for boys to 
be taught that the pirate raids and settlements of the fifth century in this 
Island were the “coming of the English”, and the complicated history of 
Britain is simplified for them into a story of how certain bold seafaring 
pagans (full of all the virtues we ascribe to ourselves today) first 
devastated, then occupied, and at last, of their sole genius, developed a 
land which Roman civilization had proved inadequate to hold.161  
 
Belloc’s motivation, in such works as Europe and the Faith, was founded on the notion that 
‘no modern book in the English tongue [gave the Englishman] a conspectus of the past […] 
He is compelled to study violently hostile authorities, North German (or English copying 
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North German), whose knowledge is never that of the true and balanced European.’162 ‘The 
prime essential to be grasped in the story of England’, wrote Belloc, was ‘the Roman 
foundation’ of its society.163 As Chesterton wrote: ‘the important thing about France and 
England is not that they have Roman remains. They are Roman remains.’164 Britannia was, 
foremost in its history, a Roman province, continued Belloc:  
 
Our institutions, our laws, the instruments of our handicraft, our whole 
method of thought, our religion, our architecture, our alphabet, our 
political institutions, derive uninterruptedly from the day when the 
chaotic society of a half-barbaric island entered the fullness of Roman 
civilization.165  
 
Belloc’s A Shorter History of England ran in accordance with this assumption, accentuating 
the nation’s most vital developments, which, of course, stressed its Roman origins: firstly, 
the establishment of Roman rule in Britain; secondly, the re-establishment of civilization, 
in the wake of Rome’s fall, by the Catholic Church in the 7th and 8th centuries; and thirdly, 
the Norman Conquest, which ultimately settled the issue in the 11th century. Chesterton’s 
history was no different. Fundamentally, for Belloc, as well as Chesterton, ‘England begins 
as a province of the Roman Empire. From that origin did she develop. All our institutions, 
instruments, laws, building, and writing derive from the Roman civilization, of which we are 
still a department.’166 Eliot, too, would later make a similar claim, though he preferred the 
more inclusive term Christianity.  
 
Despite the undoubted energy and dedication of Chesterbelloc revisionism, there existed 
a subsequent notion that Chesterton and Belloc, however justified they might have been 
in redressing the balance between the Roman and the Teutonic, had argued their case in a 
way that was not likely to garner much sympathy. There was something altogether too 
swashbuckling about the Chesterbelloc – which even their fellow Catholics thought was a 
little too much at times. It might be argued that Chesterton’s and Belloc’s histories had 
swung too far in the opposite direction; to the extent that their narrative was an exclusively 
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Catholic conception of the past: ‘the Catholic alone is in possession of the traditions of 
Europe’, Belloc proclaimed.167 He continued:  
 
The Catholic notes not hypotheses but documents and facts; he sees the 
Parliaments arising not from some imaginary “Teutonic” root – a figment 
of the academies – but from the very real and present great monastic 
orders, in Spain, in Britain, in Gaul – never outside the old limits of 
Christendom.168  
 
‘To the Catholic reader of history (though he has no Catholic history to read)’, Belloc chided, 
‘there is no danger of the foolish bias against civilization which has haunted so many 
contemporary writers’. There is ‘no such thing as a Catholic “aspect” of European history’, 
Belloc asserted in 1920.169 ‘There is no more a Catholic “aspect” of European history’, he 
wrote, ‘than there is a man’s aspect of himself’.170 ‘The Church is Europe.’171 ‘The Faith is 
Europe and Europe is the Faith.’172 These assertions made by Belloc – not merely a 
historian’s hypothesis, but an avowed belief – was the fundamental refrain that informed 
his great work Europe and the Faith, and indeed much of his output as a historian.  
 
 
Dawson and Eliot 
  
The historian Dawson, a convert to Catholicism in 1914 – who, vitally, was to play an 
important role in the development of Eliot’s own conception of Europe as a Christian 
‘common culture’ – ‘preferred’ Belloc ‘as a poet than as a historian’, Dawson’s daughter 
Christina Scott wrote.173 ‘I have never been a Bellocite and my view of Western culture is 
quite different from “Europe is the Faith”’, Dawson commented in 1955.174 Dawson, it 
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seems, felt much more of an affinity toward Chesterton, however. As we have seen in 
chapter one, Dawson owed a debt to Chesterton and his poem The Ballad of the White 
Horse (1911), relating King Alfred’s great victory, on behalf of Christendom, against the 
heathen Danes. He acknowledged the poem’s influence in a letter to Chesterton 1932: it 
had ‘brought the breath of life to this period for me when I was fed up with Stubbs and 
Oman and the rest of them’.175 It was William Stubbs, in particular, who, as Burrow has 
written, had represented, much like Freeman and Green, the nineteenth century ‘patriotic 
and populist impulse to identify the nation and its institutions as the collective subject of 
English history, which made the new historiography of early medieval times an extension, 
filling out and democratising, of older Whig notions of continuity’.176 Although Dawson and 
the Chesterbelloc were, it may be argued, kindred spirits, Dawson’s approach to the writing 
of history would be different. 
 
Russell Sparkes writes that ‘whereas Belloc’s book [Europe and the Faith] was based on 
rhetoric and assertion, Dawson’s great works such as The Making of Europe’ were 
‘grounded in deep scholarship.’177 We should not, however, dismiss the influence of the 
Chesterbelloc. When Dawson wrote to Chesterton, in 1932, he also presented him with a 
copy of his own work The Making of Europe. It was, perhaps, the inclusion of this work, 
rather than the letter itself, which truly accredited to Chesterton the vital worth of his 
revisionist exertions earlier that century. It was not simply Chesterton’s efforts in the area 
of Dawson’s conception of ‘metahistory’, but also his defence and evocation of 
Christendom as a historic reality, which impressed itself upon Dawson. Indeed, it may be 
said that Dawson, to some degree, took up the mantle of the Chesterbelloc in the sense 
that he also championed the redemptive discourse of Christendom. In such works as The 
Making of Europe, he would spend much of his career developing what the Chesterbelloc 
had posited during, and particularly after, the First World War: that, in Dawson’s words, 
‘the ultimate foundation of our culture’ was not ‘the national state, but the European 
unity’.178 Insofar as the European unity could be said to exist, Dawson argued, it was not 
political, but spiritual, as we have seen; as he had also argued in his essay on William 
Langland’s Piers Plowman. Writing in 1952, in another important work, Understanding 
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Europe, Dawson claimed that it was Christendom – ‘the medieval conception of Europe as 
the commonwealth of Christian peoples’ – which was the living embodiment of a spiritual, 
rather than political, unity.179 For what ‘Christendom’ really stood for, and indeed once was, 
Dawson explained, was ‘a single society, consisting of a diversity of peoples and states, 
bound together by a network of mutual rights and obligations and founded on a common 
spiritual citizenship and a common moral and intellectual culture’.180           
 
What motivated Dawson in his forwarding of Christendom as a historic reality was the idea 
that it was a conception that demanded that ‘the peoples of Europe’ should ‘conduct their 
affairs like a civilized community, and not like a band of brigands, recognising that their 
rights are not conterminous with their powers and that their duties to one another are no 
less morally and legally binding than their duties to their citizens’.181 For, as he had written 
as early as 1929, in Progress & Religion, it was ‘the peculiar achievement of Western 
Christianity in the past’ to ‘co-exist with the national political units without either absorbing 
or being absorbed by them’.182 It was in this sense – or, in other words, Chesterton sense 
of ‘variation without antagonism’ – that Dawson believed that:  
 
[A] return to this tradition would once more make it possible to reconcile 
the existence of national independence and political freedom, which are 
an essential part of European life, with the wider unity of our civilization, 
and with that higher process of spiritual integration which is the true goal 
of human progress.183  
 
For there was no doubt in his mind that what Europe required in his own time was some 
manner of organising principle. The vital question, however, was whether that unity ought 
to be political or spiritual.  Dawson, of course, sided with the latter, as he stated in 1929, in 
Progress and Religion: 
 
The return to the Christian tradition would provide Europe with the 
necessary spiritual foundations for the social unification that it so 
                                                          
179 Dawson, Understanding Europe, 50. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Christopher Dawson, Progress & Religion: An Historical Inquiry (1929; Washington D. C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 192. 
183 Ibid. 
229 
 
urgently needs […] Europe has never possessed the natural unity of the 
other great cultures. It has owed its unity, and its very existence as a 
distinct civilization, to its membership of a common spiritual society. And 
perhaps that is the reason why it has never been able to be satisfied with 
a purely political unification. No doubt a giant supernational state would 
bring Europe relief from many of her practical problems, but it would also 
involve a sacrifice of many of the ideals that she has most prized. But this 
is not the only solution. It is possible that the ideal form of international 
unity for Europe is not a political one at all, but a spiritual one.184  
 
In 1948, as we have already seen, Eliot, in Notes towards the Definition of Culture, 
forwarded much the same view: 
 
No political and economic organisation, however much goodwill it 
commands, can supply what this culture unity gives. If we dissipate or 
throw away our common patrimony of culture, then all the organisation 
and planning of the most ingenious minds will not help us, or bring us 
closer together.185 
 
Eliot’s text here would fit very easily into Dawson’s work Progress and Religion. Indeed, this 
was the work which first brought Dawson to the attention of Eliot in 1929.186 And Eliot 
would go on to acknowledge, in Notes towards the Definition of Culture, the ‘particular 
debt’ he owed to Dawson.187   
 
Up until recently the importance of Dawson in the intellectual life of Eliot had not been 
emphasised. Dawson has passed most Eliot scholars by, even though Eliot once dubbed 
Dawson the most influential intellectual in England.188 Certainly, Dawson was very 
important to Eliot. Russell Kirk, for example, wrote in Eliot and His Age (1971) that of all the 
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‘social thinkers in his own time, none influenced Eliot more than Dawson’.189 For a long 
time, the weight that Kirk placed on the importance of Dawson as a formative influence on 
Eliot remained unexplored. For example, Peter Ackroyd’s T. S. Eliot (1984) and Lyndall 
Gordon’s The Imperfect Life of T. S. Eliot (1998), two major biographies, made no mention 
of Dawson at all. Neither did Louis Menand’s Discovering Modernism: T. S. Eliot and His 
Context (1988). Dawson’s absence from the scholarly literature on Eliot is decidedly odd. 
However, this glaring omission has to some extent been corrected. For example, Bradley J. 
Birzer, in the most recent biography on Dawson, in 2007, argued that ‘first and foremost in 
terms of Dawson’s significant influence’ was Eliot.190 More recently, Benjamin G. Lockerd, 
contributing to T. S. Eliot and Christian Tradition (2014), detailed how Dawson became 
Eliot’s ‘primary mentor on cultural issues’.191 Lockerd writes that ‘in Dawson’s work’, in 
particular, Eliot ‘found verification of his own thinking, along with an array of historical 
examples from all cultures and times’.192 What Dawson reinforced in Eliot’s mind, 
therefore, was indeed the view that ‘the ultimate foundation of our culture’ was not ‘the 
national state, but the European unity’. Fundamentally, this ‘unity’ was a community of 
thought, which translated itself into a common practice, transcending the racialism and 
petty nationalisms of the twentieth century in the manner of what Dawson dubbed a 
‘superculture’, or civilization; no mere abstraction, but ‘an objective historical reality’, 
which, as he made sure to emphasise, had for centuries expressed itself in ‘the old spiritual 
community of Western Christendom’.193 This very much chimes with Eliot’s estimation of 
Christianity as the vital common element in European culture. Just as much as Chesterton 
influenced Dawson, it appears that Dawson passed this influence on to Eliot. There is, then, 
a line of decent from Chesterton to Eliot, with Dawson acting as a sort of intermediary. It 
was, as we have seen, a fundamentally corroborative process. Moreover, with the rise of 
Nazism in the 1930s, the idea of a Christian common culture gained an added impetus. 
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Racialism 
 
In November 1932, at the Italian conference the Convegno Volta, a symposium hosted by 
Benito Mussolini in Rome, that year dedicated to the subject of ‘Europe’, Dawson 
presented a lecture to an audience of distinguished representatives from across the 
continent. His subject was ‘Interracial Cooperation as a Factor of European Culture’. 
Speaking to, amongst others, the then President of the Reichstag Hermann Goering, as well 
as Nazism’s foremost racial theorist Alfred Rosenberg, Dawson condemned ‘the fanaticism 
of the modern pan-racial theorists who subordinate civilization to skull measurements and 
who infuse an element of racial hatred into the political and economic rivalries of European 
peoples’.194 If one was to ‘subtract from German culture, for example, all the contributions 
made by men who were not of pure Nordic type, German culture’, he was sure, ‘would be 
incalculably impoverished’.195 Dawson was necessarily opposed to any such racial 
prejudice; particularly one such as Nazism, which advanced itself in the form of a politicised 
ideology. The notion of ‘variation without antagonism’ made particularly effective 
opponents of racialism out of Catholics such as Dawson, whose expansive vision of a 
comprehensive community of Christians constituted one of the most consistent, perceptive 
and vigorous of critiques of the constrictive theories of Rosenberg. 
 
The context in which Chesterton was writing was ‘ethic nationalism’, what has been termed 
one of the ‘main legacies’ of the Great War.196 And ‘in few countries was biological racism 
as central to the definition of the nation as it became in inter-war Germany’.197 And 
Chesterton was no less of a critic. Indeed, as his most recent biographer, Ian Ker, has 
written, ‘no one had more contempt for racial theories’ than Chesterton.198 He found the 
ascendency of racialism in Germany particularly worrying: ‘I think this wild worship of Race 
far worse than even the excessive concentration on the Nation.’199 Nationalism might ‘in 
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rational proportion help stability, and the recognition of traditional frontiers’.200 This, 
Chesterton believed, was ‘a patriotism quite compatible with a passionate personal 
humility’.201 ‘The patriot loves his country as a man loves a woman; but not as a man loves 
himself.’202 ‘The curse of race religion’, on the other hand, was that it made ‘each separate 
man the sacred image which he worships. His own bones are the sacred relics; his own 
blood is the blood of St. Januarius.’203 Hitler was ‘appealing to racial pride’.204 Racialism 
made ‘patriotism something altogether different from the enthusiasm for a flag or a charter 
or a shrine or an ideal commonwealth’.205 Germany was no longer ‘an abstraction but a 
breed’, wrote Chesterton.206 This made the ‘Hitlerite problem different, for instance, from 
the Fascist problem’.207 Nazism was essentially ‘anthropology gone mad’, Chesterton 
argued, since it meant ‘everlastingly looking for your own countrymen in other people’s 
countries’.208 Consequently, Chesterton warned, racialism was far more belligerent in its 
nature than patriotism:  
 
In short, if the patriot is more or less trained as a watchdog, he may 
remain inside the fence, even if he does not remain on the chain. But if 
the patriots are trained as a pack of hounds, to follow a scent blown upon 
any breeze, to go through all fences and across all fields, they are trained 
in a certain spirit which is quite certainly of some peril to their 
neighbours.209  
 
This was ‘the essence of Nazi Nationalism’, wrote Chesterton.210 It was ‘ordeal by blood; 
the blood-test’.211 Chesterton recognised the danger implicit in such an ideology, one that 
sought ‘to preserve the purity of a race in a continent where all races are impure’.212 Always, 
when Chesterton ruminated on this topic, especially in relation to Nazi Germany, it was the 
notion of a particular people being ‘chosen’ that so much troubled him. It was for this 
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reason that he even went so far as to claim that ‘Hitlerism is almost entirely of Jewish 
origin’.213 It was probably with a sense of mischief, as well as calculated aim, that he turned 
Nazism back on itself, writing that it was in Nazism that ‘German mysticism became more 
like Jewish mysticism […] thinking with intense imagination of the idea of a holy house or 
family, alone dedicated to heaven and therefore to triumph’.214 
 
[The] imperial idea of a Chosen Race, of a sacred seed that is, as the Kaiser 
said, the salt of the earth; of a people that is God’s favourite and guided 
by Him, in a sense in which He does not guide other and lesser peoples. 
And if anybody asks where anybody got that idea, there is only one 
possible or conceivable answer. He got it from the Jews.215 
 
The idea of ‘men separated and sealed and waiting for a unique destiny’ was a claim 
Chesterton rejected in the strongest terms, quite clearly.216 ‘Until we have utterly 
destroyed it’, he wrote, ‘we shall never restore Christendom’.217 Indeed, there was the 
sense here that nationalism had itself come to fill a vacuum vacated to it by religious faith. 
John Lukacs echoes this view, writing that ‘patriotism is not a substitute for a religious faith, 
whereas nationalism often is; it may fill the emotional – at least superficially spiritual – 
needs of people’.218  
 
In 1942, the year of the Wannsee Conference, when the ‘final solution’ to the Jewish 
problem was ultimately settled, Dawson, like Chesterton, noted in his work The Judgement 
of the Nations the exceptional case of the ‘incongruous fusion of racialist materialism and 
nationalist mysticism’, which was ‘the portentous phenomenon of National Socialism’.219  
 
Here the state is no longer regarded as the member of a society of nations 
but as existing solely to further the ends of the racial community which is 
the ultimate social reality. Between these ultimate units there is no 
community, for nature demands that each should keep rigidly within the 
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limits of its own life forms. Therefore the mingling of races and cultures 
is the supreme social crime. The purer the race, the higher the culture, 
and the final law of human progress is to be found in the victorious 
expansion of the higher types and the progressive elimination of the 
lower races.220  
 
The Old Western vision of Europe was, of course, a far more inclusive expanse than 
Rosenberg’s. The former Professor of History at the European University Institute in 
Florence Luisa Passerini, although critical of much of Dawson’s and Belloc’s political 
thinking,221 conceded that ‘the value of a Catholic ideology for European unity cannot be 
denied insofar as it is potentially capable of tempering nationalisms and reaching some sort 
of harmony between them’.222 Passerini even went so far as to admit that ‘it is highly 
regrettable that the Catholic idea of Europe was not used more against Fascism and Nazism, 
since it actually had such potential’.223  
 
 
Christendom rather than Internationalism 
 
Eliot also sought a solution to the forces that had engendered Nazi Germany; a regime so 
intolerant that it felt ‘impelled to stamp out, or to remould, every culture surrounding it’ – 
as Chesterton also warned it might.224 As we have seen displayed throughout this chapter, 
the Old Western ethic believed that the solution to such an intolerance as Nazism was ‘the 
medieval conception of Europe as the commonwealth of Christian peoples’. The two world 
wars, in particular, had demonstrated, they believed, the utility of Christendom as a form 
of cultural loyalty. In this sense, too, they opposed internationalism in its institutional form, 
which they came to see as just as undesirable as Nazism. Dawson explained this opposition 
as early as 1932: that though there was of course ‘no lack of thinkers who realise[d] the 
dangers [of nationalism]’, most, he claimed, were as ‘oblivious of the European tradition as 
their opponents’.225 Accordingly, the opponents of nationalism had misguidedly placed 
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‘their faith in an abstract internationalism which has no historic foundation’, which in turn 
provoked ‘a fresh outburst of nationalist sentiment’.226 Nationalism and internationalism 
provoked each other onto further extremes, he argued. Something else was required. Not 
another ‘ism’, abstract and modern, but, instead, a revival. Christendom – ‘variation 
without antagonism’ – might cure the nationalist of his own sense of exceptionalism by 
reminding him of a far more expansive, and therefore more inclusive, exceptionalism in 
history. Internationalism was not the answer either because, it was argued, it was 
superficial and unable to command the emotional and cultural loyalties of the European 
peoples.  
 
Chesterton, commenting a year later, in 1933, in The Illustrated London News, spoke from 
the same position as Dawson, asserting that ultimately only ‘a religion might really unite 
nations’.227 He was just as sceptical as Dawson was of internationalism. ‘Internationalism’, 
Chesterton wrote, was ‘not a religion’, but ‘an “ism”; and an “ism” is never a religion. It is 
an abstraction without being an absolute.’228 A nation, on the other hand, though it was 
not a religion, was ‘a thing’.229 It might ‘be a bad thing’, but at least it was ‘a thing and not 
a theory’.230 
 
I know exactly what I mean when I say that I am an Englishman and not a 
Frenchman […] I do not know for certain what other people mean when 
they say that I am subject to the League of Nations, or am a party to a 
Pact made up by politicians in a series of Swiss hotels. In the same way, I 
do not know what other people mean when they say I am descended 
from Anthropoid Apes or Anglo-Saxons or Aryans, as Mr. Hitler would say. 
I do not know what they mean in the sense that I know what being an 
Englishman means.231   
 
The nation was the card that had been handed to them by history. It was all that societies 
had to work with, Chesterton thought. Of course, as they knew all too well, the nation had 
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its dangers. What was required, then, was some manner of mitigating force to prevaricate 
upon such excesses as racialism.  
 
It should be noted that Eliot’s work Notes towards the Definition of Culture also thought 
‘the ideal of a world state’ a ‘mistake’, since what it really entailed, he argued, was ‘one 
uniform world culture’.232 And ‘a world culture which was simply a uniform culture would 
be no culture at all’, he argued.233 Eliot thought it ‘fantastic to hold that the supreme duty 
of every individual should be towards a Super-State’.234 This paralleled Dawson’s own view. 
It is also significant that Eliot employed some of his strongest language to denounce such a 
conception of a ‘world culture’, writing that it would lead to ‘a humanity de-humanised. It 
would be a nightmare.’235 Eliot even went as far to suggest that such ‘world-planners’, 
though they were ‘serious and humane’, might ‘be as grave a menace to culture as those 
who practise more violent methods’.236 As we can see, Eliot’s was very much informed by 
the Old Western ethic that rejected the agency of state power, which he held to be not 
simply the province of nationalism or fascism, but potentially internationalism too.  
 
Eliot’s response to the twentieth century, and particularly his answer to nationalism, was 
typically Old Western. It also related so much to himself: to propose that the peoples of 
Europe treat their neighbours in much the same manner as he lived his religion. 
Significantly, Eliot, a self-professed ‘Anglo-Catholic’, was the living embodiment of the ‘dual 
allegiance, to the State and to the Church’, which he believed was so ‘essential to the idea 
of a Christian society’.237 As he wrote in The Idea of a Christian Society (1939), any national 
church that was not ‘part of the whole’ had no claim upon him.238 The conception of a 
‘Universal Church’, in which ‘the allegiance of the individual to his own Church’ was 
‘secondary’, was vital to Eliot.239 In this sense, as an Anglican, Eliot had reconciled 
Englishness with Catholicism. 
 
Eliot had, however, suffered a defeat, in the premature end of his pre-war publication The 
Criterion, which he had set up, he recounted in 1948, in ‘the assumption that there existed 
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an international fraternity of men of letters, within Europe: a bond which did not replace, 
but was perfectly compatible with national loyalties, and differences of political 
philosophy’.240 Paul Robichaud, in T. S. Eliot and Christian Tradition, has already gone into 
some detail about how ‘Eliot intended The Criterion to function as a bulwark against the 
divisions created by the various European nationalisms’.241 It ‘failed’, Eliot admitted; the 
‘mental frontiers of Europe’ proved to be too much of an obstacle.242 Nevertheless, Eliot’s 
view had not changed. And in conclusion, in 1948, he articulated a view that embodied a 
spirit that may be termed Old Western, in terms of its ‘appeal […] to the men of letters of 
Europe, who have a special responsibility for the preservation and transmission of our 
common culture’: 
 
We may hold very different political views: our common responsibility is 
to preserve our common culture uncontaminated by political influences. 
It is not a question of sentiment: it does not matter so much whether we 
like each other, or praise each other’s writing. What matters is that we 
should recognise our relationship and mutual dependence upon each 
other […] [and] we can at least try to save something of those goods of 
which we are the common trustees: the legacy of Greece, Rome and 
Israel, and the legacy of Europe throughout the last 2,000 years. In a 
world which has seen such material devastation as ours, these spiritual 
possessions are also in imminent peril.243  
  
 
An Attempt at Reconciliation  
 
‘Belloc[’s] “Europe and the Faith” my foot’, Waugh wrote in 1952.244 Like Dawson, he did 
not subscribe to Belloc’s view that ‘Europe is the Faith’. He could, however, understand 
why Belloc had said it, as he explained in 1937. ‘In natural revulsion from the exuberant 
and unscrupulous liberal historians of the last century’, Waugh wrote, it had ‘lately become 
fashionable to see the age of Elizabeth as a sombre and threatening time in English history: 
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the old Queen, obscene, unprincipled and superstitious […] [and] a dispossessed and 
oppressed peasantry helpless under the upstart landowners’.245 It was in ‘such in broad 
outlines’, promulgated by, amongst others, ‘Mr Hilaire Belloc’, that ‘the average 
Englishman [had been] educated during the last twenty years’.246 ‘No doubt there is more 
truth in it’, he wrote.247 Waugh did believe in Christendom. In a 1938 review, of Henry 
Romilly Fedden’s work Suicide: A Social and Historical Study (1938), which argued how 
‘abruptly’ the pagan conception of an ‘honourable’ suicide ceased ‘with the triumph of 
Christianity’, Waugh mused that ‘if one is ever tempted to suspect that the revived 
conception of “Christendom” is a myth and a controversial device of Mr Hilaire Belloc’s’ 
then one could not ‘find a more reassuring’ work than Fedden’s, which went some way, he 
believed, to confirm it as a reality.248 Christendom ‘needed emphasizing’, Waugh conceded. 
However, he also believed that ‘now the time has come for more sober reflection’.249 As I 
have argued in this chapter, Dawson and Eliot, but particularly Dawson, embodied that 
‘sober reflection’.  
 
Waugh wrote as early as 1930, in the Daily Express, that it seemed to him ‘that in the 
present phase of European history the essential issue’ was ‘no longer between Catholicism, 
on one side, and Protestantism, on the other, but between Christianity and Chaos’.250 There 
was certainly the view that the outside world – beyond Chesterton’s and Belloc’s constant 
replaying of the battles of the Reformation – was becoming increasingly hostile. Catholics 
and Protestants might quite conceivably have to unite in order to in some manner combat 
modernity in its various forms. If Protestants were, indeed, to reconcile themselves with 
Catholics then it was not necessarily going to be achieved through the brash methods 
employed by the Chesterbelloc, As Speaight wrote, it was not ‘to his co-religionists that 
Belloc addressed himself’, although he ‘had more effect among Catholics than among 
Protestants’.251 This was not a criticism, in that ‘no one’, Speaight argued, ‘did more to give 
the English Catholics confidence in themselves and to make them feel part of a European 
tradition’.252 And we might say, too, that Chesterton did this for Dawson – and Dawson, 
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importantly, for Eliot. However, Belloc had less, if any, of an effect on ‘his Protestant fellow 
countrymen’, it is claimed.253 He was, Speaight wrote, ‘needlessly provocative’.254 In 
contrast, however, it was an aspect never lost on Dawson that an ‘Iron Curtain’ had, for 
centuries, made strangers of the common peoples of Western Europe, dividing them 
‘between two worlds – Catholic and Protestant – each possessing its own cultural 
development’.255 And ‘of all divisions between Christians’, he believed, it was ‘that between 
Catholics and Protestants’ which was ‘the deepest and the most pregnant in its historical 
consequences’.256 And in this sense, Dawson was ‘as an historian […] convinced’ that ‘the 
chief obstacle to Christian unity’ was ‘cultural rather than theological’.257  
 
Although Dawson agreed with the Chesterbelloc in regards to the ‘evil’ of the Reformation, 
he also thought, as Waugh did, that, for the sake of combatting modernity, Catholics, in 
particular, should put aside the trauma of the Reformation. Certainly, Dawson and Eliot 
both went some way to achieving this on a personal level; and were, as a result, arguably 
more ecumenical in their reach than either Chesterton or Belloc. Dawson, for example, 
became the vice-president of Cardinal Arthur Hinsley’s ecumenical movement ‘Sword of 
the Spirit’, founded in 1940 in order to oppose totalitarianism. And as Edward Norman has 
noted, Catholics were ‘by the middle of the twentieth century an accepted part of the 
English religious pluralism’.258 Indeed, as early as the 1920s there was ‘the revival of the 
idea of some sort of reunion of the Catholic and Anglican Churches’.259 And it is a vital point 
to grasp, too, that Eliot’s Notes towards the Definition of Culture is a document very much 
unencumbered by the heavy historical burden of the Reformation. Indeed, Eliot wrote that 
‘we must acknowledge that many of the most remarkable achievements of culture have 
been made since the sixteenth century, in conditions of disunity’.260 The Chesterbelloc was 
largely incapable of making such a concession as this. For them, Protestantism was 
necessarily and wholly bad – and every Christian achievement a Catholic triumph. We see 
this, for example, in Chesterton’s treatment of Thomas Cranmer’s Book of Common Prayer, 
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‘the masterpiece of Protestantism’, its ‘one positive possession and attraction’, Chesterton 
wrote, and which, therefore, presented him with something of a problem. However, he 
solved this ostensible fix by claiming that, far from it being ‘the first Protestant book’, it was 
actually ‘the last Catholic book’: Catholic because it was a ‘moving’ expression of ‘things 
which Protestants have long left off saying; and which only Catholics still say’.261 Ultimately, 
Chesterton’s Cranmer was not so much a good Protestant as he was a naughty Catholic.  
 
Eliot, conversely, welcomed Protestantism. Indeed, he argued that ‘one needs the 
enemy’.262 And it worked both ways:  
 
The life of Protestantism depends upon the survival of that against which 
it protests; and just as the culture of Protestant dissent would perish of 
inanition without the persistence of Anglican culture, so the maintenance 
of English culture is contingent upon the health of the culture of Latin 
Europe, and upon continuing to draw sustenance from that Latin 
culture.263 
 
This applied to nations too:  
 
So, within limits, the friction, not only between individuals but between 
groups, seems to me quite necessary for civilization. The universality of 
irritation is the best assurance of peace. A country within which the 
divisions have gone too far is a danger to itself: a country which is too 
well united – whether by nature or by device, by honest purpose or by 
fraud and oppression – is a menace to others.264 
 
Chesterton once claimed that what he found ‘hardest to forgive’ about the Reformation 
was that ‘it was a Christian mutiny during a Moslem invasion’.265 This feeling found its way 
into one of his most expressive works, the poem Lepanto (1912), in which he recounted in 
verse the great naval battle of the same name, fought in 1571, on the Gulf of Patras in the 
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Ionian Sea, where the Holy League, an alliance of Catholic maritime strength under the 
command of John of Austria, inflicted a notable defeat on the Ottoman Empire, securing 
Christian jurisdiction of the Mediterranean and checking the westward expansion of Islam 
into Europe.266 
 
White founts falling in the courts of the sun,  
And the Soldan of Byzantium is smiling as they run;  
There is laughter like the fountains in that face of all men feared,  
It stirs the forest darkness, the darkness of his beard,  
It curls the blood-red crescent, the crescent of his lips,  
For the inmost sea of all the earth is shaken with his ships.  
They have dared the white republics up the capes of Italy,  
They have dashed the Adriatic round the Lion of the Sea,  
And the Pope has cast his arms abroad for agony and loss,  
And called the kings of Christendom for swords about the Cross,  
The cold queen of England is looking in the glass;  
The shadow of the Valois is yawning at the Mass;  
From evening isles fantastical rings faint the Spanish gun,  
And the Lord upon the Golden Horn is laughing in the sun.  
 
Dim drums throbbing, in the hills half heard,  
Where only on a nameless throne a crownless prince has stirred,  
Where, risen from a doubtful seat and half attainted stall,  
The last knight of Europe takes weapons from the wall,  
The last and lingering troubadour to whom the bird has sung,  
That once went singing southward when all the world was young,  
In that enormous silence, tiny and unafraid,  
Comes up along a winding road the noise of the Crusade.  
Strong gongs groaning as the guns boom far,  
Don John of Austria is going to the war.267 
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Europe had, this time, in 1571, been saved; no thanks, however, to ‘the cold Queen of 
England’ and ‘the Valois […] yawning at the Mass’.268 Here, of course, Chesterton made sure 
to note the Protestant North’s non-participation in a battle upon which the fate of 
Christendom arguably depended. For, ‘full of tangled things and texts and aching eyes’, the 
shattering paroxysm of the Protestant Reformation had, of course, ensured that no English 
ship sailed as part of the Holy League.269 This was what Chesterton found so unforgivable. 
‘While it lasted’, he wrote elsewhere, ‘Christendom was not only one nation but more like 
one city – and a besieged city’, fighting for its life against the external threat of Islam. By 
1571, however, it had been left almost entirely to the ‘Cross and Castle’ and the ‘plumèd 
lions […] of St. Mark’ to resist the advancing shadow of the Ottoman ‘crescent’.270 While 
the importance Chesterton invests in the battle is largely correct, as well as the history as 
a whole, the poem nevertheless registers a bitterness that to some degree characterised 
the Chesterbelloc’s approach to the idea of Christendom, a bitterness that Chesterton and 
Belloc never really overcame.  
 
Nevertheless, we should also note that Lepanto did, in some sense, reflect the notion that 
Europe, in particular, was facing another Lepanto. The adversary was not, however, as it 
was in Don John of Austria’s time, ‘Mahound’ and ‘the crescent of his cruel ships’, but the 
internal threat of nationalism and racialism – and later the external threat of the Soviet 
Union.271 What was required, once again, then, was yet another assembled ‘Christian’ 
citizenry, united by the ‘common culture’ that, as the Old Western ethic argued, could only 
be provided by a spiritual unity.  
 
 
Chapter Four Conclusion  
 
The difference between the Chesterbelloc and Dawson, with Eliot, was that the former duo 
had to face the problem of emphasising Christendom in the first place. As Speaight writes, 
however, ‘because so many people underestimated what the Faith had done for Europe, 
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Belloc knocked them on the head to bring them to a juster appreciation of the truth. It is 
possible that he knocked them too hard.’272 Dawson, however, it may be said, benefited 
from this, in that he could afford to pull his punches. This allowed for a far more ecumenical 
spirit to encompass a second generation of Old Western Men, evident in Eliot’s Old 
Western plea to his own readership. In this sense, too, their ecumenicism might be said to 
have anticipated the later spirit of Vatican II in the 1960s. 
 
Massimo Faggioli has written that ‘understanding the rift between Augustinianism and 
Thomism is fundamental to understanding the debate about Vatican II and the resurfacing 
of a “theological fault line”’.273 This rift is arguably defined by Augustinianism, a pessimistic 
view of the world, opposing a Thomist view that seeks a fuller, and essentially optimistic, 
engagement with the immanent. This is particularly relevant when we examine Gaudium 
et spes (1965), the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. If this key 
Vatican constitution might be said to be Thomist, admitting ‘new ways to truth’, the Old 
Western Men themselves parallel this ethic.274 The assertion, contained within Gaudium et 
spes, that ‘theological enquiry should aim at deeper knowledge of revealed truth without 
losing touch with its own time’, does indeed mirror the approach of this thesis’s key 
characters.275  
 
As we have seen with the example of the Chelsea Group, the Old Western ethic sought a 
broader engagement with the modern world; one that was not strictly Catholic or even 
Christian. The same might be said for the Catholic Church itself in the 1960s, as Joseph 
Pearce writes: ‘Vatican II had nothing to do with surrendering to modernity. On the 
contrary, it had everything to do with enabling the Church to engage modernity, to respond 
to it, to react to it.’276 And as Christina Scott tells us, Christopher Dawson ‘welcomed the 
Second Vatican Council with all its promise of spiritual and cultural renewal for which he 
had spent his whole life working’.277 We should also note, however, that Dawson, Tolkien 
and Waugh, who all lived to see the changes brought about by the Council, also lamented 
the changes to the Latin Mass, including the shift toward a vernacular form: ‘I hate the 
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changes in the liturgy and even the translations are so bad’, Dawson remarked.278 As David 
Torevell has written, the ‘potential of ritualised liturgy […] to reaffirm the values and beliefs 
on which a religious community is based’ was ‘forgotten’ or ‘underplayed’ in the debates 
surrounding Vatican II.279 It should not surprise us, therefore, that such Old Western Men, 
who so much emphasised the supernatural in their works, should have revolted against 
changes to the liturgy that had previously been ‘characterised’ by a sense of ‘transcendence 
and mystery’.280 Although they were willing to engage with the world, they were also 
deeply concerned by what exactly this engagement would entail.  
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Closing Observations 
 
Jeffrey Herf has written that ‘dichotomies - tradition or modernity, progress or reaction, 
community or society, rationalization or charisma - predominate in sociological theories of 
the development of European modernity’.1 Andreas Huyssen’s ‘Great Divide’, for example, 
was forwarded as ‘the kind of discourse which insists on the categorical distinction between 
high art and mass culture’.2 This division has come to categorise the ‘fault lines between 
modernism and postmodernism’, for example.3 There is, of course, Émile Durkheim’s noted 
dichotomy ‘between the sacred and the profane […] the dichotomy between the social and 
the individual’.4 Durkheim defined the profane as ‘sensations coming from the physical 
world’ while the sacred entailed a ‘collectivity’ of men in ‘communion’ with one another.5 
However, the essential dichotomy that this thesis has sought to underline lies elsewhere in 
terms of a separation between an immediate, and not necessarily communal, belief in 
spiritual and imaginative value – though not always in terms of Durkheim’s sacred 
‘collectvity’ – and an opposing belief in material reality. This is not an entirely novel 
concept; nor is the notion of a ‘culture war’. 
 
James Davison Hunter’s work Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (1991) famously 
posited the idea that, at the time of writing, America was ‘in the midst of a culture war’.6 
Hunter defined this ‘very simply as political and social hostility rooted in different systems 
of moral understanding’.7 In this sense, this ‘division’ was ‘certainly “religious”’ – a telling 
choice of term – though it had ‘unmistakably political consequences too’.8 Hunter 
essentially forwarded the two sides of his division as ‘orthodox and progressive’: the former 
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meaning ‘the commitment on the part of adherents to an external, definable, and 
transcendent authority’; the latter entailing ‘moral authority […] defined by the spirit of the 
modern age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism’.9 He added that it almost went 
‘without saying that those who embrace the orthodox impulse are almost always cultural 
conservatives’.10 
 
The reason why it is worth noting Hunter’s notion of cultural conflict here is that this thesis 
contends that British intellectual and artistic culture underwent its own war, along similar 
lines, between ‘orthodox and progressive’ modes of thought, in the early to mid-twentieth 
century. As Hunter writes, ‘our difficulty in coming to terms with the idea of such a conflict 
[…] arises largely from the absence of conceptual categories or analytical tools for 
understanding cultural conflict’.11 Categories are, indeed, indispensable. In this sense, too, 
the Old Western Men may be taken to be synonymous with Hunter’s own conception of an 
‘orthodox’ vision of the world. As Hunter writes, the ‘practical’ effect of the ‘Reformation’ 
is ‘both politically and culturally defunct’, in the sense that the old antagonism between 
Protestants and Catholics is now ‘virtually irrelevant’.12 His division – between a belief in a 
‘transcendent authority’ or otherwise – ‘is so deep that it cuts across the old lines of 
conflict’.13 The new ‘politically relevant world-historical event’ that has now come to define 
this stated division is, he contends, ‘the secular Enlightenment of the eighteenth-century 
and its philosophical aftermath’.14  
 
In The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that Have Shaped Our World 
View (1991), Richard Tarnas also noted ‘a complex bifurcation of the Western outlook’.15 
On one side of his divide is ‘the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment’, which ‘stressed 
rationality, empirical science, and a sceptical secularism’.16 On the other side is 
Romanticism, perceiving nature as ‘a live vessel of spirit, a translucent source of mystery 
and revelation’, valuing ‘man rather for his imaginative and spiritual aspirations, his 
emotional depths, his artistic creativity and powers of individual self-expression and self-
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creation’.17 Hunter and Tarnas share similar categories, then: a vital divide between a belief 
in spiritual principles and a belief in the positivist ideals of the Enlightenment. Moreover, 
Tarnas writes that ‘God was rediscovered in Romanticism […] [but] not the God of 
orthodoxy’, however, but ‘a divinity more ineffably mysterious’.18 This thesis has also 
touched upon a similar recovery, but one that was more ‘consciously Christian’, though not 
always Roman Catholic. Whatever the shift in emphasis, however, it may be said that I have 
charted one side of a conflict of visions that at once precedes and succeeds the Old Western 
Men, in the form of Tarnas’s Romantics and Hunter’s ‘orthodox’ vision.   
 
Apart from sharing a particular vision of the world synonymous with Romanticism, we may 
also view the Old Western Men as a twentieth century equivalent of John Holloway’s 
conception of the ‘sage’, delineated in his 1953 work The Victorian Sage: Studies in 
Argument. Here Holloway advanced the notion of a writer whose ‘peculiar gift’ is ‘that of 
seeing more widely or more deeply into life’, perceiving ‘it with a more searching, or 
perhaps a more subtle and sensitive gaze’.19 This was a repudiation of empiricism and the 
legacy of the Enlightenment; the sage placing a far greater emphasis on ‘imagination rather 
than logic’.20 This also entailed ‘seeing old things in a new way’.21 This chimes with George 
P. Landow’s work Elegant Jeremiahs: The Sage from Carlyle to Mailer (1986), which 
forwards a key notion that to a large degree defines the persons featured in this thesis: 
 
Whereas the pronouncements of traditional wisdom literature always 
take as their point of departure the assumption that they embody the 
accepted, received wisdom of an entire society, the pronouncements of 
the biblical prophet and Victorian sage begin with the assumption that, 
however traditional their messages may once have been, they are now 
forgotten or actively opposed by society.22 
 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 367. 
18 Ibid., 373. 
19 John Holloway, The Victorian Sage: Studies in Argument (London: Macmillan & Co, Ltd, 1953), 
293, 296. 
20 Ibid., 4. 
21 Ibid., 9. 
22 George P. Landow, Elegant Jeremiahs: The Sage from Carlyle to Mailer (1986; Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2015), 23. 
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Accordingly, the sage may be said to oppose what E. H. Carr once described as ‘the 
nineteenth-century fetishism of facts’.23 In this regard, C. T. McIntire has written, the 
historian Herbert Butterfield emphasised, in the twentieth century, the ‘inter-suffusion of 
religion and history’ in a way that ‘incited people to an insurgent type of Christianity’.24 In 
other words, Butterfield ‘transvalued the notion of dissent into an ethic of living in tension 
with any established system’.25 Indeed, the type of intellectual or artist that this thesis has 
dealt with is the sort who, as McIntire explains, ‘wished for his thought to unsettle the 
thinking of others’.26 Moreover, opposing mere fact, in favour of asserting the importance 
of a sense of spirit, including the imagination, in epistemology, is what defined the process 
of ‘dissent’ that this work has underscored as a key discourse in the twentieth century; one 
that should not simply be defined as belonging to a Catholic literary revival, but instead be 
acknowledged as a broader countercultural impulse at work in the modern world. 
However, it may be said that the role of the sage, in the twentieth century at least, was a 
largely Catholic or ‘Thomist’ domain, because it arguably emphasised, more than any other 
theological tradition, the sacramental possibility of the ‘More-Than-World’ within the 
world. 
 
Butterfield has not featured heavily in this thesis, though he may be considered part of the 
same intellectual grouping of the Old Western Men that includes the historian Christopher 
Dawson, who, as Joseph T. Stuart has identified, forwarded a ‘critique of the empirical 
tradition and its exclusive devotion to “facts”’.27 Dawson, he writes, ‘highlighted the value 
of critical research methods but also the necessity of intuition, imagination, and what he 
called “universal vision” in comprehending and communicating history’.28 The same may 
be said of G. K. Chesterton, whose ‘mode of thought’, Joseph McCleary writes, ‘was highly 
dependent on imagination and intuition’.29 Again, like Butterfield, Chesterton’s manner of 
thought is seemingly linked to his ‘inclination to conform to an external reality’.30 This 
                                                          
23 E. H. Carr, and R. W. Davies, ed., What is History? Second Edition (1961; London: Penguin Books, 
1990), 19. 
24 C. T. McIntire, Herbert Butterfield: Historian as Dissenter (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004), 403, 414. 
25 Ibid., xv. 
26 Ibid., 412. 
27 Joseph T. Stuart, ‘Christopher Dawson in Context: A Study in British Intellectual History between 
the World Wars’ (Ph.D thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2009), 203. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Joseph McCleary, The Historical Imagination of G.K. Chesterton: Locality, Patriotism, and 
Nationalism (2009; Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 2. 
30 Ibid., 4. 
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imaginative ethic can be applied to the poet Roy Campbell, of course, who also very much 
conformed to this outlook or theory of knowledge; as his friend Russell Kirk, the noted 
American conservative intellectual, observed: ‘Roy’s was the true poet’s awareness that 
high truth is symbolic, rather than matter of fact. The poet’s interpretation of reality is 
elastic.’31 
 
Returning to Holloway’s definition of the sage, we should also note that the sage will often 
articulate his vision of truth ‘through obscurity or through suggestive hints cryptically 
worded’.32 I would like to extend this view to incorporate the broader oeuvre of a writer 
such as Chesterton, who, as Ian Ker has argued, ‘should be seen as the obvious successor 
to Newman, and indeed as a successor to the other great Victorian “sages”’.33 For example, 
Roy Hattersley recently dubbed Chesterton ‘the apostle of magnificent nonsense’.34 
Although Hattersley respects and admires Chesterton, he also writes that, ‘like so many 
Catholic intellectuals, he looked on the Middle Ages with a sentimental reverence that was 
unrelated to the facts’.35 I would like to suggest, as part of this conclusion, that Chesterton’s 
perceived failure to adequately assess the negative aspects of the Middles Ages was really 
part of a broader attempt convey an impression of it most able to ‘unsettle’ his audience, 
as part of Michael Alexander’s stated ‘Edwardian relaunch’ of medievalism, allowing them 
to see it in a ‘new way’. This, I think, might also be applied to Chesterton’s own life, as well 
as others, which was lived in such a way as to give that vision a foundation in reality; being 
the ‘living exposition of theory in practice and of knowledge carried into action’ that Hans 
Urs von Balthasar saw as belonging to ‘the history of theology up to the time of the great 
Scholastics’.36 Chesterton was always keen to underline the sheer jollity of the Middle Ages, 
for example, which he replicated himself, as we have seen. In his ‘nonsense’ we may 
perceive a consistency which is itself telling. Above all, Chesterton and his type forward a 
conception, obscure or otherwise, affirming principles of spirit and imaginative vision.  
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The historian Eric Hobsbawm famously defined the years ‘from 1914 to the aftermath of 
the Second World War’ as ‘an Age of Catastrophe’, one that ‘stumbled from one calamity 
to another’, as ‘the great edifice of nineteenth century civilization crumpled in the flames 
of world war’.37 The Great War, in particular, has been characterised elsewhere as ‘the 
traumatic fall of the “Long Nineteenth Century”’, one that signalled ‘a crucial turn in 
intellectual history’.38 In this sense, this thesis has focused on a particular coming to terms 
with the ‘new order [that] emerged from the Great War’.39 Moreover, as Adam Tooze 
writes, in The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order, 1916-1931 (2014), 
‘the question of the derailment of liberalism is the classic question of interwar 
historiography’.40 Mark Mazower’s Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (1998) also 
follows this line of thought.41 Although Martin Pugh believes that ‘the 1920s and 1930s 
represented a calm interlude between the violent crime of the Victorian era and trends 
since the Second World War, the intellectual context that I have concentrated on is 
essentially one of angst, disorder and cultural conflict.42 Indeed, Richard Overy has 
described the interwar years, in his work The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of 
Civilization, 1919-1939 (2009), as a period underscored by ‘the constant theme of 
civilization in crisis’.43 ‘Pessimism was highly contagious’, he writes.44 Indeed, what 
emerged, as result, was a ‘population of Cassandras and Jeremiahs who helped to construct 
the popular image of the inter-war years as an age of anxiety, doubt or fear’.45 This, Overy 
adds, ‘is a narrative that historians have in general neglected’46 –  although  Lucy McDiarmid 
has also described the thirties, in Saving Civilization: Yeats, Eliot, and Auden Between the 
Wars (1984), as a time ‘when “civilization” became a polemical term’.47 This thesis has, I 
think, served to redress Overy’s stated ‘neglect’. 
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In To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949 (2015), the historian Ian Kershaw also noted that, 
in the years following the First World War, the sense amongst intellectuals ‘of civilization 
in crisis was pervasive’.48 This parallels the view of Overy and McDiarmid. At the centre of 
this perception, Kershaw argues, was an ‘intellectual reaction’ that was fundamentally 
‘polarized’ and defined by ‘a move to the Left, towards some variant of Marxism’, while ‘a 
minority […] looked to the fascist Right’.49 Kershaw goes on to assert that the rise of fascism 
was the reason why it became ‘axiomatic for many intellectuals to make the only choice 
they felt was open to them: to support Soviet-backed communism, the most fervently 
committed force of anti-fascism’.50 This purported dichotomy is a common conception. 
Enzo Traverso, for instance, writes of ‘two opposed camps’, post-1918 – ‘on the one hand, 
pacifism; on the other hand, nationalism’ – which, after 1933, took ‘the form of an 
irreducible conflict between fascism and antifascism. The intellectuals had to choose 
between them, becoming actors of an ideological and political war.’51 But as this thesis has 
shown, this supposed choice between two opposed sides has served to obscure a third 
alternative that was neither fascist nor Marxist. 
 
In 2002, the writer Christopher Hitchens argued that ‘the sheer hatred […] still to be found 
in some quarters’ for George Orwell was because ‘he discredited the excuse of “historical 
context” and the shady alibi that there was, in the circumstances, nothing else that people 
could have done’.52 This might, to some degree, also explain Kershaw’s dismissal of Evelyn 
Waugh’s rejection of politics, which Kershaw deems ‘eccentric’ and ‘remote from the 
preoccupation with crisis of most European intellectuals’.53 But Waugh was very much 
concerned with the supposed crisis of civilization. Moreover, his refutation of worldly 
politics, his own response to modernity, was, as we have seen, far from ‘eccentric’ insofar 
as it was part of a broader mode of religious response to modern secularity. And although 
Kershaw acknowledges the work of Hannah Arendt, particularly The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1951), as ‘a striking transition in the post-war intellectual climate’, when 
fascism and Marxism ‘were seen as separate manifestations of essentially the same 
phenomenon’, we have also seen how this ‘new way’ actually pre-dated the Second World 
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War, in the writings of Dawson, for instance; someone who does not follow Kershaw’s 
template of an intellectual seeking ‘spiritual renewal’ through ‘national rebirth’, which, it 
should be noted, he believes accounted ‘in good measure for fascism’s appeal to 
intellectuals’.54 In other words, it appears that the neglect of intellectuals who espoused a 
decidedly religious outlook has led to a considerable blind spot on the part of historians 
today. This has itself resulted in a false picture of the cultural context of the interwar period 
in particular.    
 
 
Coda 
 
In escaping materialism in favour of a sense of spirit that did not wholly repudiate the world 
of matter, an escape that affirmed a spiritual absolute that gave meaning to the world of 
experience, the Old Western Men rediscovered a world that they believed had been lost 
around the time of the Reformation or the Enlightenment. Viewing modern problems 
through an apparently medieval lens opened up new avenues of thought that had 
previously been closed to them. The chapters in this thesis acknowledge a number of such 
considerations from an ‘Old Western’ perspective that, I think, represented a vast liberation 
of thought for a secular age that had been shackled, as it were, as a consequence of the 
Cartesian legacy and the rise of rationalism and Newtonian mechanics. In chapter one, we 
have seen the extent to which the role of the imagination was emphasised, not only in 
terms of conceiving of a supernatural universe, but also its use for historians such as 
Dawson, for example, and a conception of ‘metahistory’. In chapter two, we examined how 
a conception of the ‘More-Than-World’ within the world found expression in literary, 
artistic and musical representations of landscape, as well as in a sense of peril, the ‘Perilous 
Realm’, in terms of a world that was governed by the supernatural and all its ramifications, 
including M. R. James’s vengeful demons that took on a tellingly real, rather than ghostly, 
aspect. In chapter three, we have seen how the Old Western Men went beyond the fact of 
man’s biology and saw themselves as spirits as well, capable of transcending materiality by 
moving toward a faith in the eternal, which also took on a conception of sainthood that 
accentuated the role of sanctity and divine indifference to worldly catastrophe. In chapter 
four, finally, we saw how such intellectuals such as Dawson, Chesterton and T. S. Eliot 
approached the subject of Europe, not in the sense of a political union, but one that was 
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fundamentally spiritual and, hence, cultural: the redemptive discourse of ‘Christendom’. 
Here, in particular, we can see how the Old Western via media had a very practical and 
relevant application in attempting to forge a middle way between nationalism and 
internationalism. Without a sense of spirit or common culture, the only union possible in 
Europe was a political union, they argued. This is an essential Old Western viewpoint, as I 
think has been shown in each chapter, always approaching worldly circumstance in 
reference to a spiritual reality; without which, it was pointed out, culture would be drawn 
toward a moral, political and imaginative imbalance tantamount to modernity itself. In this 
sense, too, if modernism is to be defined as a critique of modernity, then the Old Western 
Men must be admitted as a legitimate and significant modernism that believed it had 
diagnosed modernity correctly and was itself in possession of a proposed antidote: a 
restoration of a religious conception of the universe.  
 
Of course, what underpins this perceived antidote throughout the thesis is the centrality of 
religion, especially Christianity, in the life of individuals as well as societies. I think that, in 
part, the Old Western Men were a necessary response to a question that was increasingly 
deserving of an answer. If modernity was simply another expression for secularism, could 
modernity make a success of it? The Old Western Men exhibited, either implicitly or 
explicitly, a palpable, and I think sensible, scepticism toward modernity and its champions. 
While such writers as Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc tended to underestimate the problems 
of the past, as well as its viciousness, they were, as J. W. Burrow identified, ‘a repudiation 
of Whiggish complacency about national history’, but also modernity in general, rejecting 
what Dawson dubbed the modern religion of ‘Progress’. 
 
In the case of this Ph.D., covering a cultural mode of response as broad as the Old Western 
Men necessarily entailed a highly selective approach in order to illustrate its depth; while 
not taking away from its apparent breadth. Since this thesis has focused for the most part 
on the written word, however, the fine arts and music have been not nearly so prominent. 
This is a limitation that purchased a positive good elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is still a 
limitation. In terms of what this thesis has sought to highlight, the areas of the arts that I 
have neglected do beg further exploration. In particular, the genesis of this entire project 
is located in art history and in a ‘spirit of place’ that led to a rather more comprehensive 
conception of spirit, or religion, as a dynamic whole, informing one side of a divide that I 
identify as the Old Western Men. Further studies, especially in this area of twentieth 
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century art in Britain, would serve to supplement, as well as underscore, this identification. 
In doing so, this would also allow future scholars to view British artists through a lens that, 
far from isolating them as an eccentric outgrowth, would actually bring them into 
communion with a broader revival of spirit within the arts generally, but also amongst 
writers and historians too, such as Dawson and Chesterton.  
 
Another limitation that should be noted here is a possible ambiguity in terms of whether 
this revival of spirit was exclusively Christian. In employing that notion of a second 
‘consciously Christian’ revival of interest in the Middle Ages in the twentieth century, I have 
courted Christian, and especially Roman Catholic, intellectuals in particular. However, by 
also adopting C. S. Lewis’s term the ‘Old Western Men’ I have also attempted to go beyond 
the recent identification of a Catholic literary revival. While this thesis may, indeed, be 
considered to be, as I think it is, a rather more thorough examination of Michael 
Alexander’s conception of a twentieth century medieval revival, it is more inclusive in the 
sense that I believe it was really a Western revival, of which the Christian intellectual 
tradition is, of course, a major constituent. As I stated at the outset of this Ph.D., the 
purpose of these chapters has been to define, in particular, what is meant by ‘Western’ in 
Lewis’s phrase the Old Western Men – not necessarily what it means today but what it 
meant to him and his fellow compatriots. What it meant was an essential via media that 
attempted to forward a balance between a spiritual and material conception of the 
universe, of history itself and the vital application of the imagination as a sort of spirit itself 
in a post-Cartesian vacuum that was synonymous with modernity, one that they took to 
be, by definition, materialistic and, hence, irreligious and historically without precedent.  
 
While this thesis supplements the recent contributions of such scholars as Joseph Pearce, 
whose focus has been concentrated for the most part on Catholic intellectuals, I believe 
that my major contribution here has been to place this grouping within a far broader 
scepticism toward progress and modernity, noted, for example, by Malcolm Cowley. As he 
argued, T. S. Eliot’s work The Waste Land appeared to mark a growing division in 1922 
between what Eliot dubbed the ‘real conflict […] between the theistic and the aesthetic 
faith’. My chapters have gone some way to establish this conflict as a matter of fact – or at 
least one side of it, mirroring Hunter’s own notion of a culture war in modern-day America; 
though much more work is required to give definition to my divide and root it in a larger 
collective. There are, however, a number of queries that result from such an affirmation of 
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Cowley’s 1934 assessment; questions that have been beyond the scope of this thesis to 
answer, though they deserve future attention. Taking the year 1900 as a rough marker for 
when this conflict arose, particularly in the output of Chesterton – no small figure, as we 
have seen – to what extent, if any, did the trauma of the First World War serve to 
accentuate and acerbate this division, particularly amongst the second generation of Old 
Western Men, such as Eliot and Dawson. There is little doubt that Chesterton and his great 
friend Belloc, the first generation, were very much at odds with what they perceived to be 
the Prussian ‘enemy’. But this thesis has also revealed a myriad of responses to twentieth 
century events and phenomena, which for all Old Western Men appeared to be a 
consequence of a broader spiritual crisis: modernity. In this sense, the Spanish Civil War 
was for the poet Roy Campbell, for instance, a physical manifestation of a seething 
antagonism between materialism, on the one hand, and the spiritual, on the other. 
Suburban sprawl and the apparent scouring of the Sussex countryside was also taken to be 
another sign, being one and the same with a ‘loss’ of what Peter L. Berger has termed the 
‘sacred canopy’. Another point that deserves some study is the legacy of the Old Western 
Men themselves, who, it might be said, died a strange death post-1970, in the sense that, 
in Britain at least, they failed to replicate themselves in a next generation of fellows. There 
is a parallel here, in Callum Brown’s notion of the death of ‘discursive’ Christianity in Britain, 
of which the Old Western Men were, by definition, I argue, part of. While it may be said 
that Chesterton had successors in Dawson and Lewis, it is a struggle to name their progeny; 
unless we cross the Atlantic and turn our attention toward American conservatism, where 
Russell Kirk and John Lukacs may be said to represent a third generation of Old Western 
Men, taking part themselves in Hunter’s stated ‘culture war’. Indeed, Dawson appeared to 
prophesy this in 1959, speaking to an audience at Boston College, noting that when he 
began his career ‘Belloc and Chesterton and my eyes were fixed on Europe and the 
European tradition. But to-day I have come to feel that it is in this country that the fate of 
Christendom will be decided.’55 Future research might be directed toward establishing a 
line of lineage, then, a self-acknowledged line of descent, perhaps, connecting conservative 
intellectuals in America with both Chesterton’s and Dawson’s respective generations. 
 
It is essential to underline the point, in conclusion here, that the Old Western Men were 
characterised by a historically-informed reluctance to conform to the belief that to be 
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‘modern’ was axiomatically progressive. This is a perception that should be given more 
attention, since what has characterised recent studies of modernism, for instance, in 
reference to the past, is modernism’s attempt to reconcile itself with that past. In England, 
this has often gone hand in hand with a specifically ‘national’ past, in such works as The 
Geographies of Englishness: Landscape and the National Past, 1880-1940 (2002) and 
Romantic Moderns: English Writers, Artists and the Imagination from Virginia Woolf to John 
Piper (2010). Although it might sound counterintuitive – since the only ‘modernist’ in this 
thesis is Eliot, in the aesthetic sense – if modernism, by definition, entails ‘oppositionism’ 
then the Old Western Men constitute a purer manifestation of modernism than the 
attempt at reconciliation considered in the two previously mentioned studies. Although it 
may have vexed Cowley, Eliot’s high modernism was entirely of a piece with his evident 
hostility toward modernity. Lewis, too, though he was antagonistic toward Eliot’s aesthetic 
modernism, was nevertheless of the same mind as Eliot in his antagonism toward the 
‘modern’ considered more broadly. Indeed, once we go beyond aesthetics a realignment 
occurs, particularly in the case of Eliot, whose view of religion and Christianity met with 
such an unreceptive response from Virginia Woolf. Future academic studies in modernism 
should consider whether the failure to acknowledge a modernism that is a religious mode 
of response to the present in the form of a critique, as Cowley saw it, has skewed our 
perception of modernism as a whole. What is perhaps required now is a concentration on 
the geographies of Christendom, indeed. For what underscored the period 1900 to 1970 
was, I propose, a deeper and possibly far more consequential antagonism: that of the divide 
between the religious and the irreligious.  
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